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

SPECIAL ISSUE

NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW

FOREWORD

The *Naval War College Review* was established in 1948 by the Chief of Naval Personnel in order that officers of the Navy and Marine Corps might receive some of the educational benefits available to the resident students at the Naval War College. The forthright and candid views of the authors are presented for the professional education of the readers. Articles published are related to the academic and professional activities of the Naval War College. They are drawn from a wide variety of sources in order to inform, to stimulate and challenge the readers, and to serve as a catalyst for new ideas. Articles are selected primarily on the basis of their intellectual and literary merits, usefulness and interest to servicewide readership and timeliness. Reproduction of articles in the *Review* requires the specific approval of the Editor, *Naval War College Review* and the respective author. *Review* content is open to citation and other reference, in accordance with accepted academic research methods. The thoughts and opinions expressed in this publication are those of the authors and are not necessarily those of the Navy Department or of the Naval War College.

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The editorial offices of the *Naval War College Review* are located at the Naval War College, Newport, R.I. 02840. Published quarterly, distribution is generally limited to: U.S. Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard commands and activities; Regular and Reserve officers of the U.S. Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard of the grade 0-3 and senior; military officers of other services, foreign officers, and civilians having a present or previous affiliation with the Naval War College; and selected U.S. Government officials. Correspondence concerning *Review* matters should be directed to its editorial offices.

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PRESIDENT'S NOTES

Twenty-five years ago Rear Adm. Henry E. Eccles retired from active naval service. In the 30 years following his graduation from the U.S. Naval Academy, Admiral Eccles spent 12 years in submarines, and several years in battleships, cruisers, and destroyers before he took command of U.S.S. *John D. Edwards* in 1941. Attached to the Asiatic Fleet, *Edwards* saw considerable combat action including the battle of the Java Sea. During World War II, Commander, and later Captain, Eccles was deeply involved in base development and logistics planning and operations for the Pacific campaigns. He commanded the battleship U.S.S. *Washington* in 1946. In recognition of his valor and distinguished service, he was awarded the Navy Cross, the Silver Star, the Legion of Merit and the Netherlands Order of the Bronze Cross. He retired in 1952.

His naval career has been in the highest traditions of the service. However, this issue of the *Naval War College Review* is dedicated to him not for this service while on active duty, but for his career following this alleged retirement. Since 1952 (incidentally, the year in which I was commissioned) he has given unstintingly of his time, effort, concern, and ideas to the Naval War College, its students, faculty and friends. His record of accomplishment has been extraordinary.

His considerable energies have been directed toward the study and exposition of military theory—not an impractical, esoteric concept or even a prescriptive how-to-do-it checkoff list, but an approach in the classic sense. To him, it is a means to understand complex phenomena, to sharpen our minds so that we may approach problems intelligently, and to distinguish the important from the trivial. Among other things, he has conducted seminars, delivered lectures, written books, articles and informal papers and consulted with students and faculty. His writings and lectures are consistently marked by terse, pithy sentences, sometimes describing complex ideas, sometimes stating obvious but overlooked truths. They are always well organized, to the point and, above all, stimulating.

As valuable as they may be, the most precious gift he has given us is himself. His energy and enthusiasm match and usually exceed that of men 40 years his junior. He has been a trusted confidant to numerous presidents of the Naval War College and a prod, stimulus and inspiration to countless men and women here and elsewhere. We dedicate this issue to him in grateful appreciation.

In this special issue, therefore, we have included personal statements from Adm. Arleigh Burke, Ambassador

Thomas S. Estes and Professor Lyman B. Kirkpatrick, Jr. We also have included a recent paper by Admiral Eccles on military unionization and a bibliography of his published and some of his unpublished works to illustrate our point. We are fortunate to have Edwin Newman write on the use and misuse of the English language, one of Admiral Eccles' favorite topics. The remaining articles cover a wide variety of topics that illustrate the catholicity of Admiral Eccles' own interests.

H. Hardisty
Rear Admiral, U.S. Navy
President, Naval War College

HENRY E. ECCLES

REAR ADMIRAL, U.S. NAVY (RET.)

This special issue is in honor of RADM Henry E. Eccles on the occasion of the 25th anniversary of his retirement from active naval service. We were delighted with the enthusiastic response of those of his friends who were asked to contribute articles. The first three contributions were submitted by men who have known Admiral Eccles for many years and who hold him in great esteem and affection. The diversity of their backgrounds is good indication of the diversity of Admiral Eccles' own interests. These articles show the extent of the influence of Admiral Eccles' ideas. Admiral Arleigh Burke, our most distinguished naval officer today, was Chief of Naval Operations from 1955 to 1961. He has known Admiral Eccles since they were both midshipmen at the Naval Academy. Ambassador Thomas S. Estes was a career Foreign Service Officer who served for several years as ambassador to the Republic of Upper Volta and afterwards as State Department Advisor to the President, Naval War College. Lyman B. Kirkpatrick, Jr. had a successful career in journalism and then with the Central Intelligence Agency, before becoming Professor of Political Science at Brown University. [Ed.]

MY FRIEND HENRY E. ECCLES

The Naval War College has been in historic Newport on glorious Narragansett Bay for almost a century. Its mission has remained constant, but the faculty and students stay for only short periods—and most of the population of Newport ebb and flow even faster. Yet, the Naval War College has been remarkably stable with all the frequent changes.

The reason for its steady improvement and staunch endurance is the wisdom and understanding of its successive presidents of the value of the advice and judgment of a few extraordinary naval officers who have voluntarily dedicated themselves to the good of that college. The first was Stephen B. Luce, followed by men such as Alfred Thayer Mahan and William S. Sims. For the last 25 years, that man has been Henry Eccles.

Aside from the Naval War College, Henry Eccles has four interests: logistics; the science of command; his gracious wife, Isabel; and more logistics. What experience did this son of an Episcopalian minister have that would cause him to be known as Mr. Logistics? If Henry were older, we might think back to the early survival kits known as Missionary Barrels.

However, he probably became mildly interested in that dull but critical subject in his 4 years at the Naval Academy when it was correctly known as the best trade school in the United States for the best profession in the world.

At that time there was a rigid, fixed engineering curriculum and the only social studies were those conducted by Professor Bell, the dancing instructor. Henry narrowly escaped joining those few midshipmen who bilged waltzing. Maybe in his years as a young officer in those smelly R and S boats, in which there were few safety devices except the skill and reliability of men, he came to realize the absolute necessity in a ship at sea of having the proper gear on hand and all of it workable.

It was not surprising then to find Henry ashore in repair facilities and engineering duties in the Bureau of Ships. He went on to his graduate degree in engineering at Columbia University.

July 1940 found Henry on the China Station in command of an old World War I four stacker, *John D. Edwards.* River pirates and unfriendly shore batteries occasionally punctuated the peace and quiet, requiring Commander Eccles to exercise great alertness and his 4" guns. War came and the China Station ships were recalled to the Philippines. By February 1942, *John D. Edwards* was in the seas of Indonesia, fighting desperately to stem the powerful Japanese drives to the south. She was one of those gallant old destroyers whose torpedoes wreaked considerable damage on a much more powerful force.

John D. Edwards eventually made her way to Perth and Henry to the Adelphi Hotel along with some of his wartime associates. In those early desperate battles, he already knew the truth of Napoleon's old maxim "for want of a nail . . ."

After a stint in Base Development Planning in the Navy Department, he put into practice his logistic ideas as Head, Advanced Base Section, Service Force, U.S. Pacific Fleet under that other cagey logistician, Adm. "Wild Bill" Calhoun. He sharpened his practical knowledge of getting the right material to the right place on time and reinforced his conviction of the great weight of logistics in successful war operations.

After the war, Henry had his opportunity to do something about his beloved specialty of logistics. He established the Logistics Department at the Naval War College. Here was the welcome chance to teach others that the soft underbelly of warfare is that prosaic, unpopular art of adequate logistics. His students liked his vigorous, hard-hitting lectures, and some of them may have even comprehended their significance. At least they paid attention. Under Henry Eccles, they'd better.

Then Henry went to CINCNELM and Allied Forces, Southern Europe and, as you'd expect, to head the logistic section. Here he whetted his skill on European logistic systems as compared to ours—and helped improve them all.

When he retired from the Navy, Henry was not a man to abandon a lifelong interest so he joined the George Washington University Logistics Research Project, and since he retired in Newport, he kept a fatherly eye on the Naval War College. Fortunately for the Navy, his keen interest in and great contributions to the War College were appreciated by the leaders of that College, and his worthwhile efforts were promoted.

Henry Eccles' vast experience in the two fundamentals of naval warfare, the arts of command and supply, was the foundation for his great work in the last quarter century—but this was not the only, and probably not the most important, factor for his great success. He provides the inspiration of unbounded energy applied nearly wholly to working. He likes to work. He even gave up golf because logistics was more fun—and maybe because he wasn't very good at golf. Above all, he is a practical fellow. He is not averse to new theories, but uniquely among professorial types, he accepts only theories which have a good probability of working. He analyzes new concepts completely and tries them out on a small scale, thereby avoiding the prevalent custom of making mistakes on a colossal scale. His demand for excellent performance is surpassed by his more insistent demand for reliability. He is impatient with wand-waving enthusiasts who ignore the actual situation and base their solution to the problem on what they wish the situation to be.

Henry Eccles, the man who can write as well as fight, and who sometimes seems to do both simultaneously, probably has several other good qualities. Few men have been so steadfastly influential and gained so much admiration and affection from their associates.

Arleigh Burke

ARLEIGH BURKE
Admiral, U.S. Navy (Ret.)

"RAMB" HENRY E. ECCLES

Throughout the history of the U.S. Navy, marines have muttered their opinions about certain admirals (but never loud enough to be heard) and some have even put their opinions in writing (but never for publication). It was with delight, therefore, that this former marine accepted—indeed, seized—the opportunity to put in writing the opinions he has expressed from time to time about one admiral, without any concern about the consequences that he might have endured a few years ago.

Admiral Eccles deservedly enjoys a high reputation as an expert on strategy and logistics. He should have a reputation for something else, about which the less said the better in the days when he was an aspiring young naval officer. Today it can be mentioned out loud.

Those who have heard his lectures or engaged in what can be a lively conversation with him, or who have read any of his published works, know well that he is a firm advocate of civil-military relations. This is not so surprising, perhaps, when it is remembered that logistics, at least, requires an understanding of the economy and may call for some contact with civilian economists. When it comes to political theory and political scientists, however, that was something else again a quarter of a century—and

more–ago. Yet here was Henry Eccles contending that long ago that military theory had to be related to economic and political theory. This is quite evident in the Preface to his book *Military Concepts and Philosophy* which he describes as an outgrowth of lectures on strategy and logistics given during the period 1953 to 1963, and of prior books and articles.

Not being an economist, and having given up studies in strategy and logistics after transferring from the Marine Corps to the Diplomatic Corps, I will approach this delicate subject from the viewpoint of a political scientist.

The admiral also asserts in the Preface to his book that rather than trying to write comprehensively on military, economic and political theory, he confined his political and economic remarks to a few areas of overlap. He hoped that in doing so he would provide a "useful link for political scientists and economists." Insofar as political theory is concerned, the facts prove otherwise. He has managed one way or another in his own words to include in his "remarks" nearly every element involved in the formulation and execution of foreign policy. References to geography, natural resources, industrial establishments, people, social structure, political institutions and even diplomacy will be found in his writings when military-civil relations are being discussed.

In short, Admiral Eccles should also enjoy a high reputation as a political as well as a military expert now that one can be both without jeopardizing professional standing, career or family. Having served through at least part of the earlier period when Admiral Eccles was harboring thoughts about military-political coordination, contrary to custom in *either* the military or diplomatic establishments, I will cite a few examples, some hopefully excusably personal, to substantiate my views about the admiral.

Going back a bit beyond the period under discussion, Frederick H. Hartmann recalls in his *The New Age of American Diplomacy* that a Council of National Defense was established in 1916 and that it had been suggested by the Naval War College and discussed in Congress as early as 1911. He quotes Admiral Mahan as stating that there was little appreciation of relations between diplomacy and the Army and Navy. Hartmann notes that the Secretary of War supported the bill but did not include the Secretary of State.

The situation had not improved a war later. After Pearl Harbor the staff of the Legation at Bangkok, Thailand, was interned by the Japanese forces. It was then learned that the Military and Naval Attachés had received instructions just prior to the attack to destroy their codes, but not to inform the American Minister. Previously the staff of the Legation and the attachés collaborated in a study predicting the invasion of Thailand from Indochina in the first 2 weeks of December. The study was never acknowledged by the Department of State nor was it ever referred to the War Department so far as I was able to discern when I examined the notations on the original document many years later.

Ambassador Robert Murphy recalls in his book *Diplomat Among Warriors* being briefed by President Roosevelt on his secret mission to General

Eisenhower's headquarters in London to help in planning the landings in North Africa, probably the first instance of modern joint military-diplomatic planning. The President warned Murphy not to tell anyone in the State Department about his mission or the plans for the landings. As a good Foreign Service officer, Murphy pointed out that this could put him in an awkward position with Secretary of State Hull. The President told him not to worry about it, that the Secretary would be informed a day or so before the landings.

Ambassador Murphy, who went to London disguised as a lieutenant colonel, writes that in the first days at the Pentagon and in London he became aware of "my own appalling ignorance of military matters." He was a key figure in the first major American offensive of the war but states, "I did not know the first principles of military science." He points out that his military colleagues had the benefit of instruction in political problems at the Army War College and other military schools.

As the junior Foreign Service officer on Ambassador Murphy's staff at Allied Force Headquarters in Algeria and later in Italy, I saw at firsthand the difficulties that arose when political problems had to be solved, from those at the top involving Darlan, Giraud and de Gaulle, down to those at my level. For example, the treatment of prisoners of war, governed by the Geneva Convention, became a political issue on one memorable occasion. At that time I was assigned to accompany Swiss inspectors, who had diplomatic status, and who inspected our camps to ensure compliance with the Convention. I was instructed to report on the results of each inspection. At one camp the senior German officer charged that mass punishment was being imposed for infractions by unidentified individuals. In my attempts to get the facts and mitigate any adverse repercussions for American prisoners in German hands, I (in civilian clothes, of course) was roundly rebuffed by the American officer commanding the camp. Thanks to the sympathetic understanding of the Swiss which gave time for a quick call for help and equally quick action between Ambassador Murphy's and General Eisenhower's staff, the matter was "clarified" and the Swiss report dealt lightly with an inadvertent disciplinary action caused by a misunderstanding—or diplomatic phrases to that effect—which prevented any repercussions.

In another instance, during an exchange of sick and wounded prisoners, the Algiers Port Commander understandably objected violently to having the Swedish exchange ship *Gripsholm* lighted up like a Christmas tree when the harbor and city were under a strict blackout. Incidentally, this was the same *Gripsholm* which was used in the first exchange of interned diplomatic personnel, happily including me among them. The Port Commander, a British admiral, ordered that the lights be extinguished. The *Gripsholm's* captain refused, citing the international agreement under which he was operating and which guaranteed the safety of his ship. An aide telephoned me. I quickly saw that I was getting into rather deep water and reported the problem to my superiors, recommending the captain's position be upheld. Telegrams went to London and Washington. London supported the American position that the lights must stay on. Washington supported the British admiral. This, at least, illustrated the allied gauge of the responses. Finally a compromise was

reached. It was agreed that on the basis of the several nightly air raids the enemy had a pretty good idea of the location of the harbor so the *Gripsholm* was anchored farther out with her lights on.

Gradually the assistance that could be given the military services by the Political Advisor became recognized and "POLAD" became a special staff section of the headquarters. The POLAD staff in turn gradually began to understand the responsibilities of military command and how to help their military colleagues by going through proper channels. The mutual cooperation and understanding brought about some interesting and unusual situations.

Our daughter was born in the WAC hospital at Oran, Algeria, thanks to this kind of cooperation, and today she shows her children her GI dog tags which describe her as "Honorary WAC No. 1". When she was discharged from the hospital there was a small problem with regard to the amount to be paid for her rations, and another at the military airport with regard to two civilians trying to return to Algiers on one set of travel orders, but these were resolved in that same spirit of cooperation.

As combat operations increased it was discovered that a number of GIs were not American citizens, in spite of the fact that they were supposed to have been naturalized before leaving the United States. As a result of an agreement among the War, Justice and State Departments, Foreign Service officers were appointed as Special Naturalization Examiners with power to naturalize any alien in the U.S. Armed Forces who had entered the United States legally. These naturalizations were to take place in the "repell-depots" (Replenishment Depots) far from combat zones, but exceptions had to be made eventually. I received one of the appointments and found myself on Anzio Beachhead where I naturalized 112 GIs and one Army nurse under enemy artillery fire.

Out of the crucible of these early trials and tribulations came the experience that set the pattern for solving political-military problems in Italy, in occupied Europe and later in NATO.

It took a little longer for the successful military-civilian relationships established in a military setting to penetrate and become acceptable in Washington. I can recall that as late as 1949-50 a colonel and I at the Pentagon carefully followed instructions in communicating on matters of mutual official interest up and back down through the hierarchy of our two great departments—after practically clandestine telephone calls and meetings to get the job done—as we had done previously abroad. The election of General Eisenhower as President and the reorganization of the Defense Department helped open the way for more direct communication and, eventually, the happy situation that exists today. Some 15 military and civilian officers exchange desks for 2-year periods; civilian officers spend an academic year at the war colleges and an ambassador is Deputy Commandant at the National War College; several military officers spend an academic year at the State Department's Senior Seminar in Foreign Policy, the Department's highest level of training; and several ambassadors have had the good fortune

to be assigned to the staffs of the presidents of the war colleges. (I was happy to have been one of them.)

None of this is intended to suggest that there are not differences of views or political or personality clashes among the professionals of both services. There *should* be differences of views and the offer of several options in the formulation of foreign policy which, in spite of opinions to the contrary, is only as effective as the military support behind it. It may be noted that the new Secretary of State, Cyrus Vance, testifying before the Senate Foreign Operations Committee last February, just after assuming his new duties, discussed military assistance and told the Committee that the Department of State would join with the Department of Defense in supplying any additional information or data the Committee might desire. We have come a long way from the 1916 Council of National Defense.

What all this *is* intended to suggest, however, is that what Admiral Eccles foresaw years ago has come to pass. Yet he still reiterates the need for civilian-military coordination which is summed up in the following excerpt from a recent draft manuscript:

> As in all important problems, military problems are interdisciplinary.
>
> To understand military power in a free society requires in essence a thorough grasp of civil-military relations and of the reciprocal responsibilities between civilian executives and military professionals.
>
> Many military professionals have been so narrow in their experience and study that, until they go to one of the War Colleges, they remain ignorant of politics. In the same way, many political and social scientists remain equally ignorant of military realities.

If no other evidence were available, this passage alone should substantiate the charge that Admiral Eccles should also enjoy, openly, a high reputation as a political as well as a military expert, and not try modestly to hide his expertise under the guise of some political remarks in a few areas of "overlap." He has indeed forged a far more useful link between political scientists and economists than he himself realizes—or would admit.

To predict how economists would make use of that linkage is, of course, not really possible, given their models, linear equations and graphs. But political scientists with their intuitive approach to matters of serious import would probably agree that an admiral with such an appreciation of the political factor in military planning should be suitably recognized.

In view of the fact that several admirals have been appointed to serve as ambassadors, and in spite of the fact that for some unknown reason no ambassador has been appointed to serve as an admiral, it is believed that most political scientists would agree that Admiral Eccles should have been one of those recognized by such an appointment. Since that does not seem feasible at the moment, an alternative has been voted unanimously by a committee of one to appoint him an honorary member of the fraternity of retired

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ambassadors by changing his rank from RADM to RAMB for the purpose of this issue of the *Naval War College Review*. This has been done on one condition, however; he must continue to be a retired ambassador just as long as he has been a retired admiral.

Congratulations to RAMB Henry Eccles.



THOMAS S. ESTES
Ambassador (Ret.)

ECCLES STRATEGY ON STRATEGY

To many persons throughout the world, military and civilian alike, Henry Eccles' name is synonymous with logistics. He has carried the message to all who would hear his lectures or read his books and articles that you cannot fight a war or even make a show of force unless you have the logistics to do so. His book *Logistics in the National Defense* is replete with illustrations of belated or nonexistent logistical planning adversely affecting military operations. In an article published in this journal in March 1969, "Suez 1956–Some Military Lessons", he made the point that Eden and Pineau made the decision to attack Egypt in order to regain control of the Suez Canal without the vaguest idea of whether their military forces had the logistic capability to accomplish their objective.

One of Admiral Eccles obvious crusades is to give logistics its place in the hierarchy of considerations fundamental to higher command. In his *Command Logistics*[1] prepared for the use of the Naval Warfare Class in 1956 he uses an illustration of "The Structure and Relationship of the Military Factors in War" in which a ceiling lamp reflects *Intelligence* on the interlocking circles of *Strategy* and *Logistics*, which are on the upper plane, and *Tactics*, which is on the lower plane.[2] (Naturally, this endears him to this author who has been more parochial in preaching that *intelligence* is a vital consideration in all command decisions.)

Henry Eccles has worked long and hard to convince the students in defense colleges of the importance of logistics and of the necessary qualities of a logistician. If the number of generations of students are an indication of an educator's impact, it should be noted that he organized the first formal War College course in naval logistics in 1947. Thirty years later he still is lecturing on "Principles of Logistics" at the Naval War College.

He reminds his students that:

> The logistician . . . should be well grounded in the humanities and in ecology, for otherwise he will lack the sense of human values which determine ultimate objectives and thus transcend the routine business and technical considerations in major logistical decisions.[3]

One of the best known of the Eccles' principles is: "Logistics is the bridge between the nation's economy and the tactical operations of its combat forces." He usually follows this dictum by emphasizing that the logistic system must be in harmony with the economic system of the nation and with the tactical concepts and environment of the combat units, and by reminding us that economic factors limit the combat forces which can be employed. In his Suez article he points out that the British and French had fine combat troops, but no landing craft to transport them to the combat zone.

Admiral Eccles not only is a scholar but he is also a preacher. In a lecture to the U. S. Air Force School of Logistics on 2 April 1959 on "Logistics Philosophy" he opened with this statement:

> The problems of national security are so complex, so urgent and so truly vital that we dare not be superficial. In addition, we must realize that vested interests frequently influence people in their comments and actions relative to national defense. These are hard to identify and, if one attempts to do this specifically, one may do grave injustice to a sincere individual who may not even be aware of unusual bias. Nevertheless, it is a fact that few people are both clear and objective in their judgments. It is also true that a N. I. H. (Not Invented Here) attitude sometimes colors the advice our senior officials receive from their subordinates.
>
> It is therefore particularly important to improve the perspective of those who are involved in logistics studies and research because this is the only way that the relative importance of the many individual facets of this enormous subject can be judged. I believe that a sound broad philosophy is essential to a good perspective.[4]

As a preacher must set the example, so does Henry Eccles. Later, in the same lecture, he said: "Perhaps the most important element of my own specific logistic philosophy is the conviction that the study of logistics has no real meaning unless it is related to the study of war, or human conflict as a whole."

Thus he leads his students into the importance of strategy, and, perhaps even more important, to the necessity for the development of theory.

He points out that: "Strategic plans are mere dreams until there is assurance that they can and will be logistically supported."[5] To this he adds his definition of strategy:

> Strategy is the comprehensive direction of power. Tactics is its immediate application. It (strategy) is a type of direction which

takes into account the multitude of possible enemy counteractions and thus it becomes a means of control. It is this element of control which is the essence of strategy: Control being the element which differentiates true strategic action from a haphazard series of improvisations.[6]

As an intense student of warfare, Henry Eccles is an authority on "improvisations" and on how many times the fates of nations have hung on the delicate thread of a "jury-rigged" operation rather than a well-developed concept. Therefore, he emphasizes the need of theory to provide the base for military planning. He writes: " . . . the development of a comprehensive theory of war is essential if we are to deal wisely with the problems posed by human conflict."[7] And he uses the best possible model to emphasize the absolute necessity for theory: " . . . the true intellectual challenge posed by the political-military success of the Communists is to evolve an equally effective theory."[8]

He argues for the importance of theory obviously because of a conviction that too many officers prefer practical application and action. Admiral Eccles comments: " . . . many practical military leaders and even scholars frequently consider military theory to be an unrealistic abstraction." He continues:

> Theory does not pretend to solve problems: it sheds light on problems and thus can provide guidance for those who have the responsibility for solving them.
>
> In the application of theory to an actual problem of life, the responsible executive must make many compromises between conflicting optimum solutions of parts of the problem. Thus, in effect, he must decide when and to what degree it is appropriate for one theoretical consideration to overbalance another. This requires experience and common sense plus a lively feeling of personal responsibility for the results of the decision.
>
> Very rarely is a creative military theorist competent to make specific military plans, for very rarely does he have the same kind and urgency of responsibility as the high military executive and commander. However, if the responsible executive does not understand these theoretical considerations he will be relying on guesses where he should rely on knowledge.

And finally:

> It is important to recognize that a theory of war is something more than a mere description of war at a given stage. Theory does not content itself merely with retracing the factual state of affairs. Its task is to penetrate to the inner structure of warfare, to its component parts and to the interrelations existing between them.[9]

And to this he adds an important commentary in a short paper of 26 October 1974, on *Military Fundamentals*, saying:

> The *fundamentals are fundamental for that very reason*—they do not vary with the opinions or practices of any bureaucracy but depend for

their validity on the course of events in human conflict and the cause and effect relation determined as far as possible by logical analysis of history throughout the world.

As a teacher whose mission is to make military men theorists as well as fighters, Admiral Eccles warns his students–and we are all in that category–of the perils of sophistry and self-seekers. He writes:

> Since there is a natural tendency in all bureaucracies to restrict access to knowledge of faults to small "need to know" groups, and since persons who "need to know" generally have little time to dwell upon theory and its educational implications, a very special effort is required if military education is to reflect military reality. Yet this is a vital element of progress, for a continuing interaction between military theory and military reality is an essential element in military research and education.[10]

Further, he *repeatedly emphasizes* (his own words) "that all the substantive elements in the entire military problem of creating, supporting, and employing combat forces be given balanced and coherent consideration in military research and education," and that "The military professionals have an obligation to furnish the intellectual leadership in these areas, particularly in establishing the coherence and balance in both fields."[11]

Henry Eccles is true to his own word in furnishing intellectual leadership. In the Foreword to *Logistics in the National Defense,* Henry Wriston, the former president of Brown University and later President of the American Assembly at Columbia, wrote:

> It is rare to find a professional in any field as perceptive of the propriety of methods alien to his own, which nevertheless impinge upon his field of thought and action. It suggests, at least by inference, that reciprocal sensitiveness to the military ideas and methods upon the part of the civilian would be welcome, and in the national interest.

Dr. Wriston proceeds to comment on the book:

> The passages upon "duplication," "waste," competition among the armed forces are luminous as well as frank and realistic. The endless arguments about centralization and decentralization are reviewed fairly–and with a tolerant spirit. The absolute necessity for compromise, for cooperation upon the human level, get great stress. It is hopeful of less friction to see such perceptive treatment of the age-old dilemma between design of a flawless organizational structure and the personal relationships which can make the theoretically poor organization work tolerably well, and a perfect structure fall flat.
>
> To one trained in the academic disciplines and a member of academic communities all my working life, it is music to hear theory well spoken of. Theory is not just dreams or wishful thinking. It is the orderly interpretation of accumulated experience and its formal

enunciation as a guide to future intelligent action to better that experience . . ."

To a layman reading in a professional field one other essential quality marks this volume. When a theory has been expounded there are illustrations to make clear both its relevances and its significances. This volume is based on wide reading--as the notes amply demonstrate. It is founded upon severe analytical and sternly disciplined thought. It is filled with material which can only have been the fruit of long, first-hand experience. It is made more instructive by historical instances outside the author's own observation but available to him in the voluminous literature.

In his conclusion Dr. Wriston says, "Finally, this is an intensely logical book." This is high praise from one of the most respected academicians of his time. But to those who have been closely associated with Henry Eccles it will come as no surprise.

As one who had the honor to occupy a chair on the faculty of the Naval War College, I look back on the many benefits of that association. One of the real pleasures was the visits from Henry Eccles. I well remember the "barroom" doors of Luce Hall being pushed in; Henry taking a quick look to see if we had visitors; coming in and dropping a paper on the desk with an almost standard opening question: "What do you think of this?"

When I completed my year in the Nimitz Chair in the summer of 1972 I took with me a folder labelled "Henry Eccles Articles" which occupies an important place in my library and it is readily accessible. A glance through that file reveals the remarkable diversity and broad interests of the man. One item is a letter from Norman Cousins, the editor of *Saturday Review*, acknowledging and commenting on an Eccles "Letter to the Editor." The editorial to which Admiral Eccles took exception, "Toward A Military Welfare State?"[12] suggested *more* civilian control of the military. Henry Eccles comments were direct! " . . . . I think an excellent case can be made for the contention that many of our worst mistakes have been the result of the unwise exercise of power by civilians in positions of great military authority."

This was only the shot across the bow. Further on in the letter he says:

Certainly, the budgetary sleight of hand which concealed the true extent of the military deficits in the spring of 1966 and thus contributed to our current inflation was the act of civilians in government, not the military.

In the light of this record, I am curious to know what civilian-run institutions should serve as models for an improved Department of Defense. Would you suggest General Motors or Ford Motors? I.B.M.? United States Postal Service? The Department of Justice? The City of New York? The Penn Central Railroad? The planners of the new civic center in Albany? Or the architects and builders of the Senate and House Office Buildings in Washington? Consolidated Edison? Our Universities?

If this salvo did not score direct hits, at least the editor was splashed. It was only the beginning. The admiral continues:

> My twenty-five years of intensive study and teaching of military history, theory, and principles suggests that our troubles are caused by first, the complex intractable nature of modern human conflict; second, the tremendous domestic and frequently partisan political pressure exerted on the Department of Defense; third, the neglect of sound, thoroughly documented military principles; and fourth, the pervasive human factors of short-sightedness, superficiality, ignorance, arrogance and selfishness which are evident at least as much in our civilian leaders and institutions as they are among the military. While some benefit undoubtedly can come from institutional reform in the military, the precise nature of such reform is not clear. Too much emphasis on such generalization as "civilian control" can easily obscure and distract us from more important fundamental matters.

This was a direct hit, but three more blows were still to come:

> We need more wisdom in the manner in which civilian control is exercised. If civilian control extends to detailed control of operations, the resulting ineptitude and confusion detracts from the effectiveness of the control being exercised in the appropriate areas and thus becomes *self-defeating both in the area of control and in the accomplishment of the political purposes which military effort must support. This is one of the major lessons of the Vietnam tragedy.* (Admiral Eccles' underlining.)
>
> In other words, civilians who exercise control must understand the nature, behavior, and purposes of the systems and military forces which they control.

Also in my Eccles file are drafts of chapters on projected books, a review of *The Nerves of Government* by Karl W. Deutsch; a short piece entitled "Notes on Military Research and Discipline"; one headed "Notes On The Pentagon Papers"; some thoughts on logistic support of the forces in Vietnam; "Further Notes on Discipline"; and many others.

Prolific is the word for Henry Eccles. When I asked the assistance of the Library of the Naval War College in assembling his writings, a foot-high box arrived filled with books and articles. While logistics, strategy and theory may be his priority subjects, he writes on a wide variety of subjects, including comments on his extensive reading. It is not unusual for him to drop off some pages of quotations which impressed him as worthwhile and which always were thought-provoking. While he may reject I.B.M. as a model for defense organization, he does value the corporation slogan: THINK!

He has never shied away from controversial or emotional issues nor from taking unpopular positions, writing on such subjects as *Military Unionization* (28 January 1977) and Vietnam. In a talk to Naval Academy graduates in 1973, later reprinted in *Shipmate*,[13] entitled "The Vietnam Hurricane," he stated in his conclusion:

> It is difficult to dignify U. S. military action in Vietnam by the word *strategy*.
>
> At no time did any course of action which was adopted pass the test of *suitability*, *feasibility*, and *acceptability* . . .
>
> . . . the war was *over-managed* . . . This over-management—this excessive control of operational details from Washington—introduced time delays which compounded the other errors in a regenerative manner to produce an ineffective, gigantic but muscle-bound military effort, national frustration and national division. It was in truth *The Vietnam Hurricane*.

One of the magnificent Eccles graphics accompanied this lecture/article entitled "The Vietnam Hurricane or The Pentagon in the Eye of the Storm". In it the winds spinning out from each of the five sides of the Pentagon reach perimeters labelled "Assumptions," "Intelligence," "Inherent Complexity," "The Integrity of Command," and "Faulty Judgments and Decisions," with a total of 31 failures noted, including some listed in more than one area such as "self-serving staff study" (under both The Integrity of Command and Faulty Judgment and Decisions). The list is a staggering indictment which some will resent, some will ignore, a few will study, and maybe a handful will attempt corrective measures.

But Henry Eccles will not be surprised by this. He is a wise man, and he practices what he preaches. He is a student of mankind and not just of warfare or logistics. He knows that history must repeat and repeat before the lesson is learned and that the scholar's job is constant, not transient. For what he says, this nation is in his debt.

When I call Henry Eccles an outstanding military intellectual I am extending the highest praise. Many years ago an admiral remarked that sailors were not supposed to write books. Times have changed. Today if military scholars do not develop a sound theoretical base for the future use of force by the United States, this nation may not survive, for our strategy must be based on logistics which our economy can and will support, and this is subject to constant change. It is as simple, and complex, as that!

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NOTES

1. Henry E. Eccles, *Command Logistics* (Newport, R.I.: U.S. Naval War College, February 1956).

2. *Ibid.*, p. 7 and see also in his book *Logistics in the National Defense* (Harrisburg, Pa.: Stackpole, 1959), p. 20.

3. In *The Military and Civilian Aspects of Logistics* presented to the Convention of the Society of Logistic Engineers, Los Angeles, 5 September 1968.

4. Unpublished MS., Naval War College Library, p. 1.

5. *Logistic Research Notes, A Working Paper*, 25 October 1961, Unpublished MS., Naval War College Library, p. 3. Also, *Notes on Logistics Consolidation in the United States Armed Forces*, commenting on Hanson Baldwin's "Supplying Armed Forces," *The New York Times*, 11 August 1961; and *A Problem for Logistic Research*, 6 January 1954, revised 1 October 1955, redistributed December 1961.

6. A statement by Dr. Herbert Rosinski with a further note by Rear Adm. Henry E. Eccles, September 1955.

7. *Logistics Philosophy*, p. 5.

8. *An Introduction to Logistics Presentations*, U.S. Naval War College, 1 January 1959, p. 2.

9. *Ibid.*

10. *Logistics, Systems Analysis and Military Management, A Working Paper*, Unpublished MS., 20 October 1967, p. 7.

11. *Ibid.*, p. 3.

12. *Saturday Review*, 27 March 1971.

13. *Shipmate*, July-August 1973, pp. 23-26.

Much of the debate on unionization of the armed forces has ignored the central issue: How does a free society use military power and force in defense of its freedom and in support of its policies? Because military forces cannot by definition be democratic, Command has the increased responsibility to be concerned with and care for the welfare of people in uniform. Overcentralization and growing civilianization of the armed forces have eroded the responsibilities, prerogatives and integrity of Command, all of which is reflected in the pressure for unionization.

MILITARY UNIONIZATION:

THE CENTRAL ISSUES

by

Henry E. Eccles

Rear Admiral, U.S. Navy (Ret.)

Introduction. The current open discussion of the unionization of U.S. military forces is but one aspect of the major cultural change that has taken place throughout the world, and particularly in the United States, as a consequence of technological and social revolutions of the past 40 years.

Therefore the merits and demerits of the various proposals should be considered as they are related to, and as they influence the other elements of this change–especially those matters that relate to national security.

Mahan had some useful advice for those who deal with complex questions: "The search for leading principles, always few, around which considerations of detail group themselves, will tend to reduce confusion of impression to simplicity and directness of thought, with consequent facility of comprehension."[1] In practical terms, this means we should clarify the central issues in the question of unionization and concentrate on them rather than get distracted *and misled* by the secondary or peripheral issues.

As noted by Kane, Reynolds, Thorgeson and Gordon in the U.S. Naval Institute *Proceedings*, the interest in unionization stems from:

> First, the career navyman's dissatisfaction with his lot, and more importantly, his perception of an inability to influence the collective destiny of which he is a part. Secondly, the union leaders have recognized this discontent and have come forward in an attempt to fill this need for representation. Lastly, staunch opposition has been raised against the military unionization movement by naval

and government leaders who fear that unionization will compromise military discipline and preparedness.[2]

The formation of military unions has therefore been seen as a means whereby both the status and the rights of military personnel can be protected or enhanced. This view has been encouraged because, stimulated by the tremendous direct personnel cost of the "New Volunteer Army" and the increasing costs of military pensions, various proposals to cut back on the rights and privileges of both active and retired personnel have been made in the Congress. While this plausible reason has attracted considerable support we should realize that it is dangerously misleading.

The overriding central issue is: How does a free society organize and use military power and force in defense of its freedom and in support of its policies? This central issue has two aspects:

In a free society, national security must be seen as: First, external security and freedom; that is, sovereignty or freedom from external domination. Second, internal security and freedom; that is, preservation of the institutions which support the rights and welfare of its citizens.

There are several fundamental principles involved in answering the question of external security:

- The use of military force without a clear political purpose is futile and ultimately self-defeating.
- An accurate appraisal of the readiness and effectiveness of one's forces is a vital element in any political decision to use military force.
- A military force with poor morale and discipline is a menace rather than a safeguard to the security of the state.
- The nature of the military force of any nation is primarily dependent on the role that nation expects to play in world affairs. The force suitable for a passive role is entirely different from that suitable for an active role.
- The greatest disasters can take place when a nation pursues an active policy based on the assumption of control of a military force suitable for an active role only to find, *after the die is cast*, that the force is suitable only for a passive role.

Insofar as the military system is concerned, the most important part of internal freedom lies in the principle of civilian control of the military. This, of course, has many features, but in this context the essentials can be stated briefly.

The theory, doctrine and philosophy of civilian control of the military establish that:

- The decision to use overt military force is a political decision of the gravest importance. In a free society this decision should be made at the highest political level by civilians who can depend upon the loyalty, competence and combat effectiveness of a professional and nonpolitical military force.
- This professional military force must be prepared to *fight* effectively regardless of whether or not a state of war has been declared, and, subject to the limits of logistic capability, regardless of the geographic location of the combat.

The Problem of Limited War. Twenty years ago, James E. King, Jr., writing on "Nuclear Plenty and Limited War" in the January 1957 issue of *Foreign Affairs*, said in part:

> The prospect is disturbing, particularly to those who have thought that we could depend upon our nuclear advantages. It was not in the cards that we should owe our security to divine favor. The future counsels prudence, but not faintheartedness. While using every opportunity to reduce international tensions and to extend the reign of order

among nations, we must work positively for the limitation of war. To this end we must exert ourselves to the utmost in the technological competition to prevent the balance of advantage from shifting to the other side, and we must make it quite clear that we are prepared to risk annihilation itself to prevent Communist conquests by default, either by threat of nuclear terror or by conventional arms under cover of the nuclear ban. We must, in short, guarantee that only effectively limited hostilities *can* be rationally undertaken.

Moreover, we must be prepared to fight limited actions, ourselves. Otherwise we shall have made no advance beyond "massive retaliation," which tied our hands in conflicts involving less than our survival. And we must be prepared to lose limited actions. No limitation could survive our disposition to elevate every conflict in which our interests are affected to the level of total conflict with survival at stake. Armed conflict can be limited only if aimed at limited objectives and fought with limited means. If we or our enemy relax the limits on either objectives or means, survival will be at stake, whether the issue is worth it or not. But saying that we must be prepared to lose does not mean that we shall lose, particularly in the long run. Our strengths are many, not least the fact that our revolution offers a better promise to mankind than the Communist alternative.

The key sentences here are:

> And we must be prepared to lose limited actions. No limitation could survive our disposition to elevate every conflict in which our interests are affected to the level of total conflict with survival at stake. Armed conflict can be limited only if aimed at limited objectives and fought with limited means.[3]

At that time, few politicians would dare publicly to endorse such a statement regardless of how they may have felt as to its correctness, for it challenges the whole complex of emotional romanticism which runs through most public pronouncements on defense policy. Furthermore, it has very dangerous implications should foreign countries believe that we will willingly lose limited conflicts. What is more likely to happen is that our political leaders will *act* in accordance with this horrid and realistic concept while they *talk and write* in the traditional romantic terms.

This has several important implications for high military command. First, the military command must expect that in time of emergency the *orders and directives* they receive *will be quite different* in many respects *from the official plans.* They may also differ radically from the specific courses of action which would logically be deduced from official policy. The freedom of action of field commanders may well be more sharply circumscribed and limited than ever before in U.S. history.

While all of this may be recognized by thoughtful commanders, there are further effects which may not be so obvious. This situation will make special demands upon the imagination, flexibility, resourcefulness and discipline, both intellectual and military, of the commander himself.

But, perhaps even more important than this will be the need for greater emphasis on the discipline and combat morale of the officers and men of the armed forces. In the past all commanders have recognized the need for sometimes accepting a "tactical defeat" in one area or time in order to achieve a "strategic victory" in another area or time. It has always been a severe test of

leadership and morale to maintain discipline after such a sacrifice. But even under the best of circumstances it has always been a difficult task to develop combat forces of high morale, discipline, and aggressive spirit. However, if we limit our objectives and weapons as suggested, we will be expanding the magnitude of the tactical defeat which we are willing to so accept far beyond that previously thought acceptable in the interests of the larger strategical aim.

It will be a much more difficult task to maintain combat élan, the aggressive spirit, under these conditions.

This situation poses the most difficult of all tasks for leadership. However, if the realities of modern conflict are to be met, our strategic leadership must have combat forces with this kind of "weapon morale" and professional pride. The inducements of an easy pleasant life and the hope of swift victory, i.e., "soda fountain morale," are not enough.

With the current standard of plush, soft living in the United States, it does not seem likely that the requisite pride and weapon morale can be built with very large forces. It seems particularly unlikely if we maintain large forces while at the same time we discard the time-tested morale factors. Every factor which tends to blur or diminish discipline, service pride and unit pride will bring us nearer to ultimate strategic defeat on a catastrophic scale.

The essentials of this article and of the foregoing comments which I wrote in May of 1957 were tragically confirmed by the subsequent events in Vietnam.

Military Motivation and Leadership. There are certain fundamentals of leadership which have been recognized for many centuries, but nevertheless have been forgotten or obscured by the rush of technology and by factors associated with the large size and rapid turnover of personnel in the armed forces since World War II.

Most of these fundamentals have been repeatedly expressed in service publications such as the U.S. Naval Institute *Proceedings,* but because of these same factors they tend to be neglected.

The first basic principle is that discipline, morale, leadership and motivation are all so interwoven that no one can be understood without understanding the others. Nevertheless, for purposes of detailed discussion they *sometimes* should be treated separately.

The U.S. Armed Forces are created and operated in a special environment that imposes special obligations for performance and restriction on the freedom of action of officers in the exercise of leadership.

Associated with this is the fact that the armed forces and the national society interact. The armed forces inevitably reflect the habits and mores of the society and they are being used for two purposes: The *primary and statutory* one is to defend the society, and provide for the military security of the nation. The *secondary and nonstatutory one is to perform certain social and economic functions for the society which have no direct relation to the military function. Pressures from a variety of vested interests has emphasized these secondary purposes at the expense of the primary purpose.*

Questions of morale and discipline are the single most important factors in operational readiness and combat effectiveness, and as such they are intimately associated with the growth and effects of the logistic snowball. Thus, any study of these matters must involve the nature and importance of the distinction between "weapon morale" and "soda fountain morale."

There is a vital distinction between Command and Management and this has critical influence on the understanding of motivation, morale, and discipline in the armed forces.

The military is not and cannot be a "democratic" organization in the sense that the so-called "democratic process" is popularly perceived in the United States today.

Consequently, the concepts of justice, court procedures and the exercise of constitutional rights which are appropriate for application to the civilian society, cannot be strictly applied to the military system without substantially decreasing the effectiveness of the system and greatly increasing its cost.

Finally, and most important: The standards of ethics, of duty, of performance, and of justice, must be higher in the military system than they are in civilian life.

Cultural Change. We are living in the midst of a worldwide cultural change brought about largely by modern communications technology, which in one way or another is influencing the perceptions, the attitudes and the behavior of nearly all of mankind. It is a psychological phenomenon that is particularly evident in the young people who form the bulk of our armed forces, both officer and enlisted.

This is not the place to attempt a full examination of this cultural change, but unless its general nature and its implications are recognized, the United States can blunder into a major disaster, which will make Vietnam appear as a minor interlude. Among other things:

From the world view, there has been an increased perception of economic, political and social inequity, and a sharpening in the sense of ethnicity. This has brought about a spirit of nationalism in undeveloped countries and a spirit of separatism in some developed countries, together with a growth in both national and transnational terrorism.

From the standpoint of the external security of the state this has made the organization and employment of military power very complex and difficult. In particular, however, it has made the political control and the operational reliability of military power absolutely essential.

In the United States, several aspects of cultural change are evident in: a change in the perception of moral sanctions; a high degree of illiteracy among high school graduates; a widespread use of drugs; and a great increase in juvenile crime associated with a slowly growing recognition that our criminal justice system and our penal system both are obsolete and ineffective.

Largely as a consequence of the foregoing, there has been such a great increase in litigation throughout the United States that both the civil and criminal courts are overcrowded. *Newsweek* magazine describes the situation:

> The deluge of lawsuits is swamping the courts. The number of civil suits filed in Federal courts has doubled since 1960 and increased by more than one-third since 1970. . . . The clog in state courts is even worse. . . . In Cook County (Chicago) a negligence case can take four years to get to trial.[4]

> The legal rights of children and military personnel have barely been explored.[5]

> Law as a growth industry is little short of spectacular: there are 425,000 attorneys in the U.S. today compared to 250,000 just twenty years ago.[6]

> The U.S. has created the most sophisticated—and the fairest—legal process in the world. But the burdens have become intolerable.[7]

These factors combine to make special and still little understood problems for the internal security of the state.

From the standpoint of recruitment and training of young

people entering military service, several factors are significant:

The social perceptions of young people have been sharpened by racial trouble, the civil rights movement, and the organized dissent of the Vietnam era.

They tend to oppose regimentation and to be skeptical of all authority and systematic organization.

They wish to know the reasons for the orders and regulations which govern them and to participate in decisions.

Those of us who grew up in "The Old Navy" knew that the enlisted men were never fooled by incompetent officers. But the special critical sense of equity and justice shown by the best of today's youth demands high standards of competence, integrity and personal concern in the officers. The challenge is clear and fundamental. If not met, the loyalty and discipline needed for today's military force will not be attained.

The Matter of Command. With this general background it is well to realize that the general trend of events, Defense Department policies and attitudes have eroded the tradition and principles of military command authority and responsibility, with consequences which were specifically forecast in a series of articles published in the U.S. Naval Institute *Proceedings*, 20 years ago.[8]

The general theme of these articles was that when, by a general increase in centralization of authority in the military system, the authority of commanding officers is gradually eroded, the sense of personal responsibility and the ability to use authority wisely is also eroded throughout the chain of command. This inevitably produces dissatisfaction, frustration and lower performance of duty throughout the enlisted ranks.

Thus any discussion of military unions should be based on the perceptions and concepts of command which can be expected to prevail.

The chain of command, regardless of the manner in which executive authority is blended among military professionals and civilians, is responsible for maintaining the morale, discipline and effectiveness of the people in the armed forces. If these people have just cause for complaint, it means that this chain of command either has performed poorly or that it is faced with adverse circumstances beyond its power. In either case, unionization is not the solution to the problem of dissatisfaction among the military people, because among other things it would not increase the competence of command.

If sound principles of civilian control are to be followed, military influence on policy should be exercised by formal advice through the chain of command, not by a pressure group within the active military service which is not part of the chain of command.

If command is so indifferent to or ignorant of the welfare of their people that it responds only to organized pressure from below rather than to its own intuitive concepts of integrity, loyalty and competence, it proves its unfitness to employ their people in combat. That is: *Those exercising command cannot be trusted to use military power and force effectively to support and defend the security of the state.*

In addition to this conceptual matter, other factors influence the exercise of command.

As a consequence of rapidly changing technology, the military training programs have concentrated on technical training, technical experience and technical duty to the detriment of the development of leadership training and experience. In the Navy, this particular problem has been accentuated by the manner in which the Zumwalt personnel policies tended to bypass the chief petty officers of the Navy. As previously predicted, this diminished their prestige, authority and *morale*.

Furthermore, the "Great Society Programs" have greatly increased the "social responsibilities" of military commanders and created many programs for them to supervise and to report upon, with a consequent huge burden of administration and paperwork which (a) distracts them from their direct military concerns, and (b) adds to the size and snowballing bureaucratic growth of civilian and military administrative personnel *and facilities.*

These and other factors have combined to create a civilianization of the armed forces wherein civilian management terminology and attitudes are emphasized. An adverse semantic reaction develops gradually but inexorably.

When the chain of command is discussed as "Top Management," "Middle Management," etc., and the enlisted personnel are regarded as "employees" or as a "labor force," the sense of the special requirements and special concern of command for the needs, the aspirations and the capabilities of the men, and the consequent sense of loyalty and responsibility up and *down,* which is the essence of military professionalism, are diminished.

This semantic reaction, wherein one's perceptions are greatly influenced by the language used, has been aggravated by the increased centralization of operational authority in Washington.

The net result tends to create an adversary situation between officers and men similar to that between employers and labor in industry.

To a significant degree, this evolution is a misapplication of the principle of civilian control of military affairs and of freedom in a free society. Instead of simply civilian control, there has been a trend towards civilianization; instead of disciplined liberty there has been a trend toward irresponsible libertarianism.

The Matter of Recourse. In the current discussion as to the desirability of establishing or legalizing the formation of labor unions in the armed forces of the United States, there has been little mention of the matter of recourse by the Government should a strike take place.

In the United States in recent years there have been many work stoppages, strikes or job actions by unionized Government or municipal employees in fields where the law specifically forbids strikes by such union members.

As in the labor disputes in private industry, the Government has legal recourse to the courts for action in such cases, and in fact the process of injunction frequently prevents or greatly shortens a strike or other job action. In some cases, union leaders have been imprisoned or otherwise punished by the courts for violation of such unjunction or other judicial process. In some instances large fines have been imposed upon the treasuries of the offending unions.

In private industry, a civil suit with monetary damages being imposed, is one form of legal recourse available to an employer if a strike occurs in violation of a formal agreement.

The military situation is unique. THE GOVERNMENT HAS NO EFFECTIVE RECOURSE IN CASE OF STRIKE OR JOB ACTION BY A MILITARY UNION.

In time of crisis and even more in time of actual combat the two elements of TACTICAL TIMING and UNQUESTIONED RELIABILITY OF THE FORCES are each vital and vitally intertwined. No recourse, legal or otherwise, after a major defeat can in any way regain the lost ground (in its broadest sense), the lost time and the lost lives incurred by such defeat.

Fines or imprisonment after the event are useless. Recourse to punitive or compensatory damages after a tactical defeat in combat is meaningless and useless because of the fundamental fact that no one can make an appraisal of

the cost of such tactical defeat in monetary or other material measure.

Thus the issues posed by the advocacy of military unions transcend both in nature and magnitude the issues of industrial and routine Government unionization. The criteria of the latter are irrelevant to the former. As in some other political military matters, the advocates of measures which affect the combat effectiveness of military forces seldom relate such advocacy to the ultimate consequence of the alternative presented.

Just as strategy itself is cumulative, the various measures proposed for the socialization and democratization of the armed forces, *each of which has a plausible reason*, have a cumulative effect on combat effectiveness. The overall result can be that enormous sums be spent to achieve military impotence together with an unsupportable foreign policy. This indeed would be tempting fate.

Summary and Conclusion. National security has two parts; external security and internal security.

The military system has as its major task the support and protection of the external aspects of national security.

An unreliable, ineffective military system is more of a threat than a safeguard to the national security in both its external and its internal aspects.

Morale, discipline and combat effectiveness are all inextricably interwoven with the concept and the perspective of command and military professionalism, as exemplified by the distinctions between command and management.

In recent years there has been an erosion in this concept and perspective of command brought about by overcentralization and overcivilianization, and this to a large degree has created a loss of morale and a dissatisfaction that is expressed by the concept of a military union.

Regardless of any supposed legislative safeguards, a military union strong enough to influence the internal policy of the military would inevitably influence the employment of the military and so exercise an unconstitutional control of national policies.

At best, unionization would require a complete reexamination of our national policy and national strategy to rule out the concept of sustained, major overseas combat operations by ground forces.

At worst, it would mean that we would commit large-scale forces to combat in support of policy only to find out too late that they lacked the discipline and morale to fight effectively against a strong enemy force.

This establishes the central issues in the controversy over unionization the other issues are trivial.

The proponents of unionization present a *plausible case, and that is exactly what is wrong.* Every major political military disaster has come about because people of good intent and supposed competence have had a plausible reason for doing the wrong thing. The Vietnam War is a striking example.

While strong opposition has been expressed by senior officers, legislators, and veterans' organizations, nevertheless, some serving officers have favored unionization as the best way to protect their interest. Others, while not favoring it, consider it to be inevitable, and therefore something which the military should accept, and therefore initiate. No one should expect the public to understand the nature of, and necessity for, military morale, discipline and military professionalism, *if the military professionals do not themselves understand them!*

Finally, it is quite possible that the great cultural change of the last 25 or so years has made it impossible to maintain a large military force with a capability to conduct sustained, large-scale overseas ground combat. In which case, the

only remedy is to reduce the size of the armed forces to the point where the morale, discipline and responsiveness to control are unquestioned and to modify the national policy and strategy to conform to this capability.

NOTES

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4. Jerrold K. Footlick, "Too Much Law?" *Newsweek*, 10 January 1977, p. 43.
5. *Ibid.*, p. 45.
6. *Ibid.*, p. 46.
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

Our language is a rich and noble instrument, capable of expressing clearly our everyday thoughts and eloquently our more profound ones. It is, as Professor Higgins reminded Eliza Doolittle, the language of Shakespeare, Milton and the Bible. Speaking at the Fifth Military Media Conference, Edwin Newman used a series of horrible, but funny examples to emphasize his plea for clear speaking and writing. Since we think in words, fuzzy, pompous and redundant language inevitably leads to a corruption of our thoughts.

THE STATE OF AMERICAN ENGLISH

by

Edwin Newman

It is typical of American English that enough is almost never enough. Cecil Smith, television critic of the *Los Angeles Times*, considered CBS' Bicentennial Minutes not merely unique but singularly unique. Senator Abraham Ribicoff of Connecticut was worried not only about nuclear proliferation but about the spread of nuclear proliferation. When there was a report that Senator Barry Goldwater had condoned organized crime in Arizona, he said it was not only ridiculous but completely untrue, in contrast to being ridiculous but true.

Would it be premature to discuss new financial arrangements for New York City? No, says *The New York Times*, it would be "too premature." Is the Mississippi low? No, says an airline pilot, "The river is low, water levelwise." During the scare over swine flu, the Pittsburgh health office postponed the shots--temporarily. I have even been sent a label identifying a handbag as manmade vinyl, there being no more wild vinyl roaming the Great Plains.

Was a police raid on a New York after-hours club kept secret? No, said UPI, it was successfully kept secret. Do students select areas for study? They preselect them. I stayed at the Sheraton-Universal Hotel in Los Angeles not long ago. A sign in the room asked guests to switch off the lights and air-conditioning and television set when leaving, so as to avoid "unnecessary waste" of power. Necessary waste was all right.

All of this is redundancy, to which Americans have become addicted. A large part of American speech and writing is unnecessary, boring, and makes much reading and conversation a chore. We slog through the laborious and repetitious, and tarry when we should be moving on. Redundancy's cause is triumphant.

The United States is the most

wasteful country in the world, and our use of words is extravagant. This has two causes. One is the feeling that an idea is more effective if it is repeated and reinforced. That is why Jimmy Carter described the international situation in early January as very dormant. It is why he said that the place where he would meet Leonid Brezhnev would depend not merely on a mutual decision but on "a mutual decision between us." You can't be too careful when dealing with the Russians.

We have reached the point in the United States where it is not enough for children to get an education, or even a good education. They must have, according to the latest fashion, a quality educational experience. Which they would get, by the way, not in a school system but, according to the New York State commissioner of education, Ewald Nyquist, in a total learning enterprise.

When the Colorado State Library wants to suggest some reading for children who learn slowly, it puts out not merely a bibliography but a bibliography of books. What kind of books? Books of easy difficulty. For what kind of reading? Here the Colorado State Library invents a word. Recreatory reading. It could have been worse. It could have been recreation-oriented.

We have reached the point where even the word widow is thought not to get the idea across. *The Corning,* New York, *Leader* says of a woman who died, "She was the widow of August Bottcher, who predeceased her."

The second reason for this wastefulness is a failure to understand what the words used mean. *The New York Times* would not run the headline, "Modest rise looms in capital spending," if it knew what modest meant or what loom meant. The man at NBC in charge of assigning new telephone numbers would not preplan for them if he knew what plan meant. The weather forecaster at the CBS station in Washington would not say, "Tomorrow afternoon, the temperature will gradually plummet. . . ."

Dr. John Lundgren, looking after Richard Nixon, said in January 1975, "He still tires and fatigues very easily. When you tire *and* fatigue, you are *really* worn out. Lt. Gen. James F. Hollingsworth, when he was U.S. Commander in South Korea, said that if the North Koreans attack, "Our firepower will have a tremendous impact on their ground troops, breaking their will in addition to killing them." This dual purpose explains why the United States must have sophisticated weapons.

At that, General Hollingsworth's language is preferable to that of Gen. Alexander Haig, who is the Commander in Europe for NATO. Rather than say that NATO forces were not as ready as he'd like them to be, General Haig said that they were "not optimized in a posture of essential preparedness." What makes this sort of language attractive to those who use it is that it introduces an unnecessary abstruseness, overtones of complexity. It is increasingly characteristic of life in the United States, where engaged couples are said to be in a commitment situation, and where an economist may refer to work as labor force participation. In Seattle, federal officials who had to decide whether snow was so heavy that employees should be told to stay at home established a "four-sided matrix" that drew "data" from "four information providers." This enabled them not to know whether the roads could be used but to "monitor the condition of the ingress and egress routes."

Matrix is becoming popular. An educator in Massachusetts wrote to me that not long ago, he was asked to prepare an activities matrix. It turned out to be a schedule. The same man told me about a letter he received advising him that a new staff member would shortly begin work. The letter said: "Ms. _____ will begin executing her professional skills on January 4, 1977."

My correspondent felt sorry for the skills, which hadn't done anything wrong.

In Canada, where they also go in for this sort of thing, at a meeting on urban problems in Toronto, elevators in tall buildings were classified as "vertical high speed transportation systems." It is everywhere. During the winter, when the roads around Buffalo were covered with snow, it was not said that they were blocked or impassable or even covered with snow. Drivers were told that there was "limited lane availability." In Boston, the Metropolitan District Commission did not want to say "Keep off the ice." It urged that "all persons terminate using any body of water under MDC control for any ice-related recreation or walking." Again, it could have been worse. It could have been ice-related recreation-oriented activity.

Why is such language used? Self-importance, of course, but also because it serves as a fence that keeps others outside and respectful, or leads them to ignore what is going on inside because it is too much trouble to find out. For those inside, either effect is useful. That is why psychologists will not speak of someone as independent or self-reliant. They will say that that person has a high personal autonomy quotient. A librarian won't say that he offers many services but multifaceted services. The chief of police in Madison, Wisconsisn, spoke of the jail as "a total incarceration facility," and police cars in Seattle are now mobile response units.

There is, of course, a technique involved, but it is easy to grasp. Never say that a tank may spring a leak. Say there may be a "breach of containment." Never say of a product that people won't buy it. Say that it "met consumer resistance." Don't say that the unusual winter we went through damaged or hampered the economy. Say that it impacted on the economy. Then, if you are an economic forecaster, you can say later that pentup consumer demand will deimpact the effects of the winter.

A copying machine should not be said to have jammed. It is in an "incorrect paper misfeed situation." Don't say that you have a job where you deal with many people. Say that you have a people-intensive position. In Knoxville, Tennessee, a nurse won a product-naming contest with the suggestion that dust covers for medical equipment be called instead "sterility maintenance covers." That was worth $500 and a luncheon in the Andrew Jackson ballroom of the Hyatt Regency Hotel.

At that rate, somebody in the Federal Energy Research and Development Administration should get millions for renaming windmills. They are now "wind energy conversion systems."

I want to turn now to what I take to be the new national pastime. It is izing. A reporter I know, covering a visit by President Ford to Boston, asked the Secret Service where he could park his car. The Secret Service could not help. What should he do, then? "If I were you," the Secret Service man replied, "I would put myself in a chaufferized situation."

In New York City, *The New York Times* talked about pedestrianizing part of the area around Times Square—that is, keeping cars out—and a city official talked about cosmetizing it by putting in some sidewalk cafes. *The New York Times* has also spoken about a handsome new furniture store that was balconized; the Minnesota Vikings quarterback, Fran Tarkenton, has said that his company, Behavioral Systems, Inc., functions in a methodized way—I believe that it is, however, nonsectarian; in Denver, Colorado, the First Unitarian Society announced formation of working groups following prioritization of alternative uses; and in Santa Rosa, California, a city commissioner asked this question: "Are we prioritizing with their input?" For the sake of Santa Rosa, let's hope so.

During the last football season, a man broadcasting the Kansas-Missouri game said that one of the players "suffered self-tacklization." Whether he meant the man tripped himself or was tackled by one of his teammates, I don't know. In Canada, an official putting forms into French and English was said to have done valuable work in bilingualizing them. All forms are created lingual, and some are more lingual than others.

Sports broadcasters often have only a shaky grip on grammar and on the connection between words and meaning. During the last football season, Keith Jackson of ABC told his viewers that because of the way some of the boxes in the Superdome were placed, he could not visually see them.

Tom Brookshier of CBS, who usually contents himself with saying of somebody who made a good play, "He's come a long way from South Carolina," which of course is not always true, if, for example, the game is being played in Atlanta, and with such comments on quarterbacks as, "There is no comparison between he and Staubach," surpassed himself during the Ali-Norton fight. After the sixth round, Brookshier said, "Ali looks over his shoulder at him with disdain and maybe respect."

Some of the others aren't much better. Pat Summerall of CBS has said, "The United States is in good shape Davis Cupwise." In Cincinnati, a baseball announcer, speaking about the pitcher, Don Gullett, said, "Well, Don's speed was good tonight, but stuffwise, he wasn't all that great." It reminded me of something Earl Monroe of the New York Knicks said: "We really need to win tonight. It will put us in the right frame of mind mentalwise."

They love to tack on that abominable suffix, wise, in sports. They also love the all-American phrase, "Y'know." An NBC colleague told me that he heard a professional basketball player explain that he worried a great deal about being injured and about the impossibility of saying when it might happen. He said: Y'know . . . How do you know? Y'know?"

I have also been told by a reader in New Hampshire that he heard the heavyweight, Joe Baksi, when asked how he thought a fight would come out, reply that he did not want to make any predicaments. Which is understandable. The same reader insists that he once heard the explanation that a fighter had to retire early because of a detached retinue. Evidently he didn't like to be alone.

This sort of thing is by no means confined to the world of sports, full of rough diamonds as we know it to be. For example, we have all heard about alleged victims. They have become confused in some journalistic minds with intended victims, but intended victims are sometimes rendered as would-be victims, who apparently go out in the hope of being robbed or assaulted.

A Texas newspaper, *The Corpus Christi Caller*, was full of pride when a Texas woman, Anne Armstrong, was named Ambassador to London. "Anne Armstrong ready to take Texas flare to London," it said. That's flare, f-l-a-r-e. Take up this torch.

Another Texas paper, the *Brownsville Herald*, headlined a story about deaths on the highway: "Texas Motorcides Below Expectations." We've all heard about engines that died.

I don't want to appear to be picking on just one state. A man who got a parking ticket in Wilkes-Barre, Pennsylvania, sent me the receipt for payment of the fine. At the bottom were these words: "Obey all traffic violations."

An ironic thing is happening in the United States. As we demand more and more personal openness from those in public life—unwisely, it seems to me—our language becomes more and more covered, obscure, turgid, ponderous and overblown. The candor expected of public officials about their health, their

money, their private lives, or what used to be thought of as their private lives, is offset in public matters by language that conceals more than it tells, and often conceals the fact that there is little or nothing worth telling.

We increasingly expect of those holding office an accounting of their financial holdings and their health. There are those who want a panel of psychiatrists to examine all who seek high office, to determine whether they can be trusted with public affairs and with their private ones. The way things are going, there will probably be a demand that those in public life give assurances that their sexual undertakings leave them without anxiety and ready to turn to affairs of state without lurid dreams that trouble their minds. This demand will be strengthened by its having been reported that by the time Watergate reached its dénouement, Richard and Pat Nixon had not slept together in 14 years. During the furor over the liaison between Wayne Hays, then chairman of the House Administration Committee, and Elizabeth Ray, the novelist, the Speaker of the House, Carl Albert, dealing with reports of orgies in his office, felt it necessary to say that he was 68 and had not slept with a woman all year. (It was early June.)

It is easy to understand the insistence that public men and women tell all, especially after Vietnam, Watergate, the resignation of a President and Vice President, and various financial scandals and sexual escapades. What we ought to be demanding is that our leaders speak better English, so that we know what they are talking about and, incidentally, so that they do. Some safety does lie in more sensible public attitudes, especially toward the public relations and advertising techniques now widely used by politicians. It lies in understanding that there can be many sources of leadership in the country, not the White House alone. It lies also in independent reporting by those of us in the news business, and in greater skepticism on the part of the public, and in an unremitting puncturing of the overblown. In all of this, language is crucial.

I have been told that my view is cranky and pedantic, that I want to keep the language from growing, and to impose a standard and rigid English on Americans. Far from it. Our language should be specific and concrete, eloquent where possible (for eloquence is hard to come by), playful where possible (for wit is given to few) and personal, so that we don't all sound alike.

American English, drawing on so many regional differences, so many immigrant groups, and such a range of business, farming, industrial, athletic and artistic experiences, can have an incomparable richness. Instead, high crimes and misdemeanors are visited upon it, and those who commit them do not understand that they are crimes against themselves. The language belongs to all of us. We have no more valuable possession.

BIOGRAPHIC SUMMARY

A graduate of the University of Wisconsin, Edwin Newman began his career in journalism in 1941. Following duty with the U.S. Navy during World War II, he returned to United Press in Washington. He has covered news events in 25 countries since joining NBC News in London in 1952. As a watchdog over usage of the language, he is author of *Strictly Speaking: Will American be the Death of English?* and *A Civil Tongue*.

A good portion of the comment, discussion and debate that has concerned "détente" has been as much the result of a failure to define it precisely as it has been directed towards its substance. An accommodation or relaxation of political tensions accompanied by an increase in weapons systems might appear to be inconsistent with "détente." However, the Soviet Union is faced with two potential enemies, the United States and China, each of which it must consider when dealing with the other.

THE DÉTENTE DEBATE

by

Frederick H. Hartmann

If the debate over foreign policy today has a focus, it is détente. But that focus remains blurred, chiefly because there is little agreement on what détente *means*. To some it is a Soviet formula designed to lull the United States into a relaxed defense mode, while the Soviets pull ahead in weapons. Others see it as an expression of accommodation in a nuclear-warhead-saturated age, as a mutual superpower recognition of the futility of trying to settle disputes with weapons.

A century before Christ, Catullus remarked: "Everybody has his own delusion assigned to him: but we do not see that part of the bag which hangs on our back." And when we face our opponent, for much the same reasons, we fail to see the bag which hangs on *his* back. Indeed, by addressing détente as though it were essentially a face-to-face Soviet-American relationship, we miss most of the point.

We describe détente imprecisely, because we see it as something it is not. For détente is not a Soviet New Year's resolution to seek to diminish tension for the good of all concerned. Nor is it a cover-and-deception plan to lull the United States into somnolence. Instead it is a policy designed to make the best of a rather unpromising situation the Soviets confront, a situation whose essential and unpleasant features the Soviets cannot radically alter. To this situation the United States assigns the name "détente," while the Soviets normally avoid that term and speak instead of the "relaxation of tensions" or of "accommodation."

Humpty-Dumpty's "Words mean what I say they mean," has significance for anyone trying to understand

international relations. However, the Soviet choice of terms is not deliberately deceptive. If the American term implies relaxation of tensions as a goal, the Soviet term describes it as a thing being done. And that part is true. In the political realm, as will be argued below, the Soviets by and large are relaxing tensions, even while, in the military realm, they continue to pile new weapons system upon new weapons system.

If this confusing Soviet behavior is not due to (1) bureaucratic inefficiency (i.e., the defense part of the establishment does not have the word), or (2) to deliberate deception (as the American critics of détente allege), it has to be (3) a hardheaded and quite understandable reaction to a difficult Soviet problem. Let us examine each possibility.

The first proposition (bureaucratic inefficiency) can be readily dismissed. The Soviet Communist Party leaders *never* get distracted to the point that the Defense Establishment is left to its own devices. Everything we know about the Soviet Union tells us that the Red Army is never permitted to branch off on its own policy path. Whatever the generals and the marshals may want, they do not get it through coercion of the party leaders. If the defense effort in Russia is increasing, it is not accidental and it is not contrary to the wishes of the party bosses.

In that case let us reverse the first proposition and interpret what we see as very deliberate defense expenditure increases. What, if anything, can a look at these military developments tell us? What can we conclude from the large-scale Soviet missile program which has three new systems currently coming on line? What of the MIRVing effort and the continued expansion of the Soviet Navy? What can an examination of military "hardware" tell us about what the Soviets may be up to?

Perhaps it is easiest to state where one can go wrong in looking at military data, and then reach some conclusions about how to do it right.

It is comparatively easy in such politicomilitary analysis to make one of two opposite mistakes. One can either overstate the military-strategic part of the problem, or neglect to take it substantially into account. The first error normally takes the path of deducing foreign policy intentions altogether from military hardware developments. For example, the development of a supposedly "first-strike" capability is seen as the outward evidence of a still secret intention to commit those forces to action at some later date. Analyses along this line are usually shallow, confusing a simple capability with a determination to put it to use. The second (and opposite) error is to treat the military clues to foreign policy intentions as though they had nothing to do with one another. For example, deployments and redeployments of forces are dismissed as purely military matters. Those who commit this error usually are the same ones who give greater credence to verbal statements of peaceful intentions than experience warrants.

Striking a balance, the most reliable military indicators of political thinking, apart from alliances, are in the area of deployments, particularly troop dispositions.

In a nuclear age, with its massive, almost instantaneous ability to destroy human life in quantity, it may seem odd that the location of people in uniform should still provide a significant clue to political thinking. Yet it is not really odd at all. The only fairly sure way to control a foreign people is to deploy significant numbers of troops on their territory, as the Soviets have done in Hungary in 1956 and Czechoslovakia in 1968. Troops deployed on a bloc border serve notice, too, of intent to resist—the "tripwire" concept. Missiles cannot accomplish either of these tasks.

New missile systems of MIRVing or even new ship units tell us *how* an

enemy might or will strike at us in time of war. Troop deployments tell us *where* the enemy thinks he is in danger or in trouble.

What about the second explanation, deliberate deception? Is it not quite plausible that the Soviets, seeing a chance to deceive the gullible Americans, are simply trying to get ahead of us in strategic weapons, to achieve an overwhelming superiority from which lofty pinnacle they will be able to tell us exactly what we can and cannot do?

Lenin himself warned us: "People always have been and they always will be stupid victims of deceit and self-deception in politics, until they learn behind every kind of moral, religious, political, social phrase, declaration and promise to seek out the interests of this or that class or classes."

Deliberate Soviet deception to achieve a temporary lead would, of course, have its drawbacks, unless that lead could be exploited. To achieve a permanent lead would be much more worthwhile, if it were possible. But, in either case, cold reality suggests that following this path would be no panacea for the Soviets. When the United States had absolute nuclear superiority and the Soviets had no nuclear capability, we were unable to make the Soviets alter their behavior more than a modest amount. To envisage a Soviet Union with, say, a twentyfold overkill capability trying to blackmail a United States with a twelvefold overkill capability strains one's sense of the plausible. This does not mean we ought to be complacent about the Soviets outgunning us; it only means that one must look at the total context.

Taking Lenin at his own word, what interest does the Soviet Union have in trying to attain a precarious and unreliable—and temporary—"superiority"? Is there any real doubt that the United States, if it wished, can outstrip any conceivable Soviet defense effort? What sequence of events would most likely trigger an American defense effort of unprecedented magnitude, if not precisely this kind of deliberate deception?

Could Soviet behavior then represent a hardheaded and quite understandable reaction to a difficult Soviet problem?

Suppose we take the middle ground in the politicomilitary analysis suggested above, and assume that Soviet military developments (especially deployments) are not accidental or fortuitous. Suppose we assume that they are almost certainly closely orchestrated with their understanding of the political situation they confront.

If we did this, what would we conclude? We would conclude that the Soviets are in fact by and large avoiding head-to-head confrontations, while simultaneously making a great effort to upgrade their defenses. The rational connection between these two apparently opposite trends is that they are completely consistent if the Soviets today feel a greater sense of threat and danger than they did a few years ago.

A lot of people, citing Angola, reject this argument out of hand, believing that the Soviet Union is *not* trying to avoid head-to-head confrontation with the United States. But Angola, or any other single incident, has to be looked at and assessed in perspective.

An assessment of this kind has to be both relative and comparative. The existence of a highly armed Soviet Union, able to project power, is in itself an implicit confrontation from the U.S. point of view. If that power is there, it may be used. But what is striking is how little, anywhere, the Soviets are stirring the pot, compared with even a few years ago. The kind of adventure represented by the Cuban missile crisis, is utterly absent today. The Soviets are not becoming heavily involved militarily, on the ground, at selected points outside their frontiers. Apart from the Warsaw Pact forces which sit heavily astride Eastern Europe, Soviet military "advisers" are not found outside Russia in

any quantity today. Egypt, with the greatest number, threw them out. In the whole of the Middle East, although Soviet weapons flood the area, Soviet control over their use has declined drastically.

Today the Syrians intervene, using Soviet weapons, to moderate the Lebanese civil war, firing on Palestinian forces, also equipped with Soviet weapons. The Soviet Union looks helplessly on. Meanwhile the pressure on Israel is lessened, and Sadat moves to a still more moderate position. Compare the mischiefmaking of the Soviets in the Middle East now with a half decade ago. The Soviets were actively fomenting trouble in the second and third Israeli wars; in the Yom Kippur War it threatened intervention only to save the Egyptian Third Army from complete defeat.

Angola, although its outcome depended on Cuban troops and Soviet arms, depended far more on the black-white issue in Africa for its success. The Soviets themselves actually did very little.

Indeed, around the whole periphery of the Soviet frontiers the sense of aggressive Soviet expansionist intervention is largely absent. In Eastern Europe the new order is described as the result of *Ostpolitik*, normally seen as a West German concession to Soviet pressures. Anyone traveling in Eastern Europe today might well be pardoned for thinking that, whatever its nominal nature, *Ostpolitik* has really meant a resumption of German economic influence in what was once the Soviet exclusive preserve of Eastern Europe.

The examples could be multiplied. But, with the possible exception of Angola they clearly point to a consistently cautious policy by the Soviets. What is it all due to?

The answer is not mysterious. It arises from some fundamental, even obvious facts. That these facts are often overlooked in the United States, tells us much more about the lenses we peer through than about what we are staring at. Any people who could spend what we did on Vietnam (in money and in blood), considering its value (in any sense at all), can quite rightly be suspected of sometimes overlooking the obvious.

Consider these facts. Five years or so ago the United States was heavily involved in Vietnam, with over a half-million men on shore and two-thirds of a million deployed in the area, including the Seventh Fleet. We were also deployed in Korea, Japan, the Philippines, and Okinawa. In short, we were deployed in force on the Asian mainland adjacent to north China and south China, with a fleet off China's central coast. In addition we supported a rival Chinese government on Formosa. Our principal ally in Asia was Japan, who in the 1930's and 1940's had occupied China and killed many Chinese.

Do we think that these deployments, with their alignment links, had no effect on Chinese behavior? Do we think that the physical presence of more than a million Americans just off the Chinese coast or across the frontiers, an America with thousands of nuclear warheads, had no real effect on China? What would we have done under these circumstances if we had been in charge of Chinese affairs between, say, 1966 and 1972 or 1973? Would we have told ourselves to disregard that deployment, to trust America's goodheartedness? Would we have argued in the Peking Great Hall for an aggressive confrontation with the Soviet Union? Or would we have argued for the most cautious possible policy, avoiding trouble with both superpowers?

During the Vietnam War the United States on occasion requested the Soviets to use their influence to help bring about peace. There is something highly ironic about our asking our enemy to assist us out of a situation where all our ready forces were fully committed, so

much so that we did not even feel able to respond effectively in the *Pueblo* incident against the third-rate power of North Korea. We asked the Soviet Union if they would help us regain our strategic mobility, so that we could confront them more effectively elsewhere, as in the Middle East. We asked our enemy to help us get out of Vietnam (i.e., withdraw from China's periphery) so that China, too, would at last enjoy some degree of strategic mobility. Not surprisingly, the Soviet Union did not help us out.

We had to find our own painful way out of our dilemma. Eventually we did; the troops came home from Vietnam. Or, to express it differently, the Chinese began to enjoy a greater sense of freedom of policy choice. Militarily speaking, there was more room for the Chinese to breathe. That situation came about first in principle on the night of 31 March 1968, when President Johnson, announcing that he would not seek reelection, ordered "unilaterally" a halt of the U.S. air and naval bombardment (except in the Demilitarized Zone). Johnson added: "We are prepared to move immediately toward peace through negotiations. So tonight, in the hope that this action will lead to early talks, I am taking the first step to de-escalate the conflict."

Even then, the cautious Chinese waited almost a year to be absolutely sure the United States was on its way out of mainland Southeast Asia. Then, just as our physical withdrawal was actually underway, the Chinese kicked the Soviets on the shins in battalion and regimental strength in a flare-up on the Ussuri River frontier. Serious fighting occurred on 2 March 1969, with a second major clash on 15 March. In May 1969 there were further clashes in Sinkiang and again on 10 June. Yet again on 13 August, China's protest note that month noted 429 border violations in June and July alone; the Soviets in their counterprotest said it was 488 from mid-June to mid-August.

Compare this set of events with actual U.S. troop withdrawals from Vietnam: the first withdrawal, widely expected in advance (25,000 men), was announced on 8 June; the second (35,000 men) was ordered on 16 September. These withdrawals confirmed and continued the Chinese judgment.

In July 1971 President Nixon announced his decision to visit Peking and on 2 August 1971, Secretary of State Rogers officially announced that the United States would vote to seat Peking in the U.N. (but not to expel Taiwan). The new U.S. policy was now well in gear. In this way the United States regained strategic mobility as did the Chinese. And in this way the Soviets lost a great part of theirs. In the years which followed, as U.S. troops withdrew from Asia, Chinese and Soviet troops moved to their common frontier.

In this new and unpleasant situation for the Soviets it is not at all difficult to imagine the dialogue around the green baize table in the Kremlin.

Secretary Brezhnev turns to Foreign Minister Gromyko.

"Well, Gromyko. A fine mess this. The Americans are no longer tied down and the Chinese are now probing the frontier, hardly hiding their satisfaction. What are *you* going to do about it?"

Gromyko spreads his hands in a disarming gesture. "Well, Mr. Secretary, it had to come sooner or later. We have had a very long run of extraordinary luck, with the Chinese more irritated with the United States since 1949 than with us, and worried over U.S. troop deployments. It couldn't last forever."

Brezhnev is not mollified. "What can you do to offset it in the political sphere?"

Gromyko replies: "What the Americans have done is to cease to handicap themselves. We never made a mistake like that. We can't correct what we haven't done wrong. We have no 'China card' to play."

"How about a diversionary movement somewhere else?"

Gromyko: "Now that the Chinese are no longer tied down, we should be cutting our commitments elsewhere, not enlarging them."

Brezhnev: "But there are surely many opportunities to stir the pot somewhere . . . ?"

Gromyko: "I wouldn't recommend it on our European flank where the Poles, the Hungarians, and the Czechs are always dissatisfied despite everything we've done. And those Arabs! You never know how long they will stay with a policy. Besides, with the Americans free now, and especially with their support for the Zionists, we stand a real chance of a clash if we push too hard there."

Brezhnev: "Then you don't really have any bright ideas?"

Gromyko: "Well, there is Africa. Cheap and safe gains are available there. The United States would be embarrassed even if not very much involved, any more than we are. Of course, it would be transitory. Those African governments don't last long."

Brezhnev nods. He turns to his generals.

"Gromyko has no idea for a real piece of political cleverness. But if we do nothing the United States will lord it over us, thinking they can intimidate us. What do *you* say?"

It is not really necessary to detail here what any Russian general or admiral is likely to say at this point in the conservation. The only thing obscure without a bug to listen in would be the amounts of money named and the specific size of the new military hardware programs, plus the degree of acceleration of existing hardware programs recommended.

If this imagined conversation is close to what really happened, why is not the situation more widely understood? Why is détente still argued as though it represented either a sincere "sweetness and light" approach by the Soviets or a scheme to distract us long enough to seize the lead in weapons? There are two reasons.

The first reason is that the problem is not often approached the way nations in fact handle national security problems. People often are not very sensitive to the fact that national security, if preserved or achieved, is the result of choosing a wise blend of both political and military policies. Clausewitz a century and a half ago said: "War is not merely a political act; but also a political instrument, a continuation of political relations, a carrying out of the same by other means." Clausewitz was warning about the dangers of looking at military actions divorced from political consequences. He did not emphasize the reverse case, but he would have been equally aghast at a political policy divorced from military considerations. In national security affairs, what freedom from the fear of imminent attack you can achieve stems from the careful orchestration of both political and military choices. What safety the one set does not provide must come from the other. What is lost in one sphere must be gained from the other. The freer from political system constraint one's enemy becomes, the more one must press ahead with one's own arms. The less one's enemy is worried about his *back*, the more you must make him worry about his *front*. Or vice versa.

There is a fundamental "law" of international relations which, like any law can be broken at a penalty: the law of "the conservation of enemies." What that law tells us is that one does not normally seek to accumulate more enemies at any one time than one can usefully handle! The penalty for breaking this law is drastic. It was what constrained China when she had potentially hostile military forces on every side. It is what constrains Russia today now that she has to deal with an antagonistic China free to express her antagonism.

There is a second and important reason why the situation is not as well understood as it should be. It comes from technology and the unconscious effect this has on our feeling for geography.

Nothing could be triter than to say we have conquered space. We can send men to the moon or ICBM missiles from U.S. bases halfway around the world to their targets. So can the Soviets. From these facts it is possible to slip unknowingly into a downgrading of old-fashioned geographical, or even geopolitical thought. It is possible to deploy a million men in Asia and discount their restraining effect on the Chinese. It is possible to arrive at a state of mind where one thinks of a deployment overseas in narrow theater terms: the effect in Vietnam. The "real" military ratio for "the big picture" is still thought of in terms of nuclear ICBM's. The more one becomes fascinated by the ratio of U.S.-Soviet throw-weight, warheads, or delivery vehicles, the less one tends to think of Soviet or Chinese freedom to react in anything but such megatonnage frames of reference. At least until one confronts a *Pueblo* incident with no ready forces at hand, or the Chinese kick you on the shins on the frontier. Because technologically slanted logic suggests that the Chinese cannot decide to kick you in the shin. They have few nuclear warheads and you have many. But the Chinese did do it. So strategic decisions must indeed turn on something more (or something less) than a nuclear warhead count. Technologically slanted strategic thinking also suggests that if the Chinese ignore the warhead ratio implications they have done something foolish and they can be ignored.

But the Chinese did do it. And the Soviets have been very upset indeed. They do not in the least ignore it.

If 800 million Chinese give a collective growl, and they are your neighbors, it is not sufficient solace to sit in one's armory and count one's warheads--even if one can ignore the future when the Chinese will have more warheads. The United States can move in and out of Asia, closer or further from the Chinese, at will. The Soviets cannot. That geographic fact has fundamental political and national strategic implications.

Granted everything above, what is likely to come of it? Again there is the primarily political side of the equation and the primarily military side. They are part of the same equation, but they are not identical in nature or weight.

Consider the political side first. Unless the United States gets overclever ideas about "exploiting" the Sino-Soviet tension instead of leaving the Chinese and the Russians to deal with it, the continuing burden on the Soviets can be expected to constrain their behavior. The Chinese, with a disputed frontier of 500,000 square miles to discuss with the Soviet Union, are hardly likely to bring any degree of comfort to the Soviets as far as one can see down the road ahead. Of course, the United States would be ill-advised to expect this tension to take care of all its own policy needs.

The military side of the equation is potentially more difficult to handle. If the argument above is correct, the increased Soviet defense expenditures arise from an increased sense of Soviet insecurity. If the United States matches or exceeds the Soviet effort the Soviets ought logically, within the constraints of their budget possibilities, to increase that effort. Otherwise the United States has the upper hand. But if the United States, alternatively, decides that it can afford to allow the Soviets to forge ahead, then the Soviets, if they do, will be relieved of the sense of being behind in the national security balance, and they will be ahead in possessing instruments of force. They will feel freer to act while having an enhanced capability. They might, as an example, use their new aircraft carriers as they become operational, or their new Marine Force

for adventures overseas. Of course, that will not make the Chinese vanish so it is not quite what this way of putting things suggests. Nevertheless, there is a clear danger for the United States in allowing the Soviets to feel that militarily they are ahead.

Taking both sides of this dilemma within a single view, what seems to be required is a careful pacing by the United States of its arms effort to remain approximately equal in overall capability. Like the temptation for the United States to "improve" on the Sino-Soviet tension, the danger in such an "arms race" is to assume that the Soviets are striving to achieve that more or less mythological "first-strike" vantage point and to get carried away emotionally. Any "arms race" has to be as cooly conducted as a chess game.

The point then is that, if the United States remains roughly equal with the Soviets militarily, and provided Sino-Soviet tension does not miraculously evaporate, the United States will retain the overall advantage in the national security area. Given such a policy, we can reasonably expect the Soviets to remain "devoted" to détente to the same degree as before, and for the same reasons. For the Soviets are pursuing détente in the way we have described because the bag which formerly hung on our back has been shifted and now hangs on their back.

BIOGRAPHIC SUMMARY

A graduate of Princeton University, where he completed his undergraduate and graduate work, Professor Hartmann has had extensive teaching experience in civilian universities and service colleges. His major publications include *The Relations of Nations* and *The New Age of American Foreign Policy*. Currently he is Special Academic Advisor and Alfred Thayer Mahan Professor of Maritime Strategy at the Naval War College.

Rapid and extensive cultural, technological, social, political and economic changes are not only commonly recognized characteristics of the modern age, but also they have worked to produce an increasingly complex world. Recent applications, especially in engineering, have shown that the social sciences—anthropology, economics, geography, political science, sociology and linguistics—can help us to understand the extent and import of the seemingly intractable questions these changes have raised.

THE SOCIAL SCIENCES AND NATIONAL DEFENSE:

TRENDS, POTENTIALS AND ISSUES

by

Demitri B. Shimkin

Defining National Policies: An Evermore Difficult Problem. In 1977, the economic, diplomatic and, in large measure, military capacities of the United States, although enormous, are no longer as compelling in world affairs as they were in World War II and for a quarter-century thereafter. This change has been the cumulative result of a variety of developments: the progressive depletion of our mineral resources, and a corresponding rise of dependence upon imports; massive investment abroad, facilitating the growth of competing industrial capacities; profligate expenditures in the Vietnam War; the increasing costs of advanced weapons systems and their technological bases; weaknesses in domestic administration, including incapacities to maintain national transportation systems, to control costs in health care, to undertake systematic energy development, etc.; weaknesses in national morale; and instabilities in the Third World, and, in part, Europe.

At the same time, it must be emphasized that favorable changes have also been evident. Prominent among these have been the rise of China as a counterbalancing power to the Soviet Union; Soviet problems in agriculture and the consumer sector, and in the control of dissidence; Eastern European restlessness, and consequent drains upon Soviet power for military control and economic support, ideological and nationalistic resistances to Soviet and, in part, Chinese expansionism, especially by Moslem peoples; and world material and technical shortages which have made U.S. export capacities, especially for food, particularly strategic.

A basic result of these extremely complex changes has been to increase greatly the difficulty of determining appropriate policies, plans and actions, including those related to national

defense, in every major country. In fact, no small group of decisionmakers can follow, let alone evaluate or act on, the enormous mass of potentially relevant information on domestic and foreign developments that pours in day by day. And all of this is compounded by the visible conflict between traditional, "commonsense" aspirations of national power and ideological dominance, and the sheer maintenance limits of a planet dangerously burdened by resource depletions, pollution, and a soaring human population.

A classic paper by the great cybernetic expert W. Ross Ashby[1] brings out the limits of possible discovery let alone management in complex systems. He points out that the examination of all possibilities in a misleadingly simple problem, the number of illuminated patterns that can be presented in the lighting or darkness of an array of 20x20 (or 400) lamps enormously exceeds the limit of possible computability established by Bremermann on fundamental physical grounds. This limit has, in fact, already been passed in such a problem as the assessment of relationships—say, only, friendly, hostile and neutral—between the 130-odd members of the United Nations, pair by pair. A truly comprehensive, detailed global foreign intelligence that could cover even a major faction of all contingencies, is physically not attainable.

It is clear that if our country and the world at large are to cope with today's problems, let alone those of the future, a great need exists for vastly improved ways of information gathering and social management, including the control of armed conflicts. Here, the growing potential of the social sciences, especially in the United States, is among the assets that should be better and more extensively employed.

The Social Sciences: A Growing National Asset. The social (often termed social and behavioral) sciences usually are defined to include anthropology, economics, geography, political science, and sociology; linguistics is often included, while psychology (which includes many clinical and other practitioners) tends to be handled as a separate field. As an aggregate, the social sciences, even in the United States where they are most developed, are a small field. In 1956, 16,000 social scientists were included in *American Men of Science;* in 1973, 34,000. The corresponding figure for 1977 would be about 40,000. At the doctoral level, about one-fifth of the U.S. supply of scientists and engineers is in the social and behavioral sciences.

Technical Trends. Much more important than overall numbers has been the expansion of the social sciences into a wide array of specialties including particular foreign areas. Entire subfields, such as medical anthropology, have emerged, while regional experts with specialized language training and on-the-ground experience are now found for every significant part of the world. Moreover, the nature of social-science training at the doctoral and, increasingly, undergraduate levels, has changed profoundly since the 1950's.

Formal analytical methods resting on explicit assumptions, precisely defined data, and specified rules of relationship (which once were limited to economics) have become significant aspects of every social science.[2] Underlying this has been a widening sophistication in the philosophy of science. Genuine competence in a considerable range of mathematics, as opposed to a mere "cookbook" use of statistics, is now to be found in all good social-science departments. This has come partly through special programs for the mathematical training of practicing social scientists, and partly from the recruitment of well-trained students, including an appreciable proportion of former mathematicians, physicists and engineers.

Paralleling these developments has been very extensive work by psychologists, linguists, anthropologists, and sociologists on sources of error in the processes of eliciting information from people. J.A. Williams' work in the 1960's[3] is illustrative. It evaluated the degree to which social distances between interviewers and respondents, on the one hand, and the degree of threat carried by the questions asked, on the other, biased the answers given. The respondents were black people in North Carolina; it is clear that their answers to high-status white and lower-status black interviewers were significantly different, especially in threatening areas.

Improved research design, better and more efficient data-gathering procedures, and the widespread use of computers by social scientists have generated an explosive growth of systematic social information over the past decade. The contents of the 500-odd computer data sets of the Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research for 1976-1977[4] may be cited as a case in point. The topics covered include historical and contemporary curves enumerations; community and urban studies; investigations of conflict, aggression, violence, and wars; economic behavior and attitudes; education; elite and leadership; environment and natural resources; governmental structures, politics and capabilities; instructional packages and computer programs; international linkages, relationships and events; legal systems; data on legislative and deliberative bodies; mass political behavior and attitudes; organizational behavior; social indicators; and social institutions and behavior. Many of these sets cover foreign areas, especially Latin America and Europe. Almost all are very substantial. For example, Inglehart and Robier's "1970 European Communities Study" (ICPSR 7260) has data on six countries drawn from 10,542 respondents.[5] It probed in some depth attitudes toward the unification of Europe, and toward world society and politics, with emphasis upon the informants' views of appropriate government priorities.

Applications: The Social Sciences and Domestic Federal Programs. Over the past decade, social scientists have entered significantly in attacks upon large, complex policy planning and management problems. A major impetus for this development was a comprehensive review of the use of social research in Federal domestic programs initiated by Hon. Henry Reuss, the Chairman of the Research and Technical Programs Subcommittee of the House Committee on Government Operations. Dr. Harold Orlans of the Brookings Institution directed the study, which has been published in four volumes.[6]

This effort focused on six applied programs: crime and law enforcement; education; poverty; social aspects of illness and medical care; social welfare; and urban problems. It sought not merely to develop current facts but to explore the wider policy problem of "... the extent to which social scientists should or can assist the Federal Government in its research on social problems."[7] The study harvested an enormous range of opinion, some facts of a largely statistical nature, but little discernible direction. Its most useful results were to point out a number of administrative problems, especially the protection of the rights of human subjects of research.[8]

Paradoxically, the apparent failure of the Reuss-Orlans study was the basis of its indirect influence. It brought together much work and thinking on the practical applications of the social sciences, and visibly brought the problems of both directions and cohesive, productive methods. Indirectly, it set the stage for stronger efforts arising out of Federal legislation, such as the National Environmental Policy Act of

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1969, the initiatives of Federal agencies, and the felt obligations of professional bodies.

Applications: Engineering and the Social Sciences. These more productive developments can be sketched out by a brief coverage of three cases: the recruitment of social scientists into engineering planning and design efforts; the growth of technical assessments of the Soviet economy, by the Congressional Joint Economic Committee; and the recent aspirations of the International Studies Association to appraise the effects of governmental institutions, worldwide, on "human dignity."

In 1968, the National Academy of Engineering undertook an exploration of the problems and potentials of assessing the impacts of new technologies at congressional request.[9] The efforts of its 31-man task force, which included only two social scientists, were devoted to analyzing three nascent developments as "experiments." These were the use of instructional television and computer-assisted instruction in higher education, the abatement of noise in subsonic commercial aviation; and the use of automated, computerized multiphasic health screening to identify medical problems in the supposedly well population. The major results of these exercises were to suggest logical evaluative procedures, to formulate improved concepts of interested parties, and to indicate the need for robust decision criteria. In the key area of social benefit versus technological risk the task force used historical accident records as measures of acceptable rates, citing as its justification: " . . . the absence of economic or sociological theory which might do better."[10] In justice to the task force, it perceived its results to be quite preliminary. It urged that, for the future:

> . . . The necessary, thorough investigation of the sociological and political impacts of technologies under assessment requires extensive participation by behavioral and political scientists. The NAE experiments in technology assessment indicated that engineers and economists were able to work in harmony with those other professionals.[11]

In 1972, the Sloan Foundation funded efforts by a number of leading schools of engineering to explore the best methods of incorporating the viewpoints, methodologies and results of the social sciences and humanities into engineering, practice and education. An ultimate result of this effort was a conference convened in 1975 by the American Society of Civil Engineers, on "Human Factors in Civil Engineering Planning, Design and Education." In addition to civil engineers, the conference included representation from architecture and environmental design, anthropology, geography, industrial engineering and human factors, operations research and systems engineering, economics, social psychology and other behavioral sciences. Social science approaches were formulated in processual and, in part, as mathematical models. A large range of considerations was covered, from human sensory response to physical variables to the behavioral aspects of fire safety. Particular attention was given to attitude measurement and its relationship to public systems planning, design, and operation. The group concluded that " . . . the final criterion determining the success of a project will be based on its acceptance by the people whom it affects."[12]

In sum, a partnership between engineering and the social sciences, with profound reciprocal influences in thinking and techniques, is now emerging.

Applications: Research on the Soviet Economy. Perhaps the largest scale, most competent and most effective application of the social sciences to issues of national policy, including

defense, has been the continuing study of Soviet and Allied economics by governmental, academic and business economists. The partial results of this work have been published over the past 20 years and more by the Joint Economic Committee of the Congress. In particular, the 1976 report[13] exemplifies a very broad, deep, technically excellent and cohesive undertaking of manifest importance to Western and—quite likely—Soviet policymakers.

The report communicates the work of 51 authors representing 26 institutions as diverse as the Central Intelligence Agency, *The New York Times* and Hebrew University (Jerusalem). It is unified by broad, professional concerns with truly reliable findings on the Soviet Union, and common backgrounds in rigorous quantitative methods (generated especially by Harvard's economists) and an extensive, systematic, shared knowledge of the institutional and quantitative raw materials. The efforts of the group have been supported by the development of a medium-scale econometric model, designed to "... reflect Western understanding of Soviet economic institutions and bureaucratic behavior."[14] This model is, moreover, used with judicious care as only one element of a judgmental process which has embodied both a variety of qualitative aspects and the viewpoints of both conservatives and liberals, econometricians and more intuitive analysts.

In this work, traditional economic considerations have been broadened to include assessments of population, natural resources, and technological innovations. But there are significant gaps, nonetheless. The most important of these relate to the nature and significance of Soviet socioeconomic and political stratification, particularly between the population of Russia, other North European, and caucasian and Central Asiatic nationalities. The question of consumer anticipations with particular attention to the balances between needed motivation and effective coercion, and to the colossal costs of a quasi-voluntary Siberian development might have been more deeply explored. And, of course, the uncertainties surrounding military expenditures limit attainable results, as the authors indicate with great clarity.

The greatest weakness of the study is that it is a publication by excellent economists and related professionals written for their peers. The summary is uniformative, and the various interpretative articles are sometimes remote from the central evidence. A second-phase report, which could reflect the exploration of these massive materials by policymakers and planners, civilian and military, governmental and private, in interaction with the authors, would indeed have been valuable.

Applications: A Proposed "Global Monitoring System" by Political Scientists. Social scientists have, in recent years, sought not only to be team members in policy and planning, but institutional innovators as well. One of the boldest proposals of this type has been that "policy scientists" unite to form a cooperative, nongovernmental global monitoring system to assess and communicate "... the impact of governmental actions on espoused official goals and on the attainment and distribution of basic human values. Taken collectively, these basic values can be summarized as human dignity...."[15] As the authors see the results of this political monitoring, it would:

> ... allow the governmental actors themselves (the public sector) and—in at best some societies—individual citizen (the civic sector) to determine whether or not alternative policies should be advocated. Whatever the difficulties encountered in the formulation of alternative strategies of change based on systematic knowledge and information from monitoring,

> such redirection of government action would not be a leap into the unknown. It would be an attempt to *make* the future, rather than simply to *know* it.[16]

The Snyder, Hermann and Lasswell proposal is sophisticated in many respects. The discussions of potential data bases, methodologies, and procedures of application are farseeing yet represent sound extrapolation from today's technical levels. But the proposal is curiously provincial in its broader assumptions: it is neither global nor socially universalist but rather an appeal for American academic political scientists and their associates abroad to seek coherent influence, if not power. While the ultimate rationale of the proposal is the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,[17] the question as to whether the proposed monitoring is not really a proper function of a perhaps revitalized United Nations is never raised. Although it was the nominal central topic of the 1977 meetings of the International Studies Association,[18] the idea of the "Global Monitoring System" has apparently captured few enthusiasts. Only a small minority of social scientists see themselves as Philosopher Kings.

Trends in U.S. Social Sciences—A Summary. Social scientists, although still a relatively small professional group, have almost tripled their numbers over the past 20 years. Moreover, while naive design, poor documentation, and bad reasoning have not disappeared, technical standards among the better social scientists have improved enormously. Great expansions in substantive knowledge, much more reliable data gathering, storage, and retrieval, sounder epistomology including good to excellent mathematics; and major conceptual advances, especially in systems analysis and modeling have become general. Fruitful areas of application have developed, particularly in cooperation with engineers. Difficulties of translation between technical results and policies and plans are still evident. And the rates of social scientists as institutional members or as power-hunting entrepreneurs remain somewhat ambiguous.

The Social Sciences and National Defense: Some Potential Applications. Let us now consider in what way the social sciences can now or in the visible future become useful actors in policies, plans or actions related to U.S. national security and, more narrowly, the national defense. The focus of this assessment is *technical;* the many problems related to the *desirability* of such efforts are the subjects of the next section.

In broadest terms, the social sciences can aid in the more informed and rational management of problems largely at two levels—particular local, individual and small group phenomena and macrophenomena at the national and longer term perspectives. They can discourage badly conceived plans and enhance technically sound operations. But they cannot offset dominating situations: no propaganda to win Vietnamese "minds and hearts" could be effective in the presence of merciless bombings.

Within the realm of social phenomena—authority and support relationships, semantics, value systems, group and personal strategies, and the like—social scientists are particularly competent in evaluating primary observations, especially from the standpoints of source and method of observation, and in terms of contextual interpretation of social structure and social events. It must be emphasized in this regard that many of the hoary standards of observational evaluation utilized an intelligence almost everywhere are very unreliable. In Cuba, there was abundant confirmation of dissidence prior to the Bay of Pigs. But the narrow span of the dissidence in terms of class and place needed

the social science technique of assessing sampling bias for identification.

By the same token, the development of even approximate models of population composition, social structure, value orientations and decision and bargaining loci can yield more valid information, and greater economies as well. Approximations of probability sampling, operationally precise question formulations and statistical testing for the adequacy of information can be utilized to these ends. Their greater efficiency cannot only reduce unnecessary efforts but in doing so can reduce the immense noise of meaningless reporting that often serves to mask really important indications. Moreover, careful evaluations of the interrelations of various data sensors, e.g., responses to public opinion surveys, political humor, and private and public broadcasts, can serve to reconstruct missing data in other areas where, say, only official sources and scattered unofficial data are available.

In projecting the future and in planning, social scientists can provide the fruits of two types of competence. On one hand, with saturation in the patterns and dynamics of a particular society or social area (economics, communications, etc.) they are likely to have sound intuitive judgments. Characteristically, they will identify gaping holes and contradictions in basic assumptions, or downgrade alarming predictions in terms of local realties. Much more rarely, they will have positive suggestions emanating from observed trends in the society under consideration. On the other hand, social scientists can be important participants in model building and simulations.

As participants in military activities, social scientists are useful both as trained, acute and discriminating observers with a wide gamut of techniques, and as model builders capable of generating questions of system coherence. This effectiveness depends greatly on the degree to which they can be brought into the serious essence rather than the cosmetic surface of problems. For example, no approach to the psychological problems of military personnel can be adequate that fails to consider their ultimate requirement: to kill and be killed when properly ordered.

These somewhat newer capacities of the social sciences should not obscure older but still fundamental applications. Psychologists, sociologists, linquists and anthropologists can aid in the classification and evaluation of skills, in the evaluation of communication and learning effectiveness, in the design of equipment and operating groups consonant rather than in conflict with human capacities, and in the identification of problems such as alcoholism that every organization has and seeks to control.

Issues: Social Scientists, Social Science and National Defense. At the present time, the relations of social scientists and the use of social science skills in fields even remotely related to problems of national security or defense are extremely emotional issues among many Americans. At one extreme, held by many powerful academic figures, is the position of total abstention on the grounds of corruption and evil in everything smacking of U.S. national interests. Out of this come heavy pressures, sometimes blatantly illegal, to coerce social scientists from any role of aid or support especially to the Central Intelligence Agency. At the other extreme are the aggressive defenders of the status quo who justify every error and illegality of our own past, and who regard any questioning, especially by civilian academic people, as communistic or at least impudent.

This is a very bad state of affairs. From my standpoint, as I have played the game for many years, a compelling dual need exists, for leadership and for stewardship. The affairs of this nation

including its roles abroad are so complex and so determinative, actively or negatively, for the world at large that those capable of practical or intellectual leadership have the obligation to serve our nation. By the same token, that service must be conducted with the maximum wisdom and courage with which one is capable. Hard problems of power and conflict must be faced; simply to decry them and pretend they do not exist or to offer self-serving fantasies as substitutes is an evasion of hard responsibilities. But the proper exercise of these responsibilities also requires that questions of morality, and honest accountability, including those of personal conscience, be faced each day.

I know of no easy way that this country can return to the kind of moral consensus that it had in regard to the war against Hitler or to the Marshall Plan. Yet if our tasks in the many dimensions of national life are to prosper, the dialogues needed for such a reunification must proceed. And among the most important of these, practically and symbolically, are those between the social scientist and the soldier.

The gaining of reciprocal respect is an essential but only an initial step in examining many of the philosophical issues that must be identified if never fully resolved in the application of the social sciences to key national problems.

What are the fundamental values to be pursued? Is our national sovereignty an overriding consideration? Should new entities, a Eur-America perhaps, be goals of the future? And within the framework of nation states or their successors, what rights should persons have? And by whom, by what means, and to what limits should these rights be secured?

In quite a different vein, how are conflicts to be construed? How real, how unconditional is the persistent Soviet drive for universal communism? To what extent is the issue not one of kill or be killed but rather one of bargaining for limited goals by pragmatic powers?

Perhaps the most difficult question is that of using valid knowledge when it conflicts with preconception or special interest. Here is the underlying weakness of all advisers, particularly in areas of necessary secrecy. All too often, sins attributed to faulty advice have been those of advice refused. An illustration is pertinent. In late 1945, a task force headed by Dr. William Shockley was commissioned to evaluate when the Soviet Union would explode its first operational atomic weapon. Using extensive informational resources and careful systems design, including specific index items, such as the capacity to produce ultrapure graphite, the group estimated the date to be 1 January 1950. The report was submitted to Dr. Oppenheimer and General Graves, whose quick opinions were, respectively, "15 years" and "never." The Shockley report was thus overridden by self-serving opinions, with sad historical consequences.

To bring this argument to a sharp point: The social sciences are increasingly able to contribute importantly to difficult, increasingly intractable ques-

BIOGRAPHIC SUMMARY

A graduate of the University of California, Berkeley, Professor Shimkin served in the U.S. Army during World War II. Since then he has been a member of the Institute for Advanced Studies at Princeton, a Research Associate at the Russian Research Center, Harvard University, and a member of the faculty, Naval War College. He is now Professor of Anthropology and Geography, University of Illinois. Since 1975 he has been a member of the Task Committee on Bioengineering and Human Factors of the American Society of Civil Engineers.

tions of national policy, including those of national defense. This use is hampered by perceived conflicts of morality and reliability, although these have been overcome to a considerable extent in such limited areas as the evaluation of the Soviet economy. It is of great importance that these conflicts between academic and military people be resolved. Beyond these issues are many philosophical ones that have no absolute answers, but which need extensive review by both parties if the bases for sound policies, plans and actions, including the proper use of social science skills, are to be attained for our nation.

NOTES

1. W. Ross Ashby, "Analysis of the System to be Modeled," Ralph M. Stogdill, ed., *The Process of Model-Building in the Behavioral Sciences* (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1970), pp. 94-114.

2. An illustrative recent handbook is H.M. Blalock, Jr., ed., *Causal Models in the Social Sciences* (Chicago: Aldine Publishing Co., 1971).

3. J.A. Williams, "Interviewer-respondent Interaction: A Study of Bias in Information Interviews" in Raymond Cochrane, ed., *Advances in Social Research* (London: Constable, 1973), pp. 229-248.

4. Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research, *Guide to Resources and Sciences 1976-1977* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan, Institute for Social Research, 1976).

5. *Ibid.*, p. 252.

6. Ninetieth Congress, 1st sess., House of Representatives, "The Use of Social Research in Federal Domestic Programs." A Staff Study for the Research and Technical Programs Subcommittee of the Committee on Government Operations (Washington: U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1967), 4 vols.

7. *Ibid.*, v. 1, p. iv.

8. See v. 4, pp. 187-458.

9. Committee on Science and Astronautics, U.S. House of Representatives, "A Study of Technology Assessment." Report to the Committee on Public Engineering Policy, National Academy of Engineering (Washington: U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1969).

10. *Ibid.*, p. 19.

11. *Ibid.*, p. 4.

12. George C. Lee and Tiyokan Hung, eds., *Proceedings of the Specialty Conference on Human Factors in Civil Engineering Planning, Design and Education* (Buffalo: State University of New York, 1976), p. 3.

13. Ninety-fourth Congress, 2nd sess., "Soviet Economy in a New Perspective." A compendium of Papers Submitted to the Joint Economic Committee, Congress of the United States (Washington: U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1976).

14. *Ibid.*, p. 302.

15. Richard C. Snyder, et al., "A Global Monitoring System: Appraising the Effects of Government on Human Dignity," *International Studies Quarterly*, v. 20, pp. 221-260, 1976. See p. 222.

16. *Ibid.*, pp. 222-223.

17. *Ibid.*, p. 230.

18. International Studies Association, Preliminary Program of the XVIII Annual Convention, *Worldwide Appraisal of Institutions: Toward Realizing Human Dignity* (Columbus: The Mershon Center, Ohio State University, 1977).

In World War I and again in World War II the United States and Great Britain enjoyed a close and cooperative relationship while fighting a common enemy. However, during the interwar period relations became strained at times for a variety of reasons. The Naval Conferences of this period reflect the successes, strains and problems encountered in Anglo-American relations during this period.

THE NAVAL CONFERENCES OF THE INTERWAR YEARS:

A STUDY IN ANGLO-AMERICAN RELATIONS

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Alliance in war often seems to be the best preparation for rivalry in peacetime; and perhaps not surprisingly when one thinks of the unaccustomed pressures which war exerts on governments as well as on individuals. When the emergency is over it is natural that thoughts and policies should resume those more independent lines which common danger temporarily obscures. Yet war compels the recognition of priorities. And it is a chastening reflection on human wisdom—or the lack of it—that, in the return to the easier times of peace, men so often forget or deliberately ignore the correctness of those difficult choices which war had earlier forced upon them. One example of this is to be seen in relations between the United States and the United Kingdom between the two World Wars, and particularly in relations to naval affairs seen through the perspective of a series of conferences dealing with naval limitation and disarmament.

The naval conferences of the interwar years, and the story of Anglo-American relationships in that context, have already given rise to a wide range of historical studies and continue to do so. The purpose of this essay is not to summarize that literature or to deal with any single conference in detail; but rather to try to see the story in outline and as a whole as a commentary on a relationship which began and ended in alliance but which, in between, seemed often to thrive only on distrust and suspicion.

The treaties resulting from the Washington Conference of 1921-22 were, by any standards, a landmark in the history of arms limitation. It could be argued that navies are more easily dealt with in this way than either air forces or armies. Nonetheless, Washington, which formed the basis for the London Treaty of 1930, and was so near to doing the same for yet another treaty in 1936, represents a degree of success which the

League's Preparatory Commission on Disarmament and the Geneva Conference of 1932 never approached. Much of this was due to the perception and wisdom of many of those—both politicians and sailors—who either prepared the ground for the Conference or actually took part in it.

There undoubtedly was a good deal of suspicion—and sometimes animosity—shown in the views expressed in both Britain and America about the other in the 2 years before the Washington meeting. None of this, however, approached the virulent anti-Americanism expressed by Sir Warren Fisher 10 years later, or even the more controlled but certainly hardening suspicions of politicians and sailors on both sides of the Atlantic in the period of the 1927 Geneva Conference. Indeed, there were some whose awareness of long-term trends in world events was startlingly clear and who foresaw the likely future dependence of each country upon the other. This was certainly true of Lord Grey, formerly Britain's Foreign Secretary, when he stated the terms on which he would undertake a special mission to the United States in 1919.[1] It was equally true of the new British First Sea Lord, Lord Beatty. He argued that it was inconceivable for Britain to seek to continue an alliance with Japan "which can only have for its object protection against the United States;" and, more positively, urged upon his colleagues that an understanding with the United States, upon a basis of naval equality, should be their first aim, both for the sake of economy and "from the far mightier motive of a union between the English-speaking nations of the world."[2] There can rarely have been a more committed statement of the concept of the "special relationship."[3] In other words, British and American negotiators at Washington still had a substantial fund of goodwill to draw upon despite the fact that there were attitudes of other kinds also at work.

What was less promising about the preliminaries to Washington was the degree of ignorance each country showed about the anxieties and plans of the other. In 1920-21 there was nothing to compare with the detailed exchange of views which preceded the two London Conferences and even, to some extent, that held at Geneva. This was not altogether surprising. It took time for each country to appreciate changes brought about by a major war and there had been no prewar discussions of issues of this kind. Of course, there were detailed plans and discussions within each country. But these plans and discussions were larded with doubts and hypotheses about the other, as, for example, in a Foreign Office view that it would be "of extreme difficulty" to draw up a satisfactory working agreement on Pacific matters with the United States, and that independently of considerations related to Japan.[3] It is true that America's failure to enter the League and her refusal to guarantee the security of France had left a bad taste in the mouth. While for the Americans the Anglo-Japanese alliance was an unpleasant fact and its continuation a distinct and even more unpleasant possibility. Yet there simply was not the evidence to support the view, in either country, that agreement with the other would be difficult, let alone impossible. Old prejudices and assumptions, no doubt with the help of some irritating memories of Britain's naval blockade on the one hand and the threat of America's 1916 building program on the other, took the place of serious argument. Whether, without Mr. Meighen's pressure at the Imperial Conference of 1921, the British Government would have opted for a renewal of the Japanese alliance it is impossible to say. But his very forcefulness on that occasion at least brought the debate much closer to solid, firm ground. And when the Washington Conference itself took place many vague fears proved groundless.

Given this somewhat unpromising background to the Conference, what was remarkable was how successful—and in how short a time—the Washington Conference proved to be. It would have been difficult to anticipate the amenability, even docility, of the Japanese both about China and the Pacific and about ratios in naval strength. But if there was a certain amount of luck in that respect it was surely wise of all concerned to limit naval discussions mostly to matters concerning battleships. This was in many ways the simplest issue of all. And once the Coalition Government in London had overridden its professional advisers on the subject of the proposed building holiday (an American proposal, incidentally), then little remained but the details. Of course, there was dissatisfaction with some of the terms of the agreement, particularly in the Royal Navy. But a race in battleship construction had been avoided and money saved, as well as rivalry avoided all around. What had begun in ignorance and suspicion ended in an awareness of mutual benefits.

If Washington suggested that good sense, an informed awareness of common interests and blood relationship could permanently overcome prejudice in Anglo-American relationships then it was misleading. In fact, what followed in the 1920's showed those relationships at their worst for a long time—whether before or since. At Washington, as has been pointed out already, discussion was largely confined to capital ships. Cruisers were dealt with to some extent but not to the point of danger. It was on cruiser programs, however, that the difficulties of the next 10 years were to hang. As students of naval history are well aware, the problems at issue between the United States and the United Kingdom in this matter were that of total cruiser tonnage and the size of individual ships. The Americans preferred larger ships with heavier guns; the British smaller ships with lighter guns. But, and this was critical for the debate, the British argued that their worldwide spread of political and economic interests demanded an absolute and not a relative figure for their total cruiser tonnage. Their needs were greater, therefore their ships for trade protections should be more numerous. The Americans did not, and argued that they could not, agree. They demanded parity.

The curious thing is that a year or so before these problems were considered at the Geneva Naval Conference of 1927 the two countries seemed close to agreement. Going a stage further at Geneva by embodying agreement in a formal document, and even more so bearing in mind the comparative ease with which the Washington terms had been reached, therefore seemed to be in the natural course of events. The fact that events did not take that course probably accounts for some of the disillusionment about the prospects of common action between the two countries which affected some British politicians and sailors throughout the remainder of the interwar years.

At Geneva the Americans took their stand squarely on the statement that "equality with Great Britain is the sole basis on which a just treaty limitation can be imposed."[4] The British, with rather more argument, although equally inflexible, held to their claim of special need, justifying that need in emotional words used by Lord Balfour some years before when he claimed that "no citizen of the British Empire . . . can ever forget that it is by sea communication that he lives, and that without sea communication he and the Empire to which he belongs would perish together."[5] As for Japan, her delegation sat in the middle disguising, by an amenability even greater than that shown at Washington, that she was the real potential enemy with whom both the other powers should have been primarily concerned.

Geneva was a complete failure. Why, is a less simple matter. There were those in the United Kingdom who blamed themselves for inadequate preparation, particularly at the political level. And if one accepts the view of a contemporary that "technical arguments are only political arguments dressed up in uniform,"[6] then they were probably right. Certainly the strategic needs of the two countries—apart from their common opposition to the danger of Japanese expansion in east Asia—were sufficiently different to demand a great deal of explanation, explanation easier for politicians than for sailors to offer. But the explanation for what was, after all, unexpected failure at Geneva cannot end there.

The conference saw a display of sheer animosity of a kind which was not exhibited in public again, whatever the private views of individuals on some later occasions. And here the offense seems to have been greater on the American side. It may be, as Roskill quite reasonably argues, that the American Navy General Board and its representatives at Geneva used Britain simply as a cover to disguise policies which were anti-Japanese in purpose and, as such, unacceptable to many people in the United States.[7] Be that as it may, the combination of a "big-Navyite" American professional representation at Geneva with an anti-British press—typified by the Hearst newspapers—at home produced an atmosphere of national hostility and bitterness quite different from anything seen at Washington or, later, at London. Lord Bridgeman, the head of the British delegation at Geneva complained that "every little incident has been used to make mischief,"[8] and went so far as to say in a letter to King George V that it was "evident that no agreement which did not humiliate the British Empire was likely to find acceptance" with the Americans.[9] Bridgeman had had a good deal of trouble with his own colleagues in London, as well as with the American negotiators in Geneva, and could be forgiven for being overwrought. But his complaints were not entirely exaggerated.

One would have expected the unforeseen bitterness of the Geneva discussions to make those involved in future negotiations at least more cautious even if not much wiser. The British could be forgiven for feeling sore and disappointed. But at least they had been warned. And if the Prime Minister, Baldwin, really thought (as he is reported to have said at this time) that America was "a hundred years behind us politically,"[10] then he and his colleagues had a clear obligation to behave accordingly. Yet a year later they acted in a way which belied their own assumed standards.

After Geneva, disarmament talks naturally reverted to the League's Preparatory Commission. The work of the Commission so far had given very little hint of a possible accord between the British and the French. The League, however, was concerned with general, not only naval disarmament and it was this which, basically, offered some prospect of closer accord between Britain and France. Concessions by one country in one area of military security might be met by concessions by the other country in another area. Besides, or so the French argued, they had some problems in naval matters vis-à-vis Italy similar in kind to those which Britain had in relation to the United States, the issue of parity in particular. Neither Italy nor America, so the French argued, would recognize these particular problems. So why should not Britain and France get together and enforce recognition by a common front? And the British, after Geneva, were in a frame of mind to accept a little consolation.

What now took place did so, it must be remembered, formally within the framework of the League's Preparatory Commission and the negotiations associated with the Commission's work. There

were talks between British and French naval representatives in Paris in November 1927. There was nothing necessarily sinister about this. It had been disagreement between the French and British which had led to a stalemate at the Commission's previous session, and it was quite natural to undertake bilateral talks in the hope of preventing a repetition of that deadlock. By early 1928 the French proposals had been considered within the Admiralty and passed on to Ministers. Although there were differences between the two national points of view, there seemed at least some hope that agreement might be reached on the basis of offering the French the flexibility of switching tonnage between different classes of vessels while giving the British what they wanted, i.e., a division of cruiser classes with emphasis on smaller, more lightly armed types. These were matters on which neither country had so far achieved its aims.

In early March 1928, views were being exchanged at the League's headquarters in Geneva between the French Foreign Affairs Minister, Briand, and the British Foreign Secretary, Austen Chamberlain. It seems clear that the French were, from the beginning, pushing the pace in these talks, and Briand specifically compared Anglo-American with Franco-Italian relationships. "In each case," he argued, "our [i.e., French and British] overseas responsibilities were much greater, and our sea communications much larger [than those of Italy or America]. It would be to our mutual advantage, when the proper time came, jointly to press that these factors should form the basis of assessment of the cruiser strength that we could justifiably claim." And although there were differences to be ironed out, Chamberlain felt able to report to the Cabinet in London that "it was agreed that M. Briand's proposal was a sufficiently satisfactory basis of negotiation to recommend for the consideration of the Admiralty in the first instance and later of the Cabinet." He added that there was now hope of an Anglo-French agreement when these matters came before the Commission in the summer of that year, thus ensuring Britain French support in possible subsequent negotiations, "whereas at present we had none, having alienated at the three power conference [Geneva] the Americans, who had been our ally at the Preparatory Commission".[11]

There is no intention here of going in detail into the events of the next 3 or 4 months, or of suggesting that France and Britain now worked hand-in-glove continuously. There were ups and downs in Anglo-French relationships, and even a fear on the part of the British that the French might try a deal with the Americans instead. But in late June 1928 the French produced an offer of mixed army and navy proposals, not very different in principle from Briand's March offer, which appeared to the British to be a workable compromise. In this, each country would, in proposals which the two countries would later put to the Preparatory Commission, get naval disarmament provisions to its liking, the French also scoring a second gain in proposals concerning army reserves. If neither participant used the word "deal" about these proposals, it was an obvious description from the viewpoint of any outsider. And a "deal" in such circumstances was bound to appear, even to pro-British Americans, as an attempt on the part of Britain by backstairs methods to try to get from a minor naval power what her naval equal had been unwilling to agree to at Geneva. And there were more than enough Americans who were not remotely pro-British and who were anxious to make the most of any opportunity.

Technically the British Government behaved properly, as in 1935 before the signing of the Anglo-German naval agreement of that year. The other interested powers were told of the details

and invited to comment. Unfortunately, proper diplomatic secrecy was not preserved. As in December 1935 with the Hoare-Laval discussions, details were leaked in Paris to the press while delicate diplomatic maneuvering was still going on. As so often, publicity heightened offense and made levelheaded discussion virtually impossible, particularly when an ill-considered French comment—of no official significance—suggested that Britain and France were now reverting to the pre-1914 entente.[12] The American Navy General Board regarded the draft terms of an Anglo-French agreement as even more objectionable than the British proposals at Geneva the year before, limiting, as they proposed to do, provision for large cruisers but doing virtually nothing to provide for restrictions on smaller vessels. It was clear that the Americans would have nothing to do with what their former allies had in mind, and the Anglo-French proposals died an ignominious death. The bitter debate, however, lasted on until near the end of the year.

The allocation of blame for this curious nonevent, with its undoubtedly harmful effect on Anglo-American relations, is something over which historians have differed widely. Roskill, in a very moderate summing up, argues it was unreasonable to heap so much blame on the British. To consider terms with France was perfectly proper from the point of view of the work of the Preparatory Commission; those terms originated not in Britain but in France; and they were fully communicated on a "for discussion" basis to the other powers directly concerned.[13] All that is true as far as it goes. But it is also true that the possibly inflammatory effect of the French proposals on known American susceptibilities should have been clear to any experienced negotiator, whether in the Foreign Office or the Admiralty, from the beginning.

Austen Chamberlain, it is true, had been seriously ill, and appears not to have been sufficiently recovered to display his normal adept handling of affairs. Moreover, he had already been accused—both in the House of Commons and outside—of being exaggeratedly pro-French. Once the unexpected and unwelcome public debate had begun he gave too much opportunity for rumor to spread before making information officially available. The Admiralty, too, including the First Lord, Bridgeman, were not entirely without fault. It was quite proper for the Admiralty to give the French overtures serious attention and not everyone in the Department was enthusiastic about the various draft proposals. On the other hand, both before this episode and immediately afterwards the Admiralty was distinctly unenthusiastic about the principles of disarmament adopted by the Baldwin government. Now, in June 1928 with what the sailors wanted in sight, some of them pushed hard for an arrangement which they must have known would antagonize their American counterparts. What appears to have been lacking was a sense of reality about who mattered, and no irritation could excuse that misjudgment.

But the real tragedy lay elsewhere. There had been clear signs of anti-Americanism in Britain in 1927. Winston Churchill is a good example. And in 1928 he was even more vociferous on this score, arguing that an Anglo-French agreement on naval disarmament would be an expression of Britain's independence of America in this vital area. But there were now others who were as extreme as he. Baldwin's biographers quote a later comment on the Prime Minister that "he has got to loathe Americans so much that he hates meeting them" as originating in the events of 1927-28.[14] Hankey, Secretary to the Cabinet now and for a further 10 years, was equally explicit. And Hankey was no mere civil servant. He wrote to his immediate inferior, Tom Jones, in early

October 1928, complaining that Britain had been practicing the policy of conceding to America for too long and without any obvious gain:

> We played up to America over the League Covenant, abandonment of the Japanese alliance and so on, always making concessions and being told that the next step would change their attitude. Yet they are, as a result, more overbearing and suspicious against us than anyone else . . . I would make no more concessions to the Americans and I am convinced that we cannot "square yardarms" over the naval agreement . . . You can't do business with them. The only plan I can see is to make an agreement with those with whom we can agree.[15]

This was undoubtedly the lowest point to which relations between the two countries sank in the interwar years. There could be nothing but losers in such a situation. But, fortunately, signs of an improvement were not far off. Both heads of government, Coolidge and Baldwin, were determined to mend the bridges broken in the past 18 months and were already busy doing so before the end of the year. Both seem to have reached the conclusion that naval disarmament was too important a matter to be left to the sailors, although in terms of sheer intransigence no British sailor approached the performance of Adm. Hilary Jones, the American chief naval adviser at Geneva. And both heads of government were succeeded, Coolidge by Hoover and Baldwin by MacDonald some months later on, by new men even more committed to a new naval agreement than they had been themselves. To add further incentive there were the effects of the American Cruiser Bill which received Senate approval in early February 1929. On the one hand, the British were made even more painfully aware of American shipbuilding potential and of the virtual impossibility of competing with it. On the other, the Bill itself increased opposition to the "Big-Navy" program and party in the United States, thus increasing pressure on the President to reach a further limitation agreement with the other naval powers.

In this favorable atmosphere the London Naval Conference of 1930, which prolonged the battleship building holiday for a further 6 years and, most notably, brought cruisers within the scope of the 1922 ratios, was a success as remarkable in its own way as Washington. Despite some rumblings of discontent the Japanese agreed to continue their inferior status and to widen its scope. More important for our immediate purposes agreement was reached, on paper at any rate, between the previously widely different views about large and smaller cruisers. As part of that agreement the Royal Navy resigned its claim to an "absolute" complement of 70 cruisers and accepted a total of 50 instead. Whatever the unsettled issues in the background, this was the bright light of day compared with the gloom of 1927-28. But it should be remembered that the ground had been most carefully prepared for the London Conference, both within each country and between them, the latter particularly at a political level.

The most startling change in 1930 was undoubtedly the British acceptance of a future cruiser total well below any figure considered previously. Several things are worth noting in this context. First, MacDonald was in full charge of events on the British side as Baldwin had not been. MacDonald was still a political force to be reckoned with. He was not, in this Ministry, his own Foreign Secretary, but he knew quite well what he wanted and was determined to get it; for him this was a matter ultimately for political decision. Moreover, with his sights on the full Geneva Conference on Disarmament due to open in the spring of 1932,

failure over further naval limitation would be an unacceptable prelude to the wider issues yet to be tackled. Secondly, MacDonald and the Foreign Secretary, Henderson, did consult the Admiralty in detail, and both Admiralty and Committee of Imperial Defense records bear witness to that. Of course the sailors were reluctant to give way and made that clear to the Prime Minister; but they cannot, as senior advisers to Ministers, have been unaware that their advice was only one component in the process of decisionmaking. To the end of his life Admiral Chatfield, soon to be first Sea Lord and, despite the claims of Beatty, surely the most influential sailor of the interwar years, maintained that MacDonald had deceived his naval advisers. A fairer judgment would be that the Prime Minister accepted his own proper responsibilities. But, thirdly, however reluctantly the Royal Navy accepted the about-face in their previous cruiser demands embodied in the London terms, they did so with two warnings which it was perfectly proper to give. One, that the much lower cruiser tonnage which Britain was now allocated was acceptable only "if the European situation was so improved as to give reasonable security for ten or twelve years, with a chance of further improvement." Two, that the Royal Navy "could regard naval requirements as satisfied for a limited period with a number of 50 cruisers [only] provided proper provision was made in the meanwhile for the steady replacement of our war-built cruisers."[16] On the first, the Foreign Office still felt able, on balance, to forecast peace or at least no major war for 10 years; but clearly such a forecast could be proved wrong. On the second, the Labor Chancellor of the Exchequer, Snowden, was adamant in his resistance to the increased expenditure involved in a replacement program, and he had his way.

From the British point of view there was from the beginning a big question mark against the continued viability of the terms reached at the first London Conference. The actual terms of the cruiser clauses were basically unsatisfactory from Britain's point of view. Those clauses did not specify total numbers of cruisers which could be retained in future, but did limit by total class tonnages, i.e., overall totals of 8"-gun and 6"-gun ships. Within these totals each country had freedom of choice how and what to build up to a maximum tonnage of 10,000 tons for any one vessel. For example, Britain's total tonnage allocation would allow her to build 50 ships of an average displacement of 6,750 tons, some with 8" and others with 6" guns, building less or more according to the tonnage for each selected ship. America and Japan were correspondingly free. But the British had all along claimed that their problem of trade protection, with its demand for numerous light cruisers, was different from anything which faced the Americans and Japanese. Yet if these two countries were to opt for greater firepower and displacement in their cruisers for the fleet work on which their own needs were concentrated then Britain would be faced with the problem of trying to deal with such vessels both in fleet and in convoy operations with the smaller cruisers which she herself wanted to concentrate on.

In other words, the London Treaty represented a quantitative rather than a qualitative limitation and, in that respect, from Britain's point of view was less satisfactory than Washington had been. The great achievement of the latter, as Chatfield was to put it, "was not in limiting numbers of total tonnages but in stopping the principle of going one better."[17] Those who are familiar with Corbett's analysis of the battle cruiser or hybrid type problem in the early 20th century will understand the arguments involved here.

This matter became of importance in

the years immediately after the London Treaty was signed. In October 1931 the Japanese announced a "Replenishment" program including two large cruisers of 8,500 tons displacement and an unusually heavy armament of 15 6" guns. The British on the other hand were engaged in building cruisers of the *Leander* class, with a displacement of 6,500 (later 7,200) tons and an armament of eight 6" guns. Obviously a *Leander* cruiser would be heavily outgunned by the new Japanese type. The Admiralty hoped that for the time being the Geneva Disarmament Conference would solve this problem by imposing a displacement limit on 6"-gun cruisers, i.e., a qualitative limit, and decided simply to wait and see. Nevertheless it was decided that Britain's larger 6"-gun types would eventually have to be provided "with greater armament if required to meet the larger and more powerful cruisers now being constructed by other powers."[18]

Nothing happened at Geneva. What was worse from Britain's point was an American decision in June 1933 to copy Japan's lead. Part of the reason for this decision was the new President's (Roosevelt's) wish to provide work for the unemployed. But within the Navy General Board (as in the Admiralty in London) there was a continuing debate on cruiser displacement and armament. Now, in the spring of 1933, it was decided to build a new class of cruiser of nearly 10,000 tons displacement and armed, like the new Japanese ships, with 15 6" guns. These became known as the *Brooklyn* class.

The true strategic picture was now becoming clear—as, in many ways it ought to have been in the 1920's. Anglo-American quarreling was an emotional family luxury, not the unavoidable result of distrust based on a realistic appreciation of the likelihood of war. Indeed, in November 1933 the Defense Requirements Sub-Committee in London was expressly instructed to omit all consideration of preparations for war against the United States in the rearmament program it was to draw up that winter. That instruction only made explicit what had long been assumed in practice. The real potential enemy was Japan. What America did was important for Britain only in its practical implications for what Japan might be induced to do as a consequence. America would naturally be similarly concerned about the implications for herself of competitive shipbuilding between Japan and Britain.

In London two moves were decided upon in face of these unwelcome developments. First, the Admiralty asked for and was given permission by the Prime Minister to plan for a new class of large heavily armed cruisers. By the autumn of 1933 this had settled into what became known as the "M" class of about 9,000 tons displacement armed with 12 6" guns. The displacement figures make it clear that the Admiralty were properly concerned with Japanese and not with American plans. The second move was altogether more debatable in terms of Anglo-American relationships. It was suggested—originally, it seems, by the Treasury which was disturbed by the prospective cost of competitive cruiser building—that an approach should be made to the Americans to see if they would agree to a postponement of current building programs in order to examine the possibility of a qualitative limitation which might be embodied in any agreement reached at the next general naval conference planned for the winter of 1935-6.

As one senior naval officer in London wrote—

> We are now, in fact, witnessing the first steps in competitive building in a new type. We shall have to follow suit . . . this will make the problem of finding a lower qualitative limit for the 6" cruisers in 1935 more difficult

> Whilst . . . this building is technically . . . within the provinces of the London Treaty, . . . it is of the utmost importance to take every possible measure to check it.[19]

These views formed the basis of the London approach to Washington suggesting that the Americans " . . . be prepared, pending a discussion between the three powers, to suspend the laying down of cruisers of this particularly large type, if Japan would agree to do the same."[20]

The American response was far from encouraging, partly perhaps because officials in Washington were taken by surprise. They were not convinced, certainly not willing to admit that what was happening were the first steps in a new naval arms race. Moreover, both America and Japan had already announced new building plans and had made contracts with shipbuilding firms, whereas Britain was still working out the details of her own plan. Finally, argued the Americans, the British proposal to delay was based "on the assumption that the maintenance of a definite treaty ratio requires a matching not merely of total tonnages within categories but of unit characteristics vessel for vessel."[21] Which was true.

The British were very dissatisfied with this aspect of the London Treaty. But the Treaty still stood. In the end no change was made and fortunately there was no diplomatic crisis as in 1928. Nonetheless some tempers were frayed and, certainly in London, expressions of anti-Americanism appeared once more. Neville Chamberlain, now Chancellor of the Exchequer, used the occasion of a Cabinet discussion of revised naval estimates to lament the bargaining of the Anglo-Japanese alliance for the Washington terms in 1922, a theme not far from the forefront of his mind for the rest of the interwar years.[22] A little later Warren Fisher, the Permanent Secretary to the Treasury and probably the most hardened anti-American of them all, wrote a bitter diatribe against the results of British "concessions" to the United States since 1922, bemoaning the fact that "Rule, Britannia!, that heartening battle song of England" had been "degraded into Rule, Columbia!" and quoting with obvious relish some words spoken by the famous military historian, Sir John Fortescue, at Oxford in 1911 that—"the Americans . . . must always prevail, and never give way; they must always take and never concede; they enjoy the flouting of our older community as a proof of their superiority; and they esteem a good bargain, even if gained by dishonourable means, to mark the highest form of ability."[23] Unbalanced words, perhaps, and not of a kind which many would have indulged in. But the fact is that this formed part of that attitude of "nonexpectation" of help or even interest from the United States which lasted in Britain down to and after the beginning of the Second World War. This will be mentioned again later.

But these attitudes were not the complete story and there was also a ground swell of Anglo-American understanding which became increasingly evident during preparations for the second London Naval Conference of the winter of 1935-36. The work of that Conference will not be dealt with in any great detail in this essay. Japan had given 2 years' notice to terminate her adherence to the existing treaties and, although she sent representatives to London in December 1935, she refused throughout—as she had done in preliminary talks—to continue the Washington ratios demanding instead a Common Upper Limit, "a figure which the country feeling most vulnerable deemed necessary for herself"; in other words, no limit at all. Since the other principal members of the Conference, America and Britain, were unwilling voluntarily to abandon limitation by ratios which had lasted for so long, Japan withdrew her representatives in mid-January

1936, leaving only observers behind. Thereafter the remaining powers did reach some agreement on the displacement and armament of battleships and on cruiser matters, some of the latter being of considerable importance to Britain. But the fact that Japan announced in June 1936 that she would not adhere to the treaty and, in March 1937, that she would not accept the battleship limitations agreed to by the other powers, left those powers in a situation in which they simply could not avoid competitive building to safeguard their interests should they eventually go to war against Japan. Roskill's judgment that "the whole [London] proceedings were a colossal waste of time and effort, since the treaty finally signed did not in fact have any significant success in achieving the naval limitation for which the conference was convened,"[24] sounds harsh but is correct.

On the other hand, the second London Conference, and the discussions which preceded it, were not unimportant from the particular point of view of Anglo-American relations. The Conference was much more carefully prepared for than any of its predecessors and that proved beneficial. For example, the main British series of official papers dealing with this subject at a ministerial level runs from April 1934 to the end of October 1935, numbers just under 80 items, and covers records of private talks between individuals all the way to major policy statements. In addition to that series there are also minutes of a large number of official meetings. In fact, some discussions preceded the first of these papers and really began directly the cruiser negotiations of 1933 so ignominiously collapsed.

During this preparatory stage there were, as one would expect, some substantial differences between the two powers, quite apart from differences between each of them and third parties. The British wanted a reduction in future battleship displacement and armament; the Americans were not willing to go below 35,000 tons and 14" guns. The British argued that the deteriorating international situation demanded a return to their earlier claim for a much greater overall cruiser tonnage than that agreed to in 1930; the Americans, still intent on "parity," strongly disagreed since public opinion in the United States was thought to be opposed to the kind of building program which parity would involve if the British had their way. But, and more important than detailed qualitative and quantitative limitations was the fact that America in 1934-35 faced one potential enemy, Japan.

Britain, on the other hand, was increasingly apprehensive of a situation in which she might be faced by a hostile Germany and Japan at the same time. As a result of this fear there was a strong body of opinion which regarded a policy of friendship and accommodation with Japan, a return to the spirit of 1902, as the correct objective for British policy to aim at. In the spring of 1934 Neville Chamberlain, then Chancellor of the Exchequer, later to be Prime Minister, and in some ways the most determined and influential man in the Government, urged his colleagues to see that Germany was the long-term threat to Britain's security and that Britain, in the 1930's as before 1914, could not cope with war in Europe and in the Far East at the same time. Since the real enemy was in Europe, then appeasement was necessary in the Far East, although appeasement backed by some semblance of strength—"showing a tooth" as it was called.

His most recent biographers have pointed out that Baldwin—second in command in the National Government of 1931-35 and Prime Minister after that—and MacDonald, Prime Minister until 1935, were less committed to this proposed policy than was Chamberlain.[25] Both strove to keep open the

lines of communication to Tokyo *and* to Washington. But the Americans were well aware of the pressures in Whitehall to come to some sort of accommodation with Japan. Indeed, as Norman Davis, the principal American negotiator on disarmament affairs in these years, reported to the Secretary of State, with two potential major enemies to face at either ends of the world Britain was unlikely to favor more committed cooperation with America unless the latter agreed to some specific understanding between the two powers vis-à-vis Japan, and that that understanding was formally ratified by the Senate.[26] Baldwin and his contemporaries had some reason to be doubtful about the value of American promises which could so easily be broken by the operation of America's constitutional separation of powers. In addition they were afraid—although the opening of official archives after the war showed with how little justification—that if the British took too strong a line with Japan they might thereby promote a closer link between Japan and Germany.

This atmosphere of doubt and mistrust between Britain and America reached its peak during the autumn of 1934 when bilateral talks between British and Japanese representatives took place in London. There were sharp reactions in the American press, and the President wrote to warn Davis that if the British preferred Japan to the United States then he, Roosevelt, would feel compelled to approach the British Dominions direct to make them "understand clearly that their future security is linked with us."[27] In the end, no such drastic course was necessary. In October 1934 Chamberlain wrote in a private letter that—"I have *no* doubt we could easily make an agreement with them [i.e. the Japanese] if the U.S.A. were out of the picture. It is the Americans who are the difficulty and I don't know how we can get over it."[28] But Chamberlain was wrong. Now, as before this and afterwards, Britain found it impossible to negotiate acceptable terms with Japan whether at a naval, commercial or political level; however much the British continued to doubt whether they would get effective help from America in time of trouble, there was nothing to do but wait and see. A return to something like the old Anglo-Japanese alliance was no longer possible, and Anglo-American relations could only gain from that slowly developing realization. Lessons had been learned the hard way but they had been learned.

As a result the London Conference, whatever its lack of formal success, contributed much to the improvement of Anglo-American relations. Those individuals who contributed most included ministers, civil servants and sailors. Of the latter Admiral Standley and Admiral Chatfield must qualify for special mention. And it is because of this episode, among so many others, that students of British history so much need a full-length biography of the latter. To paint a picture of unruffled friendship and collaboration from now on would, however, be fatuous. It was not merely that there were practical difficulties which obstructed the growth of sentiment into practical alliance; sentiments themselves were by no means of one kind. Old emotions died hard, even when Japan's ambitions became clear beyond serious doubt. In all their major prewar appreciations the British Chiefs of Staff refused to place any great reliance on American help in the desperate danger which threatened the British Commonwealth. At best they expected the United States to "be a friendly neutral, probably willing to modify the Neutrality Legislation in our favour, but not likely to intervene actively unless at a later stage."[29] Since the earlier stages were expected to be critical ones then the prospect was bleak.

But there were more hopeful signs, for example, Eden's conduct of affairs

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during the Far East crisis of the latter months of 1937, both at and on either side of the Brussels Conference. During that Conference Eden wrote to King George V that his main object was to "ensure the closest possible co-operation with the Government of the United States," adding that–"Even though such co-operation may not emerge in definite joint action in the present crisis, the future of world peace depends to so great an extent upon Anglo-American co-operation that Mr. Eden feels that no effort should be spared to consolidate it."[30]

What, more specifically, Eden was looking for from the United States was a willingness to cooperate in sanctions against Japan, and even a joint Anglo-American naval presence in the Pacific as a deterrent to Japanese aggression. Roosevelt's actions, however, were more restrained than some of his words, and the Americans rejected both courses of action, leading one senior British official to sum up the American record at this point as "a poor performance, and a warning to us–if such were needed–of what to expect from them."[31] That was unfair to Roosevelt himself. Besides there were many in England who disagreed with Eden's policies–including the Prime Minister. And disagreements over the Far East were, as much as those on policy towards Italy, what forced Eden to resign in February 1938.

But Eden's efforts were not altogether wasted. At the very beginning of 1938 Captain Ingersoll of the U.S. Navy's Plans Division arrived in London, had a long interview with Eden, and then began talks at the Admiralty a few days later. Once more the fruit was slow to ripen. But these talks and what slowly developed out of them implied a growing realization of common interest and of the need to recognize that interest by plans for common action. The first stones in the building of a new alliance were, however hesitantly, now being laid.

BIOGRAPHIC SUMMARY

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NOTES

1. This episode is dealt with in detail in the doctoral thesis of Professor J. K. McDonald, "British Naval Policy and the Pacific and Far East, 1919-1922," submitted for examination in Oxford University in 1975.
2. Admiralty file 116/667, Case 5846; see also C.P. 645.
3. C.I.D. memorandum 122-C.
4. Stephen Roskill, *Naval Policy between the Wars* (London: Collins, 1968), v. I, p. 502.
5. C.I.D. memorandum 816-B.
6. Keith Middlemas and John Barnes, *Baldwin* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1969), p. 369.
7. Roskill, p. 509.
8. *Ibid.*, p. 508.
9. Middlemas and Barnes, p. 371.
10. *Ibid.*, p. 372.
11. The quotations in this paragraph are all taken from Cabinet Paper 81 (28).
12. Middlemas and Barnes, p. 373.
13. Roskill, p. 548.
14. Middlemas and Barnes, p. 375.
15. Thomas Jones, *Whitehall Diary*, Keith Middlemas, ed. (London: Oxford University Press, 1969), v. II, pp. 144-148.
16. N. H. Gibbs, *Rearmament Policy v.I Grand Strategy in World War II* (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1976), p. 29.

17. *Ibid.*, pp. 326-327.
18. Admiralty Papers 167/86; Board Minutes of 17 March 1932.
19. Admiralty Papers 116/2998; memo of 7 September 1933.
20. Foreign Office Papers, F.O. 371/17383; memo of 9 September 1933.
21. U.S. Dept. of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States*, 1933, (Washington: U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1948), v. I, pp. 386-388.
22. Cabinet Conclusions 57 (33).
23. Papers of the Naval Conference, 1935 (N.C.M. (35)) no. 3, pp. 3-4.
24. Roskill, v. II, p. 320.
25. Middlemas and Barnes, chap. 28.
26. *Ibid.*, p. 777.
27. Roskill, v. II, p. 297.
28. Gibbs, p. 394.
29. *Ibid.*, p. 797.
30. Sir Anthony Eden, *The Eden Memoirs: Facing the Dictators* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1962), p. 540.
31. B.A. Lee, *Britain and the Sino-Japanese War, 1937-1939* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1973), p. 42.

Author's Note:

It is a great privilege and pleasure to be invited to participate in this tribute to Rear Adm. Henry Eccles as sailor, author and teacher. As an Englishman who has enjoyed Henry Eccles' company in England and New England it seemed to me appropriate to select not only a naval topic but also one which is concerned with the development of Anglo-American relations. His American friends will know of the admiral's great pride in and loyalty to his own country. Those of us who have enjoyed his company in England will be aware of his considerable knowledge of and concern for the welfare of this other country also. N.G.

The Nazi triumph over France in June 1940 stunned the French nation. Even so, it was not long before courageous and resilient Frenchmen began to resist the German occupation. One of the earliest resistance groups was formed by staff members of the Musée de l'Homme, under the leadership of Boris Vildé. In December 1940 this group commenced publishing Résistance, an underground newspaper. Although the group was liquidated in the next few months, it showed that civilization and decency were not dead and it portended an even greater effort by Frenchmen in the difficult years to come.

THE EARLY FRENCH RESISTANCE IN PARIS

by

Martin Blumenson

In 1940 the resistance emerged in occupied France to challenge by nonviolent means the awesome power of the German occupation. The basic conflict was over values, and the proponents of each set were easily identified. On the one hand were German soldiers and administrators who represented a victorious army, a triumphant government, and a way of life called nazism, which stressed discipline, order, and authority, stifled scholarship and free inquiry, classified human beings as "aryan" supermen or inferior subhumans on the basis of race and ethnicity, and had no hesitation to use force and brutality.

On the other were the victims, the conquered, shocked, stunned, and humiliated who wished to adjust and to accommodate to the new German order, to be sane in the face of reality, yet they were torn by their adherence to the traditional values of Western civilization, liberty, equality, fraternity, democracy, representative government, and free debate.

Particularly in retrospect, the line between morality and immorality, between good and bad, between the crass and the spiritual appears to be clear and distinct.

The collapse of the French Army, indeed of virtually the entire society, in the 6 weeks following Hitler's attack on 10 May, disillusioned and shocked the population. Premier Paul Reynaud, who wished to continue the war from North

*This paper is based on and taken from my book *The Vildé Affair: Beginnings of the French Resistance*, to be published by Houghton Mifflin in July 1977. © by Martin Blumenson.

Africa, had no support from his government and was replaced by Marshal Philippe Pétain, World War I hero, the victor at Verdun, a legendary figure to most Frenchmen. Pétain immediately asked the Germans the terms they required for an armistice.

On the following day, 18 June 1940, General Charles de Gaulle spoke to the French people over the radio from London. Emphasizing that the contest was a world war and that ultimate victory was possible, he invited all French officers and enlisted men to join him in England. "Whatever happens," he said, "the flame of the French resistance must not die and will not die."

Not many Frenchmen heard de Gaulle's appeal. Very few read accounts of his message in several papers in Marseille and Lyon on the following day. A few weeks later everyone in France knew something about it.

What he had said was vaguely understood. He seemed to want to rebuild the French Armed Forces in England for further military action against the Germans. He neither anticipated nor created what was to become the underground movement. His use of the word "resistance" was in a conventional military context. Yet his talk provided hope for those who were unsympathetic with the desire for an armistice.

Delegates of the Pétain government signed the terms of capitulation with Germany and Italy, and an armistice went into effect on 25 June. Half a million French soldiers were in prisoner-of-war camps; 120,000 had been killed; 250,000 were wounded.

De Gaulle spoke again on the radio and talked of the flame of the French resistance "shining and burning," but no one knew what he meant.

The armistice imposed a line of demarcation that cut France into two parts. In the north, including Paris, was the occupied zone; in the south the unoccupied zone, with Pétain's government at Vichy. Traveling across the line, guarded by German troops, from one zone to the other was prohibited without a special German pass called an *ausweis.*

German forces had entered Paris on 14 June, and within a short time the city had changed. German troops were everywhere. German flags, large red standards with the swastika, flew from important buildings and principal hotels. Messages on the radio advised that the Jews, Englishmen, Freemasons, politicians, and plutocrats were responsible for the war, the defeat, and whatever ills the French suffered.

German headquarters and agencies were established all over town, many with overlapping and conflicting functions and confused jurisdictions that made it difficult to know who was responsible for what. They regulated currency and prices, controlled electricity, started to repair roads and bridges, and issued directives. One German bureau immediately decreed that the French flag was not to be displayed at funerals and at Boy Scout ceremonies. Another prohibited the *Marseillaise,* the national anthem, to be sung in public.

The police directed traffic in the German manner. A profusion of German language signs pointed the way at important intersections to German offices. French newspapers with German permission and censorship appeared in print. Large posters, written in German in one column and in French in the other, adorned walls and buildings, proclaiming, warning, and ordering.

One said, "Military Government will take all necessary measures to safeguard troops and maintain calm. The orders from the military authorities must be obeyed without reservation. Avoid all impulsive and thoughtless acts. Every act of sabotage, active or passive, will be severely punished."

Every day the Germans staged a parade. A company of soldiers and a

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band directed by a huge drum major goosestepped up the Champs Elysées to the Arch of Triumph, then returned.

The first sign of opposition came during these parades. Some Parisians looked away, stared into the shop windows, turned their backs to the street, trying to shut out the music, making no reference to the event.

For the most part, everyone in France, as an historian has said, was stupefied by the military disaster, traumatized by the exodus, conditioned by a propaganda already well orchestrated. They had welcomed Pétain as a savior and the armistice as deliverance, and they saw the defeat as merited punishment. As many saw it to wish to continue the struggle, to persist in solidarity with Great Britain, to take even General de Gaulle seriously, to think of organizing for clandestine action was to cede to impulse, to act unreasonably and to withdraw from the national collectivity.

Yet individuals and small groups emerged spontaneously from the stunned population and found ways to oppose the newly established order. In the last few days of June 1940, arrangements were already being explored on how to get military information to the British Intelligence Service by way of Switzerland and Spain. Other activity was starting, unorganized at first, gradually coalescing.

For example, one dear old lady, from the early days of July 1940, was engaged in the fabrication of false papers of all sorts. Becoming involved by chance, she was turning out identity cards, demobilization certificates, and ration tickets by the hundreds.

Her name became known to others in these activities, and a retired colonel, looking for a place to work in private, came to her. She found him a small room that no one was using where she worked, entered his name in the ledger as an inspector-general, and obtained a building pass for him. He copied German military plans, listed new airfield construction, and recorded the locations of troops and installations.

She carried documents from the colonel to persons she did not know, and she brought the colonel messages from those contacts.

Eventually she was arrested, put in jail, but was quickly released by a judge who had a doctor certify that she was mentally disturbed and incompetent and not responsible for her acts.

If some people specialized in false papers, others concentrated on helping men escape from prisoner-of-war camps, provisional and rather primitive facilities with haphazard and poor food, virtually no medical service, and nothing for the men to do. The prisoners awaited their release after the armistice. Instead, they learned, they were to be shipped to Germany as a labor force to work in factories and on farms.

The wish to escape was overpowering, but civilian clothes and false papers, as well as guides for the British soldiers who spoke no French, were needed. Although German regulations prescribed severe punishment for civilians having unauthorized contact with prisoners of war, methods of escape came into being quickly.

Until the prisoners were moved to Germany in October 1940, thousands were helped to escape. They were started along secret routes to Spain where they could get to England.

If some people drifted into the work that as yet had no name, others were driven to it by what the Germans did. There was no dramatic event, no symbolic incident, but instead a series of minor irritations that gradually rubbed the French the wrong way.

The Germans created the friction thoughtlessly. Their actions flowed in part out of their defeat in World War I and their memory of the humiliating Versailles peace treaty; in part out of their urge to remake the world, specifically France and especially Paris, into

their image. Their superman mentality, egoism, lack of sensitivity, and an insane or foolish stupidity drove them.

For example, on the day after the armistice went into effect, a crew of German soldiers armed with pickaxes and shovels, hammers and crowbars, demolished the statue of Gen. Charles Mangin, a World War I hero. A week later they destroyed the monument to Edith Cavell. In Vincennes they destroyed the memorial to the dead of 1914-1918 because they thought the inscription was insulting.

At the debris of the pedestal where Mangin's statue had stood, two courtly elderly gentlemen met by chance. They had come spearately to see what the Germans had done. They were retired colonels, and as they chatted mildly, they concluded that something had to be done about the German occupation. This meeting led to the formation of an anti-Nazi group directed by the two colonels who specialized in the collection and transmission of military intelligence.

Irritating actions by the Germans were paralleled by peculiar actions on the part of Marshal Pétain's government, which was setting out to collaborate with the new German order. Following German guidance, the Pétain government soon adopted the Nazi racial laws, acquiesced in the propaganda, and became, in the eyes of many Frenchmen, a puppet regime. "Was this France?" many asked.

Bastille Day, 14 July, the national holiday, fell on a Sunday in 1940, and it was a pleasantly warm day. Thousands of Parisians turned out and placed flowers around the flame of the Unknown Soldier at the Arch of Triumph. An innocent gesture or an expression of patriotism equated with opposition to the Germans? It was barely 3 weeks after the armistice, but the Germans began to be uneasy.

They held press conferences twice a week in Paris for French reporters, briefing them on what the German papers were featuring, what themes were acceptable. German newsreels and cultural films were shown in Paris theaters. All seemed to be propaganda, and gradually skepticism over the news being published spread. Purchasers of newspapers began to tell vendors at the Kiosks, "Let me have a copy of the *Daily Liar.*"

In July, August, and September 1940, small groups of friends were complaining about the occupation, and some of them became organized and linked one to the other in an attempt to do something. Many produced and disseminated flyers and tracts. Handwritten, typed, mineographed, they were distributed secretly, hastily stuffed into mailboxes, casually left in half-darkened subway cars, nonchalantly deposited on park benches, surreptitiously slipped into merchandise for sale in department stores.

They gave news from the BBC radio programs and from stories in foreign newspapers made available by friends in embassies. They appealed for dignity and commonsense, for suspicion of information coming from German sources. Extracts from speeches by President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill were popular.

A subject that became famous concerned the disparaging remarks that President Poincaré and Marshal Joffre had made about Pétain in the First World War. They had characterized him as a vain and obstinate old man with limited military perceptions who was thoroughly defeatist in outlook, ready throughout much of the 1914-1918 struggle to make peace on unfavorable terms. Those who read the tract smiled and said, "Imagine, Pétain, even then." Another version had it that Pétain had believed firmly in the defeat of France in 1918. Twenty-two years later he was able to say, "You see, I was right."

Some youngsters on bicycles attached stickers to the backs of

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German trucks, stickers that said, "We are for General de Gaulle." Napoleon's statement was repeated: "To live in defeat is to die every day." Foch's line was reiterated: "A people is conquered only when it accepts defeat." Clemenceau had remarked, "In war as in peace, the last word is to those who never surrender."

General de Gaulle and his organization, the Free French in London, made skillful use of the BBC. Eventually 12 programs were beamed every day to France, cultural programs, French music, and the like. They also stimulated a sense of orderly opposition, peaceful manifestations of one sort or another as protest against the occupation.

For example, they suggested that veterans and everybody else who wanted to do so walk out on Armistice Day, 11 November, to stroll through Paris, to place flowers at the statue of Clemenceau, the Tiger in World War I who had led the French to victory. A large turnout showed a sense of solidarity and discreet opposition. Later, de Gaulle's organization asked French people to stay home on the afternoon of New Year's Day, 1941, so that those on the streets would mark themselves as collaborators of the occupation.

This was tremendously successful in mobilizing people who could not, for one reason or another—health, temperament, circumstances, or whatever—take an active role against the occupation. They felt themselves mobilized too, participating members in a giant underground scarcely seen that was dedicated to removing the German presence from France.

The deteriorating standard of living also generated French hatred of the Germans. After 23 September, ration cards were needed to buy ever-decreasing stocks of bread and meat, and later, cards would be needed for most foods, for clothing, fuel, and more. Unemployment and galloping inflation, regulated prices and currency had their effects, along with requisitions and expropriations. Although the Germans blamed the British blockade for the difficulties of staying alive, the huge daily reparation that France paid Germany, together with the systematic economic looting, was responsible.

A certain climax was reached on 24 December 1940, the day before Christmas. When Parisians got up and went out to work or to shop, they saw new German posters all over town, put up during the night. The announcement was short. It read, "The engineer Jacques Bonsergent of Paris was condemned to death by a German military tribunal for an act of violence against a member of the German army. He was shot and executed this morning. Dated: December 23. Signed: The Military Commander in France."

No one knew who Jacques Bonsergent was or why he was killed. But many people in Paris at midnight mass, celebrated by order of the German authorities at 5 p.m., prayed for his soul. He shocked Parisians into a clearer awareness of the occupation, for it seemed to many Frenchmen that the Germans, without compassion, without even concern, killed to maintain their concept of order.

By then, a considerable resistance organization was inbeing. If some persons had drifted into the secret work that had as yet no name, if others were driven to it by what the Germans did, a substantial group of men and women had made a conscious choice after due deliberation.

They were for the most part intellectuals. Professors, anthropologists, art historians, linguistics specialists, they understood better than anyone else the meaning of nazism, its racism, brutality, mockery of culture and civilization. They were the first to form groups of like-minded friends and acquaintances to combat what they saw was otherwise inevitable, the transformation of

egalitarian and parliamentarian France into an image of Nazi Germany.

One of the earliest resistance groups was formed by staff members of the Musée de l'Homme, the Museum of Man, which still stands on place du Trocadéro opposite the Eiffel Tower and overlooks the Seine River. The group they formed was known by the name of the museum even though they rather quickly established links to other groups and welded cooperating cells into networks.

The leader of this group was a man of 32 named Boris Vildé. Vildé and his associates helped prisoners of war to escape from the camps, put out flyers and tracts, and gathered and transmitted military information to the British. Significantly, Vildé's group procured, copied, and forwarded plans of the naval base at St. Nazaire that the Germans were using for surface raiders and submarines. These plans helped the British launch the amphibious operation against St. Nazaire in March 1942, an operation called "the greatest raid of all" that virtually destroyed the port and the U-boat base.

By October 1940, Vildé was thinking of bigger things. He wished to federate all the resistance groups in occupied France so that they would be responsive to a single direction. If all the energy of the small and separate and independent groups could be harnessed to expand the membership and to carry out harassing actions, the Germans might be driven from France.

But how could he, in a country full of German agents and spies and counter-espionage police and military units, to say nothing of active collaborators who welcomed the Germans, exert his control over so large a number of dispersed and hidden people? His solution was to found a clandestine newspaper. Through it he would give hope and direction to the movement, inspire the timid and bewildered, and establish a method of action that thousands of followers would carry out in a massive internal movement of such might as to confront the occupation.

The first issue appeared on 15 December 1940, and it consisted of four mimeographed pages. A host of volunteers carried copies to the far corners of France, where they were copied and recopied. Some found their way to London, while others were picked up by the Germans.

The title of the newspaper was *Résistance*, and this was the first time that the anti-German activities received the name that would be applied ever since—resistance. The editorial read in part as follows:

> Resist! This is the cry that comes from the hearts of all of you who suffer from our country's disaster. This is the wish of all of you who want to do your duty. But you feel isolated and disarmed. In the chaos of ideas, opinions, and systems, you are confused and looking for your duty. "Resistance" is here to speak to your hearts and brains, to show you what to do.
>
> Resistance means above all to act, to be positive, to perform reasonable and useful things. Many of you who have tried are discouraged because you think you are powerless. But some have formed themselves into groups, scattered and weak. Patiently, we have searched them out. We have united them. They are numerous (more than an army in Paris alone). They are ardent and resolute men and women who understand that organization is necessary, that a method, a discipline, and leaders are needed.
>
> The method? Group yourselves in your homes with those whom you know. Choose your leaders. They will find other groups with which to work in common. Our committee will coordinate your

efforts with friends in unoccupied France and with those who are fighting alongside our allies. Your immediate task is to organize yourselves so that you can, when you receive the order, take up the fight again. Find resolute men and enroll them with care. Bring comfort and decision to those who doubt or who no longer dare hope. Seek out and watch those who have renounced our country and betray it. Meet together every day and transmit information useful to your leaders. Practice an inflexible discipline, a constant prudence, an absolute discretion. Beware of inconsequential people, of talkers, and of traitors. Never boast, never give yourselves away. Face up to the moment. Later we shall tell you how to act.

In accepting our responsibilities as your leaders, we have promised to sacrifice everything, staunchly and pitilessly, for this mission. Unknown among ourselves yesterday, having never participated in the quarrels of the prewar political parties, we are Frenchmen. We have only one ambition, one passion, one wish: to bring about the rebirth of a pure and free France.

It was that editorial that defined the resistance. Those who were members belonged to organized groups that had recognized leaders and performed specific functions. This too has become the classic definition of resistance activity.

The second issue of "Resistance" appeared on 30 December 1940. It had six pages. The editorial read in part: "All of you who have agreed to work in this community of resistance for the liberation of our country, you must remember this essential idea, that we cannot act effectively without an organization founded on discipline." What was discipline? A thoughtful and reasoned obedience to leaders. Flaming words, hasty gestures, absurd bravados, or moving sacrifices could hardly save the country. What was needed was an immense work, daily, patient, secret, and of savage tenacity. The first task was to organize a network of disciplined legions within the France that was in chains, the occupied zone.

The third issue appeared on 31 January 1941. The editorial counseled readers to stop thinking of France as a conquered nation. France was a symbol of science and art, civilization and humanism, culture and liberty. "No, France is not vanquished if we remain proud of her, resolute in our resistance to save her, if we seek in her past only reasons to make her more beautiful, more free, more generous, more human."

The fourth number appeared on 1 March. It was obviously prepared in haste. The editorial lacked the finish of previous exhortations. Yet the message was strong and persuasive. "We must say it and repeat it without stop to ourselves: resistance of the oppressed French people is becoming increasingly powerful in the world struggle for liberation." Germany needed France. No longer sure of victory, Germany required a France that was ready to serve, ready to consent to the betrayal perpetrated by Vichy. The real France was in resistance, and this was the new France being created, a nation unwilling to accept the occupation. By resisting the invaders, France, was becoming once again truly French.

The fifth number dated 25 March was the last. It had two pages and little content.

The reason why the newspaper languished and finally died is the dwindling number of editors, contributors, and distributors. Since January 1941, the Germans had been arresting members of Vildé's group. Those who escaped traveled to the south of France, to the unoccupied zone.

Tracking resistance people, the Germans picked up and imprisoned about 25 members of the group known as the Musée de l'Homme. The arrests took place during the first 4 months of 1941, and Vildé's group was liquidated.

In their short resistance life, these members helped to bring France from the stupor of the defeat, the disillusionment of the German conquest, and the paralysis of the national will to a reawakening of morality and dignity and hope.

The first resistance reaction had come from those who understood nazism and who opposed collusion and concessions. The individual and spontaneous resistance from the beginning was a refusal to accept the reality of the German military victory in 1940 and the German domination of Europe. They were clearheaded on how the Germans were corrupting the world, and they understood that the peaceful presence of the Germans in France was a pretense, the government at Vichy a sham.

The resistance was born after the armistice when France was cut in two, when the Germans controlled the north, when Vichy tried to persuade the world that France remained independent. In part the Germans stimulated the resistance—by their massive purchases of food and other items for shipment to Germany, by their patronizing attitude toward the French, by their goosestep military parades, their gross propaganda, their announcements on the walls of Paris, and by their crimes against the dignity of human life. Rooted in the memories of the Franco-Prussian War and the siege of Paris, in the recollections of the First World War, the resistance fed on the long lines at the stores, the flourishing black market, the lack of heat, the declining quality of life.

It took three forms initially: escapes, which required safe houses, conductors, and passers across the demarcation line; information networks, which collected and transmitted military intelligence; and tracts and newspapers to clarify the meaning of the occupation and the role of Vichy.

The Musée de l'Homme group was among the first, perhaps the very first, to carry out the original resistance. But what gave Vildé's movement its unique place were two accomplishments, his use of the word "resistance" that crystallized the vague and amorphous activities into a single, well-recognized endeavor; and his vision of federation, his desire to unify for concerted effort all the spontaneous bands arising throughout the country, a task finally accomplished in 1943 by Jean Moulin.

With a network of persons unskilled in the game of secret existence, Boris Vildé and his friends drove the Germans to distraction, to discomfort, to uneasiness, to bewilderment, and finally to bloody repression on a massive scale. For the resistance threatened to make the occupation too costly to the Germans.

If Vildé's activists were a comparative handful, they could be effective only because the great majority of their countrymen were their accomplices. A movement like the Musée de l'Homme, with tentacles across France, depended on a substantial number of passive people who were mobilized too and gave a helping hand. In Mao Tse-tung's figure, the fish could swim if the water nourished and kept them alive.

BIOGRAPHIC SUMMARY

Martin Blumenson is a noted military historian. He has served on the faculties of the U.S. Army War College, The Citadel and the Naval War College. He is author of *The Patton Papers*, as well as several works on World War II. Currently he is doing historical research for the U.S. Air Force.

Could the resistance have forced the Germans out of France without the military invasion of the European continent in June 1944? Would the internal conflict have exacerbated to the point where the Germans would find themselves unable to keep an entire population repressed and submissive by the massive use of the bayonet? How many German reprisals, executions, deportations were necessary to keep the resistance in check? How many German troops were needed to keep the dissidence at a low level, below overt disturbance, riot, and mass uprising?

There are, of course, no firm answers. But what is admirable is that men and women risked and sometimes lost their lives to restore human values in a world of brute force.

Ψ

THE USES OF NAVAL FORCES

The purpose of nuclear deterrence is to prevent nuclear war. Even so, politics continue to require limited forces in support of national policies for national defense. Flexibility is among the chief requirements for such forces, and it has traditionally been the hallmark of naval forces. Changing political conditions, developments in technology and an emerging maritime regime affect but do not obviate the use of naval forces. It is still necessary to pay close attention to the strategic effect we wish to achieve and to the employment of the means best calculated to produce that effect.

by

Captain James A. Barber, U.S. Navy

There is a striking contrast between the concerns which dominate naval planning and force structure and those things we actually do with the fleet. For 30 years the specter of a major war with the Soviet Union has been the contingency that has dominated our planning; yet none of us, in careers filled with naval operations in support of national policy, has ever exchanged anything more lethal than gun salutes with a Soviet warship.

This does not mean that the focus of our planning is wrong. Major war with the Soviet Union is the most demanding and threatening of possible contingencies, and therefore quite properly has a first claim on our attention. But now that technology has provided both us and our potential opponents with mutually suicidal weapons, the upper levels of available violence cannot be sanely used in the pursuit of policy goals. A major nuclear war would be a catastrophic failure of policy, not a Clausewitzian pursuit of policy by other means. Thus as a first priority we must deter nuclear war, by making it abundantly clear to the Soviet Union or any other nation that the costs of such a war would far exceed any imaginable gains.

The Political Context of Military Force. A recurrent theme throughout the literature of strategy is the intimate relationship between military strategy and national policy. Henry Eccles has stated it well:

> Political purpose must dominate military strategy. The use of military force without a clear political purpose is futile and ultimately self-defeating.[1]

A clear and continuing understanding of this primacy of the political objective is basic to the effective use of military force. Navies, like other military forces, are nothing but tools, and

need to be measured by how effective they are in helping to achieve desired political ends.

It is interesting to examine what really takes place at the decisionmaking level of government when we are confronted with a new or changed international problem. It is only in minor affairs that previously planned routine is followed. The more important the crisis, the more surely the response is an improvised one. Depending on the style of the incumbent President, the players may be bureaucratically determined—for example the National Security Council—or simply chosen by the President because he wishes to consult men whose knowledge and judgment he trusts. The JCS as individuals are usually important players, but only by happenstance will the options considered track closely with existing military contingency plans.

In grappling with their problem the decisionmakers cast about to see what tools can effectively be brought to bear, and military force is by no means always a useful one. The ultimate response is usually a combination of actions, containing diplomatic, psychological and economic as well as military elements. Thus, most of our policies which involve the use of military forces combine both military and nonmilitary actions.

To digress, it is interesting to note that, after spending more than a year on the Murphy Commission on the Organization of the Government for the Conduct of Foreign Policy, Paul Schratz concluded that in crisis situations military options often get a disproportionate share of the decisionmaker's attention because the military staffing is more thorough and responsive than that for nonmilitary options, and the alternatives are set forth more clearly. Schratz argues that it is important for the State Department to improve its staffing performance in crisis situations in order to ensure that nonmilitary options are given full weight.[2]

Once it is determined that a military option is the appropriate choice, the effective use of military force must follow a political logic, and not a logic of its own. This is equally true whether the use involved is actual combat or the more frequent nonfighting use of military forces to pursue desired political outcomes. In this regard the Center for Naval Analyses recently completed a catalog of naval responses to international incidents and crises during the 20-year period 1955-1975. CNA identified 99 cases (excluding the Vietnam War) in which naval forces were actively used in response to events occurring outside the United States.[3] In fewer than a dozen cases did even a minimum amount of actual fighting take place, yet in each of these circumstances responsible decisionmakers viewed the potential utility of naval force as being sufficiently high that nonroutine naval operations were directed.

This nonfighting utilization of the Navy underlines the point that military force must be viewed as a tool to gain political ends, and that the proper yardstick for evaluating it is how relevant it is to the particular political goals desired. Dr. Schlesinger makes the point well in stating: "Military power properly must be judged by whether it is relevant—in particular places, times and circumstances."[4] This test of relevance to particular circumstances is an important corollary to the principal of the primacy of political goals. It is precisely this kind of relevance that is a particular characteristic of navies, and therefore an important key to an understanding of naval strategy.

An important part of relevance is the ability to respond at an appropriate level. In the Korean DMZ incident of 1976 a number of informed observers expressed the view that the way in which the United States responded with an impressive but restrained show of force, coupled with the effective symbolic act of cutting down the tree

around which the original incident revolved, was at just the right level to gain maximum political advantage. Many might have preferred more forceful action, but at least in this case vengeance was not really the proper goal. The goals we sought involved not only demonstrating firmness and resolve, but also displaying judgment and prudence. Our chosen actions gained widespread international support for the U.S. position, despite North Korea's attempt to exploit the incident for propaganda purposes.

Because international problems requiring U.S. response take an unpredictable variety of forms at a wide range of threat levels, it is important that we be able to respond with flexibility. Without flexibility we could be limited to a choice between withdrawal and escalation. During the Cuban missile crisis this is exactly the choice our naval quarantine presented to the Soviet Union. It is often suggested that Soviet dissatisfaction over being limited to those alternatives was in large measure responsible for the subsequent strengthening of the Soviet Navy.[5]

Perceptions about military capacity, and the political will to use that capacity, are often as important as realities, and can influence a wide range of international behavior. Strong military forces exert their influence across national borders without anything so crude as a direct threat. The constraints exerted by nearby Soviet military might upon the international behavior of even a nation of people as demonstrably courageous as the Finns should be an adequate example of this point.

A further point is that although relevance is always a valid test in assessing the utility of military force, rationality may not be. Even though it may not be rational to use military force in a given circumstance, this does not mean that there is no utility in threatening the use of force—or even in just possessing usable military force without any explicit threat. An adversary can never be certain that one will behave rationally, and since an irrational action may be at least equally painful for him, he may be induced to tread more cautiously.

By way of illustration, during the Arab oil embargo the fact that the U.S. Marines were conducting desert maneuvers received widespread attention in the press. Despite the obvious fact that the Marines have had a training facility at Twentynine Palms for many years, and have regularly trained there, this time the training was widely interpreted by the media as evidence that the United States was considering use of the Marines in some military response to the oil embargo. As a result, Arab spokesmen were quoted in a variety of ringing responses to the alleged threat, which included vows to blow up the oil facilities in response to any U.S. military intervention.

For a variety of reasons, it would not have made much sense for the United States to respond to the oil embargo by landing the Marines. Such an attack would have provoked instant and bitter worldwide opposition. It could have triggered an Arab scorched-earth policy, and might well have resulted in a dangerous confrontation between the United States and the U.S.S.R. But the fact that a Marine landing might have been irrational does not mean that it was necessarily bad for the Arabs to fear it as a U.S. option. The threatened scorched-earth policy would have been more costly for the Arabs than for us, and thus they had a vested interest in not pushing us too hard, for fear that we might indeed prove irrational. It is hard to establish that any particular Arab action was affected by such considerations, but the evidence does indicate that the possibility of a military response was much on their minds.

There is another problem in being too "rational" about the use of force. The joys of peace are sufficiently sweet

that it is not difficult to become convinced that any use of military force is irrational. But this can be a dangerous idea, for an increasing belief by one side in the irrationality of force may tend to encourage violence by the other side, as the "rational" nations make clear that they will yield in preference to fighting. The concessions to Hitler at Munich to achieve "peace in our time" are a familiar example. Thus, the paradox: Too firm a conviction that violence is irrational may serve to encourage violence.

The Uses of the Sea. The discussion to this point has concerned the uses of military force in general. Let us turn now to a consideration of naval force in particular. To understand the uses of naval power, it is first important to understand the uses of the sea. From the viewpoint of naval strategy there are only three major useful characteristics of the sea: It is an efficient means of transport; it is a valuable natural resource; and it can serve as a base for the projection of power against the land. Naval forces can be employed both to ensure any of these three uses to ourselves and our allies or to deny them to an enemy.

The classic concern of naval strategy is the use of the sea as a highway, or in current jargon, a SLOC (sea line of communication). Viewed as a means of transport the oceans can be either a highway or a barrier, depending on who controls their use. This aspect so dominated the strategic thinking of Mahan that he declared the sea to be an unfruitful possession "... except as a system of highways joining country to country."[6] This is still probably the most important use of the sea, and many of the concerns of naval strategy revolve around the tasks of denying sea transport to an enemy, while insuring it to ourselves.

The second of the uses of the sea, as a natural resource, is increasing steadily in importance, partly because the technical capacity to exploit the riches of the sea and the seabed is expanding dramatically, and partly because land resources are becoming inadequate to world needs. All of the implications of this process are not yet clear. But it is clear that there is danger of conflict as nations move to establish their claims over larger areas of the sea and seabed. Evidences of this process have already appeared in the waters around Iceland, off Peru, and in the Aegean and South China Seas. It is as safe as a prediction can be to say that this kind of conflict will become both more frequent and more serious in the future. As a single example, one might ask what happens the first time the U.S.S.R. commits a major overfishing violation of our new 200-mile fishery zone.

This process of bringing increased areas of the sea under national control is beginning to affect one of the most ancient and valued characteristics of the high seas: their status as an international commons to which all of mankind had free access. For naval forces the international character of the oceans has provided a freedom of movement to and from areas of potential problems unfettered by the complications and commitments of having soldiers on foreign soil. The freedom of the seas is being eroded, and the implications are worth careful attention.

The third major use of the sea is as a base from which to project power against the land. The importance of this use has increased greatly in the last half century. Neither large-scale amphibious operations nor naval strike warfare were really practical until World War II, and the use of the oceans as havens for submarine-launched ballistic missiles is, of course, an even more recent development. The use of the sea as a base for the projection of power has become one of the most important areas of contemporary naval strategy.

There is a different way to go about

classifying the uses of military force, by focusing not on the use of the sea to be achieved or denied, but rather on the way in which a use of force tries to achieve a desired result. There are three such strategies. The first strategy involves direct action against an enemy's military forces. The intent is, by defeating them or reducing their capacity, to place oneself in a position either to win a conflict outright, or to dictate terms of settlement, in anticipation of the fact that if the conflict were to continue victory would be certain. This is close to the philosophy espoused by Clausewitz and Mahan, in which the principal focus of military or naval strategy is the pitched battle between opposing armies or fleets.

The second strategy seeks to inflict pain on an enemy. The intention here is to convince an enemy that his aim in pursuing the war is not worth the beating he is taking. It is not the actual violence itself that does the persuading, but the threat of further violence. If it succeeds, it is not because of pain that has already been inflicted, but because of the fear of pain that may be inflicted in the future. In those circumstances the reason for causing an enemy pain and terror is to convince him that more will follow if he does not accede to our demands. The airpower theorist Giulio Douhet was a leading exponent of the systematic use of terror as a weapon in war. According to Douhet, the will of the enemy was the proper target of military power, and he thought that the will to fight could be broken more easily than an enemy could be defeated militarily. This concept has found expression in arenas as diverse as our use of the atomic bomb against Japan, France's strategy in Algeria, and the terrorist tactics of the IRA and PLO. Rarely has it been as effective as its advocates have claimed, mainly because the human animal often reacts to pain by becoming angry and hitting back instead of by giving up.

The third strategy is that of the seige, the blockade and the U-boat war. In current terminology, it is the strategy of interdiction. The intent of this strategy can be similar to that of either of the other two. It may seek either to reduce military capacity by the denial of supplies and reinforcements, or to create shortages that cause pain and starvation. A variant of this strategy is directed against the source of supplies—factories and oil refineries. In general, blockade or interdiction produces results slowly, but history provides numerous examples of just how effective it can be.

In the real world it is, of course, difficult to identify pure examples of any of the three strategies. In the Vietnam War, for example, Market Time and the mining of Haiphong utilized interdiction; the bombing campaign had elements of interdiction as well as pain and destruction, and at least parts of the campaign in the south used the strategy of the battlefield war. The important point for a strategist is to be entirely clear in his own mind as to what effect he is trying to achieve and then to employ the means best calculated to produce that effect.

The efficacy of a particular strategy is often dramatically affected by geography. We would, for example, have had a much better chance of winning in Vietnam if the country had been shaped like the Korean Peninsula instead of being bordered by Laos and Cambodia.

A useful mental exercise is to work out the ways in which each of the strategies for the employment of force can be applied to each of the uses of the sea. It is not practical here to try to work out all of the possible interactions, but it may be useful to develop a single example by way of illustration. One of the uses of the sea, as developed earlier, is as a medium of transport, and we can seek to ensure its use to ourselves and our allies, or to deny its use to the enemy. The intersection of the utilization of the sea for transport with each

of the three strategies can serve as an illustrative example.

Suppose the Soviet Union, in response to a local conflict, chose to announce a naval "Quarantine" against, say, Norway or Israel. What use can be made of each of the three strategies for the employment of force to get shipping through to our ally?

If we use the battlefield strategy our task would be to engage and destroy those elements of the enemy's military forces that threaten the sealanes. If we use an interdiction strategy, our task would be to keep those forces from gaining access to the crucial sealanes, by the use of minefields and barriers across their access routes. Finally, if we use the pain strategy our task is to inflict sufficient pain and destruction on our opponent that he is willing to forego his attempt at sea denial in preference to further punishment. An example of this technique might be an announcement that we would respond to any sinking of an allied merchant ship by sinking two Soviet merchant vessels anywhere on the high seas.

It is not self-evident in advance of a particular crisis which of the strategies, or what mix of them, would be most effective. None are without dangers, but any confrontation between the super powers is dangerous. Each strategy does, at least, provide an option between backing down and threatening nuclear war. And that is exactly what we are trying to do: provide usable and relevant tools that can be used in carrying out national policy.

Naval Flexibility in an Uncertain World. In the kind of world in which we live, one of the most important characteristics military forces need to have is flexibility. This is because the world is unpredictable: We rarely fight the kind of war we are prepared to fight. The reasons this is so are complex, and go far beyond the well-known tendency of our profession to prepare to fight the last war. One reason is that the better prepared we are for a particular kind of war, the less likely is any enemy to challenge us on those grounds. He is, after all, interested in winning, and therefore can be expected to choose strategies and tactics that play into our weaknesses, not into our strengths.

Continuing conflict is inevitable, but the particular forms it can take come in infinite variety, and given our national preference for peace, usually at someone else's choice. In consequence it is important that our military forces be broadly flexible if they are to meet the test of being relevant to "particular places, times, and circumstances."

One way of appreciating the role of flexibility in military strategy is to look at the results of inflexibility. The phrase "Maginot Line Mentality" has been often used as a description of inflexibility. Yet during the 1930's the Maginot Line was touted as the ultimate achievement of military technology, and it was widely believed to be invulnerable. What went wrong? The basic problem stemmed from too great a certainty as to what kind of war would be fought. If the Wehrmacht had attempted a frontal assault against the line, it might well have proved as invulnerable as its designers supposed it to be. But by locking a major portion of France's military resources into a single scenario, the Maginot Line permitted the Germans to choose a strategy that made that strength virtually useless. There was no way in which the resources invested in the Maginot Line could be brought to bear in the kind of war that was actually fought.

The kind of inflexibility at issue has not just to do with geography, but rather with the problems that result when major military resources are not applicable to the problem at hand. To select another, less dramatic example, in the early years of this century, following the dictates of Mahan, the U.S. Navy concentrated on building an impressive

fleet of battleships, somewhat to the neglect of smaller men-of-war. Yet as it turned out, the surface dominance of the British Fleet was such that our major naval task of World War I was to assist in defeating the submarine menace, a task for which a large portion of our naval investment was almost useless.

Yet even though navies are by no means exempt from the problems of inflexibility, naval forces have certain kinds of inherent flexibility that suits them to a wide range of contingencies. Four of these inherent characteristics are discussed here: (1) Geographical mobility; (2) relative freedom from foreign political constraints; (3) the ability to linger; and (4) the ability to operate at a wide range of relevant force.

Not a great deal needs to be said about the inherent geographical mobility of naval forces. The seamless expanse of the oceans permits us to move forces appropriate to the circumstances freely and rapidly wherever there is blue water. Men-of-war, as self-contained units, arrive ready for action, and are much less dependent upon the existence and availability of local bases than are most other kinds of military forces.

Related to the geographical mobility of navies is their relative freedom from foreign political constraints. Naval forces are freer of dependence on overflight authorizations and diplomatic clearances than are land-based forces. The difficulties we encountered in being able to utilize certain of our forces based in NATO Europe during the 1973 Mid-East War is a case in point. Because ships are integral units which carry much of their own support with them, they can be maintained in the neighborhood of potential trouble spots for as long as necessary. This means that naval forces need not necessarily involve the political difficulties inherent in troops or bases on foreign soil. Nor do naval forces automatically trigger the same pressures toward involvement that exist when U.S. forces are physically present in an area of crisis.

U.S. bases and troops in foreign countries can serve as prime targets for anti-U.S. propaganda and, in the event of a local conflict, they can be the object of an attack. Our natural and proper reaction to such an attack is to defend American lives and property. This can easily escalate into full U.S. involvement, as much as a matter of instinctive reaction as of carefully considered national interest. Seabased forces can provide desired local capability without the loss of flexibility involved in a physical presence on foreign soil.

Naval vessels have an almost unique ability to linger. This ability often lets us move forces to the vicinity of potential need far in advance of an actual requirement, stay for as long as is desirable, and either take rapid action or withdraw quietly as national command authority dictates. The flexibility in timing and commitment this ability provides us is highly valued by those who bear the political responsibility for decision. At the first sign of an international problem the first JCS question asked is always "Where are our ships?" and the majority of the time the first military action taken is to begin to move ships to the proximity of the trouble spot. Even the most long-ranged and mobile aircraft cannot perform the same role, since they lack the warships' long endurance on station.

The last of the specific elements of naval flexibility is the available range of relevant force. Naval force can be applied in infinite gradations ranging from showing the flag up to and including nuclear strikes. The integral nature of warships, together with the task force concept, allows us to tailor forces specifically for the tasks at hand.

In presenting the Navy's case, we sometimes fail to make the importance

of this kind of flexibility as clear as we might. A good example is a comparison of two weapons systems that are presently on the drawing boards: the MX intercontinental ballistic missile and the new Navy A-18 attack plane. In comparing them in the most catastrophic of occurrences, an all-out nuclear exchange, a single MX would be worth more than a number of A-18's, because it would be more likely to survive a surprise attack and almost certainly would have a higher probability of getting through to key targets. Thus, in a forum like SALT the MX would be worth a great deal more than the A-18.

But vital as it is to maintain an effective nuclear deterrent, there are many other kinds of conflict with which we must be concerned and here the values become somewhat different. As Figure 1 illustrates, the A-18 is useful across a much wider range—from large-scale conventional war to peacetime presence—than is the MX. This by no means argues that we need the A-18 more than the MX, for there is no military task more vital than maintaining effective nuclear deterrence. It does argue, however, that once a satisfactory deterrent level is achieved, flexibility becomes a virtue much to be desired.

	MX	A-18
Major Nuclear Exchange	X	X
Tactical Nuclear War	?	X
Large-scale Conventional War		X
War At Sea Only		X
Limited War		X
Police Action		X
Guerrilla War		X
Peacetime Presence		X

Figure 1

It is almost always true that in a narrow scenario a single-purpose system can be demonstrated to be more cost effective than a multipurpose system. One widely circulated study by a former Rand Corporation scholar concluded that since a European war would inevitably be short, there would be no need to protect the sealanes to Europe. We could, therefore, dispense with our escort forces and use the money saved thereby to buy tanks and guns. His analysis, which was perfectly sound within the narrow framework he established, neglected to address the possibility that such a war might not be short, or the possibility that the destroyers and frigates might have value in other situations than the one he addressed. Because of the inherently flexible and multipurpose nature of naval forces, they are more likely to get their proper share of scarce resources if we can ensure they are evaluated against the entire range of relevant uses.

If we are to make the most effective use of the inherent flexibility of naval force, we need to structure our forces appropriately. In this regard, there is a recurrent controversy over the relative desirability of less expensive single-purpose ships and more expensive multipurpose ships. The fact of the matter is that we usually wind up using our warships in multipurpose ways no matter what the intent of their designers may have been. A case in point is the FF-1052-class frigate. As single-purpose an ASW ship as has been built by any modern navy, the FF-1052 has still been used almost continuously as a general-purpose destroyer, steaming in company with carriers and shooting on the gun line. It was not particularly well-designed for those tasks, but operational requirements have an imperative of their own.

The problem, of course, is that we never have enough money to buy both the numbers and quality of ships that we need. The result is a continuing compromise. To have an affordable Navy we do need large numbers of so-called low-mix ships. But I would argue that they should almost always be

conceived as multipurpose platforms, since that is inevitably how they will be used. The low-mix FFG, with the Harpoon and Standard missiles as well as an effective ASW capability, will be a more useful and flexible ship than the FF-1052—useful as that ship has proven in carrying out missions for which it was never designed.

Since the October War of 1973 a number of military commentators have emphasized the increasing importance of precision-guided munitions. Many have heralded PGM's as creating a revolution in warfare as profound as those which accompanied the introduction of such earlier technical innovations as the armored steamship, the airplane, the submarine and the tank. Michael MccGwire has argued that precision guided munitions will have several kinds of significant impact on naval warfare. Among the effects he anticipates are (1) that there will be an increasing role for land-based systems in maritime war; and (2) that the increased hitting power of small vessels, coupled with the wide dispersion of missile technology, will increase the reach of coastal states to seaward.[7] His overall conclusion is that the sea is becoming "A much more complex and potentially hostile operating environment."[8]

The key point is probably that weapons like Harpoon and the Soviet SS-N-9 give to relatively small warships essentially the same kind of offensive punch that large warships have. This is a more dramatic change than may at first be evident. From the day of the trireme through the sailing ship of the line, the Dreadnought, and the aircraft carrier, the general rule applied that the large man-of-war held a decisive edge in combat power over lesser men-of-war. This no longer holds. It is important not to exaggerate—the larger warship does still hold important advantages in seakeeping ability, longer range, command and control, magazine capacity and the ability to support aircraft, whether rotary wing, VSTOL or conventional. Still, the fact that a patrol boat with significantly higher speed can fire the same weapon as a cruiser is cause for some painful reflection. It is a far cry from the dominance the armor and 16 inch rifles of a battleship gave it over any lesser ship.

This probably means that our ships are more likely to be attacked at sea during future limited conflicts. The relative immunity from attack we enjoyed during the Korean and Vietnam Wars may be a thing of the past. It also means that we need to disperse the combat capability of our Navy more widely throughout the fleet. Right now far too high a proportion of our capability resides on our remaining carrier decks. In a combat environment the disablement of a carrier can reduce the combat capability of an entire task force catastrophically. Programs are underway to remedy this, notably Harpoon, SLCM, Aegis, the strike cruiser, development of a family of VSTOL aircraft, and the inclusion of air-capable ships smaller than the carriers in our future building programs. It will, however, be several years before we will have managed to divide our eggs among a more reasonable number of baskets.

Conclusion. There is no evidence of a decline in the role of force and conflict in relations between nations, yet tech-

BIOGRAPHIC SUMMARY

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nology has made total war unusable as a tool of policy. Deterrence theory tells us we must plan for total war so that we might avoid it, and I see no way of escaping that uncomfortable logic. Yet there is also the entire range of force that must be available in relevant forms to support national policy in a world that still respects force a great deal more in private than is usually admitted in public.

The unpredictable nature of the world dictates that a prime characteristic of relevant force must be flexibility. This flexibility must be of several kinds: Geographical flexibility, political flexibility, flexibility in timely response, and the flexibility necessary to exert a wide range of relevant force. It is the way in which the Navy fits these criteria that leads to the conclusion that naval forces will continue to occupy an increasingly important role in the support of national policy.

NOTES

1. Henry E. Eccles, "The Vietnam Hurricane," *Shipmate*, July-August 1973, p. 23.
2. Paul Schratz, "National Decision Making and Military Intervention," Proceedings of the Research Symposium on the Consequences and Limits of Military Intervention, University of Chicago, 1976, pp. 18, 45.
3. Robert B. Mahoney, Jr., *International Incidents Project Data Base* (U) (Washington: Center for Naval Analyses, August 1976), p. 32.
4. James R. Schlesinger, "On Making Too Much of Our Present Discontents," *Foreign Policy*, Fall 1976, p. 32.
5. See, for example, George E. Hudson, "Soviet Naval Doctrine and Soviet Politics, 1953-1975," *World Politics*, October 1976, pp. 102-103.
6. Alfred T. Mahan, *Naval Strategy* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1911), p. 139.
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One of the most important things members of a profession must do is to think about their profession, in addition to practicing it. Naval officers must be able to answer such questions as "Why do we need a navy?" and "Does the Navy do anything useful in peacetime?" In a world characterized by instability, increasing complexity and the danger of nuclear conflict, naval officers cannot rely on pat answers or well-worn cliches. Professor Booth provides an extensive inventory of what navies can do in both peace and war.

ROLES, OBJECTIVES AND TASKS:

AN INVENTORY OF THE FUNCTIONS OF NAVIES

by

Ken Booth

Frankly, most of us find questions about our professional purpose at best too complicated and at worst something of a bore. For most of the time we are too busy cleaning in-trays, smoothing over yesterday's crisis and overlooking tomorrow's, to worry overly much about the essential nature of our jobs. We take them for granted. For most of us, for most of the time, this reluctance to worry about the big questions does not much matter. But for one group it does, and increasingly so. That group is the armed forces of the Western liberal democracies.

Social and international changes in the last 25 years have resulted in military professionals in general and naval officers in particular being regularly faced by the challenge to justify their existence. Not only have many officers found it increasingly difficult to meet this challenge, but at the same time their civilian audience has scrutinized their answers ever more closely. Technical innovation, social changes, and political pressures have combined to make the life of the contemporary naval officer far more stressful than that of any of his peacetime predecessors. Under pressure from all sides, it is hardly surprising if the busy officer, faced by the why-do-we-need-a-navy challenge, tends to resort to flip answers, the traditional cliches about seapower or inflated images of possible threats. But these replies will not do. They will not do either for a public which is more skeptical or for a generation of junior officers far less ready than their fathers to accept the words of those in authority. As time has passed the navies of the traditional

maritime powers have faced more questioning about their functions, a greater demand for cost-effectiveness in their performance, and a greater skepticism of the answers. All these trends spell trouble for the naval officer who does not meet the taxing standards of the day. They put a premium on sophisticated answers and articulate officers at all levels. But finding such answers is obviously easier said than done. Because of the complexities of the modern situation it is often tempting merely to relay pat answers: There is relatively little guidance in the modern naval literature for those hoping to give a satisfactory appreciation, one which is both comprehensive and easily assimilated.

This article is designed to help thinking about these problems. Its method is simple but basic: It sets out merely to provide an inventory—sorted, annotated, and exhaustive—of the functions which navies have carried out, or might carry out in future.[1] By providing a comprehensive checklist of the functions which navies can perform several aims can be furthered: (1) The inventory will provide at least the beginnings of an answer to the question: why do we need a navy? (2) Concentration on objectives should help the problem of establishing the rational selection of resources, the determination of tactical and financial priorities, the optimum selection of weapons systems, and the focusing upon the responsibilities of the whole of a navy rather than upon any of its parts.[2] (3) Although inventories are not exciting reading, the present listing will be usable by students of the subject for a variety of purposes, namely as a reference point in their studies of the uses of navies in general or in particular, as a checklist for contemplating the usage of different types of ships, in their essays on the possible uses of warships in the support of foreign policy, in attempts to cut up the naval cake into as many basic "missions" as are thought desirable for satisfactory planning and explanation, and for the exhibition for uncertain junior officers or interested civilians of the character and extent of the functions which naval forces can perform in support of national policy in near or distant waters.

The Use of the Sea. At its simplest, navies have existed because while some groups have wanted to use the sea for various purposes, there has almost always been some possibility that others would seek to challenge that usage. The *raison d'etre* of navies therefore arises out of national needs in using the sea for: (1) the passage of goods and people; (2) the passage of military force for diplomatic purposes or for use against targets on land or in or on the sea; and (3) the exploitation of resources in or under the sea. Navies are therefore a *means* whereby a nation attempts to use the sea for its own purposes while attempting to prevent others from using it in ways which are to its disadvantage.

In identifying the functions which navies carry out in support of a country's general maritime interests, the inventory has been structured into three levels. The three levels of analysis which have been adopted are:

1. Basic roles. These are the main functions which navies are expected to perform, the general reasons for which they exist. For the purpose of clarity in explanation, these have been divided into the *Policing, Diplomatic,* and *Military* roles.[3]

2. **Policy objectives.** These refer to the specific purposes which belong to each of the basic roles.

3. **Operational tasks.** These are the ways in which planners translate policy objectives into modes of naval action. A further elaboration of this level might include detailed *tactics,* but that would be a needless complication in terms of the purpose of this inventory.

I. THE POLICING ROLE

This role is concerned with maintaining authority within the state's maritime frontiers. Its subsidiary policy objectives are A. *Coast guard responsibilities* (extending sovereignty, maintaining good order, and ensuring resource enjoyment in contiguous seas),[4] and B. *Nation-building* (contributing to internal security and development).

A. Coast guard responsibilities

Operational tasks:
- –Customs
- –Air-sea rescue
- –Pollution watch
- –Control of navigation
- –Protect fishery vessels
- –Ice patrol
- –Deter and detain smugglers
- –Deter and detain foreign agents
- –Deter and detain all illegal entrants
- –Prevent unauthorized departure of own citizens
- –Protection from piracy
- –Law enforcement in territorial waters

B. Nation-building

Operational tasks:
- –Assist in natural disasters
- –Contribute to national development and modernization through education, construction, riverine work
- –Contribute to civil order by transportation, deterrent patrol, and projection of force off coast and in rivers
- –Blockade coast in event of major internal conflict

II. THE DIPLOMATIC ROLE

This role is concerned with the use of navies in the support of foreign policy short of the actual employment of force. In this role navies are the handmaidens of diplomats in the carrying out of international bargaining: warships might have their effects by being kept in the background, or by being brought forward explicitly into the foreground. Within this role the subsidiary policy objectives can be classified as A. *Negotiation from strength,* B. *Manipulation,* and C. *Prestige.*

A. Negotiation from strength

1. Reassure and strengthen allies and associates:

Operational tasks:

- –Regular goodwill visits (with appropriate declaratory commitment)
- –Naval aid
- –By joint exercises, joint forces (even mixed-manning) symbolize solidarity and enhance deterrence
- –Ensure access
- –Deployments and demonstrations as tokens of support in areas of tension, of a preventive, preemptive, and reactive character

2. Reassure and strengthen friendly governments threatened by serious internal challenge:

Operational tasks:

- –By visits and deployment demonstrate general support, including the legitimizing of particular governments
- –Deterrent presence offshore or in harbor to forestall violence and contribute to the maintenance of order
- –Assist local government in transport of men and supplies
- –Protect lives and property of friendly foreigners
- –Intercept shipping supplying men or other supplies to "rebel" forces
- –Use of naval-based aircraft for deterrence and/or surveillance
- –By limited intervention ashore, assist in dealing with mutiny or other major internal challenge
- –Blockade to affect outcome of civil unrest, or civil war
- –Rescue and evaluate friendly foreigners after coup, civil war, etc.

3. Reassure and strengthen friendly governments fearing external attack:

Operational tasks:

- –Naval aid
- –Reassurance visits
- –Deterrent presence offshore or in harbor
- –Reinforce an existing presence
- –Patrol against small intrusions
- –Contribute to reconnaissance and/or air defense
- –Transport troops of friendly country
- –By demonstrative actions, visits, deployments and firepower displays warn enemy of rising seriousness
- –Deploy to preempt other third-party activities
- –Threaten blockade
- –Show of force to encourage compliance with international agreements
- –Threaten intervention against unfriendly regime, by assembly or sailing of a fleet
- –Show of force patrols by naval-based aircraft
- –Threaten naval bombardment, air attack, amphibious assault
- –Show of force to ensure "rules of the game" at sea are complied with
- –Support subversive activities from the sea in enemy countries

4. Change the behavior of friendly governments when the latter are facing the threat of external attack:

Operational task:
- Refrain from taking any of the actions indicated immediately above

5. Signal "business as usual" during a crisis:

Operational task:
- Maintain normal strength and operating patterns

6. Support or threaten force from the sea to support friendly governments contemplating acquisitive military action:

Operational tasks:
- Naval aid
- Contribute to surveillance and covert intelligence activities
- Support subversive activities from the sea against the target country
- Vague or specific menace of naval force to threaten conformity with desired policy
- Preventive deployments to discourage third-party intervention
- Provide the capability and flexibility to raise the level of violence for the naval aspects of the conflict

7. Improve bargaining position:

Operational tasks:
- Local deployment to indicate commitment to establish the right to be consulted
- Increase forces to improve bargaining strength
- By deployment and behavior attempt to neutralize the image of power accredited to other naval powers operating in the region
- By deployment and behavior attempt to encourage third-party countries to be deferential
- By deployment, well-timed cruises, harassment, calculated discourtesies (and accompanying propaganda) attempt to affect negotiations and local attitudes
- By harassment (interference with navigation and sideswipes) and diplomatic maneuver create the conditions for negotiation in a particular area for adversary or mutual withdrawal

8. Threaten force from the sea to support policy:

Operational task:
- Vague or specific menace of naval force (supported by deployments, force augmentations, diplomatic actions, etc.) directed with inducing conformity with desired policy

9. Improve one's ability to affect the course of specific diplomatic negotiations:

Operational tasks:

- –Provide venue for meetings
- –Dispatch of warships to add weight to diplomatic negotiations
- –Deploy warships to symbolize power in negotiations
- –Display warships as bargaining chips in negotiations
- –Dispatch of warships to influence negotiations between third parties
- –Use warships to symbolize independence in negotiations

B. Manipulation

1. Manipulate bargaining positions within an alliance:

Operational tasks:

- –By showing excellence or special contribution in the naval field, establish the right to be consulted, and increase decisionmaking status within an alliance
- –Refrain from actions which attempt to reassure and strengthen allies
- –By reducing forces, changing deployment area, etc., indicate declining interest in specific situations
- –Refrain from actions supportive of allies threatened by use of force
- –Use disengagement to discipline local ally, or show disapproval of particular action
- –Harass warships of allies to show disapproval
- –Interpose between hostile allies

2. Demonstrate support to different countries:

Operational tasks:

- –Help in natural disasters
- –Symbolic visits to demonstrate support for change of government, and later to underline legitimacy of friendly regime
- –Well-publicized visits of reassurance
- –Naval aid
- –Use warships to transport friendly rulers
- –State and other official visits
- –Venue for diplomatic meetings

3. Gain or increase access to new countries:

Operational tasks:

- –Naval aid, including advisers, sales, gifts, and related activities such as mine-clearing, port-clearing, etc.
- –Use naval visits as opportunity to gain access to new countries
- –Use naval visits as opportunity to develop relations
- –Use visits to keep the country's policy in the mind of local decisionmakers
- –Use visits to project a favorable general image, or impressive naval capability, to make the target country more susceptible
- –Use visits backed by propaganda to symbolize a growing commitment

4. Build up foreign navies and create proxy threats:

Operational tasks:
- As above

5. Create a degree of naval dependency:

Operational tasks:
- As above

6. To provide standing demonstrations of naval power in distant waters to establish the right to be interested:

Operational tasks:
- By demonstrating permanent military capability, become accepted as local power
- Maintain a presence to underline a commitment
- Vary the strength and behavior of a presence to imply changes in policy, and by the character of the deployment attempt to reassure some, and decrease confidence of others
- Exercise vague menace, show interest, deter, take advantage of favorable situations, provide insurance
- Suddenly reinforce commitment to show concern
- By presence attempt to minimize the impact on third parties of the presence of others

C. Prestige

1. Provide psychological reassurance for home community:

Operational tasks:
- See the tasks with "hearts and minds" connotations under the Policing Role
- Visits, displays, and presentations

2. Project a favorable general image of one's country:

Operational tasks:
- Show excellence (including firmness or forbearance) in the performance of all tasks, supported by suitable diplomatic and propaganda efforts in target countries

3. Project an image of impressive naval force:

Operational tasks:
- As above, with a naval emphasis

III. THE MILITARY ROLE

The threat and use of force from the sea is the essence of a navy's existence. It is the possibility of violence at sea which gives rise to navies, and

actual or latent violence is the currency in which they deal. The ability of a navy to threaten and use force is the basis of a navy's significance: Its diplomatic impact is related to perceptions of its military prowess, while its utility in conflicts is determined by its ability to discharge its missions successfully. For the purposes of this inventory, the military role has been subdivided into wartime and peacetime activities. The former are described as *balance of power* functions (that is, pertaining to the structuring of an acceptable international order) while the latter are described as *projection of force* functions (that is, pertaining to the actual employment of force at any or all points across the spectrum).

Balance of power:

A. Strategic nuclear deterrence

1. Deter attack on the homeland, and the homeland of allies

2. Provide secure situation in which to promote foreign policy interests

3. Contribute to the nation's ability to negotiate from a position of recognized strength

4. Counter deterrent tasks

Operational tasks:

- –SSBNs on station
- –Strike carriers on station
- –Weapons testing activities
- –Recognized assured destruction capability
- –Tracking, marking, gathering intelligence about adversary deterrent forces

Balance of power:

B. Conventional deterrence and defense

1. Prepare for wartime tasks:

Operational tasks:

- –Exercising and readiness of relevant units
- –Maintain amphibious forces for cooperation with army
- –Build up infrastructure for war, e.g., sensor
- –Oceanography
- –Surveillance
- –Shadow potential threats, both under and above the surface of the sea

2. Deter hostile intrusion:

Operational tasks:

- –Deterrent exercises and patrol
- –By ready air and sea surveillance demonstrate to any potential intruder that intrusion will be met

- Discourage, by seizure or harassment, unfriendly naval presences offshore (e.g., intelligence gatherers)
- Demonstrate the ability to raise the level of violence against intruders

3. Contribute to local maritime stability:

Operational tasks:
- Protect airspace above the sea for national or other transport
- Supervise, and if necessary enforce jurisdiction at sea

4. Protect national claims in contiguous seas:

Operational tasks:
- Ensure access to national claims
- Protect and supervise the activities of merchant vessels and fishing fleets in contiguous seas
- Protect and supervise the exploitation of minerals on or under the seabed

5. Extend national claims in contiguous seas:

Operational task:
Patrol, harassment, seizure

Balance of power:
C. Extended deterrence and defense

1. Protect state activities on the high seas:

Operational tasks:
- Support space-related activities (provide communications, supervise splashdown)
- Supervise weapons testing activities (mark out test areas and danger zones, patrol and supervise missile firings and nuclear explosions)

2. Protect the lives, interests, and property of nationals (and others) operating in distant waters:

Operational tasks:
- Provide assistance in event of natural disaster
- Supervise, protect, discipline, and assist national merchant ships and fishing fleets
- Protect shipping against piracy
- Protect shipping against harassment, blockade and other state interference
- Operate convoy in unfriendly waters

3. Protect the lives, interests, and property of nations (and others) overseas threatened by local disturbance or natural disaster:

Operational tasks:

- –Support nationals by routine visits in normal times
- –Reassure nationals by presence in times of trouble
- –Evacuate nationals from foreign countries after natural disasters, and provide relief and rescue
- –Interpose to protect national economic stakes in foreign country during disturbance
- –Break blockade against own nationals
- –Inject forces to deter attack on nationals
- –Interpose between hostile parties in local dispute
- –Protect or evacuate nationals and/or foreign sympathizers in civil disturbance or civil war

4. Local maritime defense of distant national territories:

Operational tasks:

- –Carry out range of coast guard activities
- –Contribute to internal security
- –Maritime defense in contiguous seas
- –Maintain access
- –Presence to symbolize continuing commitment

5. Develop operating techniques for the essential wartime tasks:

Operational tasks:

- –Maintain strength and readiness for war, including the ability to fight at various levels of hostility
- –Exercise in distant waters
- –Shadow potential threats
- –Develop tactics to control surface, air, subsurface operations in the relevant geographical areas
- –Develop operating procedures for using the sea for the projection of power ashore, blockade, bombardment, the supply of military, industrial, and other needs to overseas areas
- –Develop tactics to deny to the enemy control of surface, air, and subsurface operations in the relevant geographical areas

6. Build up an infrastructure for the performance of major war-related missions:

Operational tasks:

- –Build up and consolidate bases and other shore facilities
- –Develop sea communications with allies and associates
- –Ensure access to facilities for war, e.g., underwater sensors

7. Demonstrate commitment to allies:

Operational task:

- –As above, under negotiation from strength, strategic deterrence, and extended deterrence

Balance of power:

D. International order

1. Contribute to general maritime stability:

Operational tasks:
- –Support an internationally recognized law of the sea
- –Assert the right of innocent passage
- –Protect airspace above the sea for national or other transport
- –Attempt to break "illegal" blockade

2. Do not support maritime stability:

Operational task:
- –Use naval forces to challenge the above, to extend national claims, etc.

Projection of force:

A. Guerrilla wars, limited wars, and interventions

1. To control the areas of the sea required for national or allied use, for acquisitive or retaliatory purposes.

2. To use the seas controlled for the transportation of men and supplies.

3. To use the seas for the projection of power ashore against opposition.

4. To challenge and deny the enemy's ability to use the sea for his own purposes.

5. To meet the naval challenge at whatever level is considered militarily and politically desirable.

6. Support international peacekeeping operations.

Operational tasks:
- –Seize or harass foreign shipping on behalf of friendly government
- –Detain foreign ships at sea or in port
- –Interfere with right of innocent passage in order to press national claims
- –Use harassment or seizure of naval units or merchant ships for retaliatory purposes
- –Close sea areas to foreign shipping
- –Closure of straits for bargaining chips
- –Apply pressure through mining of sea area, straits, harbor entrances, etc.
- –Limited shore bombardment as punishment for hostile act
- –Landing of a punitive expedition
- –Send force ashore and seize hostages
- –Retaliate at sea for pressures on land

- Seize island, town, or strategic point for bargaining purposes
- Contest islands and territories where ownership disputed, by preemptive occupation or fighting
- Nonbelligerent blockade
- Blockade, national or international
- Attempt control of air, surface, and subsurface in relevant zones
- Maintain sea communications to allies
- Break blockade
- Use aircraft over the sea for reconnaissance, interception, strike, minelaying
- Use aircraft over the land for reconnaissance, interception, logistics support, tactical and strategic strike
- Provide air defense, reconnaissance, logistic etc., support for ally or associate (government or nongovernment or international organization)
- Intercept shipping supplying men or supplies to "rebel" forces
- Contribute to subversive activities against foreign countries
- Self-protection of naval task forces and joint service task forces
- Show of naval force to ensure "rules of the game" at sea are complied with
- Deterrent presence offshore or in harbor
- Deter larger intrusion by deployment or reinforcement
- Support land operations (own or allied) by naval gunfire

Escort troops to theater of operations

Logistics support, by ship and naval aircraft

Patrol or interpose against possibility of large-scale invasion or small intrusion

Preemptive occupation of islands and pieces of territory

Inject marines temporarily to coerce conformity with desired policy

Maintain sea communications to allies, associates, and own forces

Protect/evacuate foreign governments to underline sympathy and support

Contribute to overt and covert intelligence gathering

- Brown water navy
- Support land operations by naval air support, either tactically or strategically
- Amphibious landings, to occupy territory

Assist forces of international organization to interpose between hostile parties in local dispute

Destroy enemy ships and commerce

Protect convoys against interference

- Anonymous sinkings

Local naval engagements

Undertake a "total wet war" against the enemy's maritime efforts

Destroy enemy bases

Deny the enemy the ability to use the sea for the foregoing purposes, by blockade, attacking his naval and merchant shipping, by ASW, by attack from the air, etc.

Projection of force:

B. Conventional war

1. To control the areas of the sea required for national or allied use, for acquisitive or retaliatory purposes.

2. To use the seas controlled for the transportation of men and supplies.

3. To use the seas controlled for the projection of power ashore.

4. To contest and seek to deny the enemy's ability to use the sea for his own purposes.

5. To meet the naval challenge at whatever level is considered militarily and politically desirable.

Operational tasks:

- –As immediately above where relevant
- –Defend homeland against hostile intrusion from the sea
- –Deception
- –Transfer and supply own land, sea, and air forces
- –Transfer raw materials and industrial goods
- –Support army operations by air and sea gunfire, logistic backup, and transportation
- –Protect convoys
- –Damage limitation efforts by attacking enemy seaborne strike platforms
- –Maintain sea communications to allies and associates
- –Maintain maritime security in distant national territories
- –Support land operations by amphibious operations
- –Apply pressure by mining
- –Apply pressure by blockade
- –Destroy the enemy's main forces at sea
- –Destroy the enemy's naval bases
- –Use aircraft over the sea for reconnaissance, interception, strike, minelaying
- –Use aircraft over the land for reconnaissance, interception, logistic support, tactical and strategic strike.

Projection of force:

C. Nuclear War

1. To control the areas of the sea required for national or allied use, for acquisitive or retaliatory purposes.

2. To use the seas controlled for the transportation of men and supplies.

3. To use the seas controlled for the projection of power ashore.

4. To contest and seek to deny the enemy's ability to use the sea for his own purposes.

5. To meet the naval challenge at whatever level is considered militarily and politically desirable.

6. To use the seas for strategic nuclear retaliation, or its deliberate withholding.

Operational tasks:

- As above where relevant
- Withhold strategic nuclear bombardment for bargaining purposes
- Contribute to initial nuclear strikes
- Strategic nuclear bombardment
- Bring relief, succor, rescue

Intelligence. One task which navies perform which contributes to the prosecution of all the others is the gathering of information of a military, political, or economic type.

Operational tasks:

- Oceanography
- Surveillance of missile firings, nuclear explosions, weapons testing
- Surveillance of other navies, their tactics, techniques, exercise patterns, capabilities, etc.
- Close electronic surveillance of foreign countries
- Protection of intelligence gathering ships in sensitive areas
- Deployment of and access to covert sensors in distant waters
  By covert methods support intelligence cells in foreign countries
- Provision of intelligence and early warning of hostile movements on behalf of others in limited wars
- Use of submarines for inshore covert surveillance

Conclusion. This inventory should have demonstrated several things: (1) It should have proved conclusively that warships are an inherently multipurpose instrument of policy; and (2) it should, by showing the subtlety and overlapping character of many usages, have underlined the fact that simply *describing* the functions of navies is a task which is as worthwhile as it is complex. Having said that, two warnings are necessary: (1) The inventory is not meant to suggest the *utility* of different usages, that is whether the objectives which might be secured by naval operations will outweigh costs in particular instances; and (2) the inventory is not meant to be a model in any sense, that is a standard against which particular navies might measure themselves. Different countries have different interests in using the sea, and hence the size and character of their naval forces, and their strategies and tactics, will differ accordingly. However, the *raison d'etre* of all navies can be understood within the framework adopted by the inventory in this article, namely:

I. The Policing Role
   A. *Coast guard responsibilities*
   B. *Nation-building*

II. The Diplomatic Role
   A. *Negotation from strength*
   B. *Manipulation*
   C. *Prestige*

III. The Military Role
   A. *Balance of power*
   B. *Projection of force*

This framework is both true to life and leaves the observer in no doubt as to what ultimately navies are *for*. By focusing on roles and objectives, one places oneself one level above arguments about "missions" such as naval presence; it is very easy to become embroiled in contentious discussions about the definition and usefulness of such concepts. Adoption of this proposed framework would clarify the problem of describing the objectives of a particular navy. It would thereby help minimize the confusion which listeners sometimes have when they hear naval spokesmen change the number and styling of their service's basic "missions" with all the frequency with which the average taxpayer changes his car. If the professionals give the impression that they are not sure what they are *for*, can they really expect the population at large to be other than wary?

BIOGRAPHIC SUMMARY

Ken Booth received his B.A. in the Department of International Politics at the University College of Wales, Aberystwyth. He has taught there since 1967, specializing in strategic studies. His publications include *The Military Instrument in Soviet Foreign Policy, 1917-1972* (1974); joint editor of *Soviet Naval Policy: Objectives and Constraints* (1975); coauthor of *Contemporary Strategy: Theories and Policies* (1975); and his own *Navies and Foreign Policy* (1977).

NOTES

1. With the exception of possible roles and tasks in nuclear war, the inventory is based on particular historical episodes mentioned in the literature on naval strategy.

2. On the value of a functional approach, see Stansfield Turner, "Missions of the U.S. Navy," *Naval War College Review*, March-April 1974, pp. 2-17.

3. This trinity of roles is discussed in my *Navies and Foreign Policy* (New York: Crane, Russak, 1977), especially Chap. I.

4. This is based upon J.R. Hill, *The Rule of Law at Sea*, unpublished thesis, Department of Laws, University of London, King's College, 1972, pp. 172-3.

Ψ

Naval War College Review, Vol. 30 [1977], No. 3, Art. 27

The concept of seapower as developed by Alfred Thayer Mahan was based on the realization that a country using the seas could grow strong and powerful. Times have changed significantly in the 90 years since Mahan used the example of Great Britain in the 17th and 18th centuries to prove his point. However, the fact remains that the United States can reap substantial benefits from use of the seas, provided we recognize and understand the characteristics of the maritime environment in the latter part of the 20th century, and provided that we have an appropriate maritime policy.

TOWARDS A NEW ORDER OF U.S. MARITIME POLICY[1]

by

Geoffrey Kemp

and

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I. Introduction. The United States does not have a coordinated or articulated maritime policy sufficient to cope with the fundamental changes taking place in the strategic environment. Unless we make certain critical decisions concerning the nature and direction of this policy for the next decade, we may find our international position severely eroded. For, although we are on the threshold of a potential renaissance in maritime affairs, the debate over U.S. policy has been couched almost entirely in terms of the U.S.-Soviet naval balance, which, although of great importance, cannot be fully understood except in the context of the broader maritime issues reflecting the growing relationship between the sea and society.[2]

The sea is in the ascendancy as a source of vital resources, for transportation of goods and services and as a medium for projecting and deploying military force. Yet, if the words "chaos" and "disorder" do not fully describe the existing condition of world maritime affairs, there are indications they soon will.

On the international level, the fifth United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) ended in New York in September 1976. With the failure to resolve the major issues relevant to establishing an acceptable regime for regulating navigational and commercial exploitation of the oceans, the possibilities for political and even military conflict over the uses of the seas have increased. Within the Western

alliance, as elsewhere, the competition for ocean resources has exacerbated existing tensions over fish in the North Atlantic, oil in the Aegean and North Seas and sovereignty over numerous small islands located throughout the world's seaways. In the United States, complex financial and bureaucratic pressures restrain and retard attempts to establish maritime policy. Quantum increases in unit costs of all U.S. naval forces have contributed to substantially reduced overall force levels, the lowest since the end of World War II, and the cost overruns of several of the U.S. Navy's shipbuilding programs could conceivably cause a legal showdown between the Department of Defense and two major civilian construction firms* which, in turn, could jeopardize current and projected Navy shipbuilding programs. This comes on top of an already foundering U.S. merchant marine building program. (Similarly, primary naval aircraft manufacturers, such as Grumman and Lockheed, are experiencing financial difficulties.)

On the more specific question of U.S. military power, during most of the post-World War II era, the United States and its allies, especially Britain and France, have controlled virtually all major oceans and waterways of the world. This was regarded as an important adjunct of the policy of "containment" and was, in part, a reaction to the *land threat* posed to Eurasia by the Soviet Union and China and the *maritime threat* posed by the Soviet submarine force which, in turn, was seen as analogous to the U-boat peril of World Wars I and II. This worldwide deployment was also due to the historical legacy which gave the United States, Britain and France numerous base rights in overseas territories adjacent to critical sealanes and waterways. One effect of this legacy was to assume that we had ready and unchallenged access to distant places. Thus, during the entire U.S. involvement in Vietnam, there was no serious public debate or worry over the sea and air lines of communication. However, during the October 1973 Arab-Israeli War which lasted for 3 weeks, the security of our lines of communication was threatened by non-military acts which included the denial of many NATO European bases to our mobility forces. Since 1973 further erosion of base rights in the Pacific and Atlantic pose growing constraints on our overseas presence at the very time our dependency upon maritime access is increasing. This comes concurrently with the proliferation of advanced weapons technology to many littoral states which now possess military capabilities sufficient to give the superpowers at least second thoughts about the projection of their own military power.

The broad changes in the international maritime environment (Law of the Sea, conflict over sea resources, changes in shipbuilding programs, access to overseas bases) also cut across many domestic bureaucratic lines. We believe that a comprehensive review of U.S. policy requires that the maritime interests of government institutions other than the U.S. Navy be more fully considered and understood, (including the U.S. Air Force, Army and Marine Corps and civilian agencies such as the Departments of Commerce, Interior, Labor, State and Transportation) and must be balanced with the maritime interests of the private sector.

Thus, on almost every level of maritime activity, the problems of policy formulation and successful implementation have become increasingly complex and less prone to solution. However, none of these problems is insolvable. The U.S. Government still has sufficient

*While the Navy appears to have reconciled claims with Newport News Shipyard, substantial difficulties remain with Litton and recently with Electric Boat in Groton, Connecticut.

flexibility and scope to determine the nature and direction of maritime policy. Because the emerging environment is much more complex than the post-World War II era we must undertake a careful analysis of the interaction between *all* maritime activities and interests before reaching conclusions on the preferred size, capabilities and deployment of the fleet, as well as on other aspects of our maritime policy, including the commercial exploitation of the seas, the continued development of advanced technology and those political commitments which require us to maintain an overseas basing structure.

We propose first to review the current debate concerning U.S.-Soviet naval rivalry and examine the evolution of U.S. and Soviet naval forces. Second, we will examine the major strategic changes and their impact on the ocean environment and, third, we will suggest several policy options for the United States which can exploit the new emerging maritime order.

II. U.S.-Soviet Maritime Competition. In order to appreciate the nuances of the current debate over the magnitude and meaning of the U.S.-Soviet maritime rivalry, it is first necessary to consider briefly the uses of naval power and the evolution of the U.S. and Soviet navies.

Evolution of Navies. Traditionally, navies have been constructed for one or more of three related purposes: to project power; to defend or deter against maritime threats; and to serve political and ideological interests.[3] The first set of purposes has led to traditional uses which concentrated on achieving "mastery" or "command" of the sea by the decisive victory of "capital ships" against the capital ships of an adversary in main force actions. Navies achieving "command" of the sea in this manner could, *de facto*, have served the purposes of the other two categories.

The second purpose focused upon "denying" and deterring an adversary's use of the sea. Smaller, numerically inferior navies tended towards this category relying more on commerce raiding (*guerre de course*) in which main force actions were to be avoided. This "defensive" use of naval power dates from the days of oar, sail and piracy to Hitler's attempt to cut off Britain's maritime lifelines during World War II. Likewise, the deterrent qualities of navies, described by Mahan as the concept of a "fleet-in-being," have led to roles such as that played by the German High Seas Fleet before the Battle of Jutland which, without major actions, restrained the Royal Navy from wide-ranging operations outside the North Sea simply by virtue of a threatened sortie.

The political and ideological uses of navies are more difficult to comprehend and analyze because measurement of these perceptions is often imprecise. The *flottenpolitik* nature of navies includes an indeterminate mixture of awe, will, credibility, uncertainty and, perhaps most critically, the subjective perceptions of adversaries and potential victims. In an historical sense, political and ideological determinants have had two major results. First, commitment or interest has been demonstrated by the presence of naval ships and, more precisely, the naval ensign representing the power of the state. To be credible, however, it was essential that sufficient force would be applied against an adversary even if reprisals were delivered well after the offending act.

A second result, indeed almost a corollary of the first, focused more on the ideological purposes behind naval development, namely that states acquired navies, in part, for reasons of prestige, influence, as part of great power status or due to a pervasive and demanding ideology. Today, the ascendancy of the Soviet Navy to naval superpower status, has led some Western observers to refer to the political and,

perhaps, ideological roles of the Soviet Navy which include "securing prestige and influence." Taken together, these three purposes have produced primary naval missions of: projection of power; sea control; sea denial; presence and deterrence.

Not until the late 1960's when a strategic nuclear standoff and political "parity" emerged between the two superpowers did the distinctions separating these traditional missions become blurred and artificial on two levels. First, while great navies once had classical projective purposes, in the nuclear age, the overarching concern of escalation into general war seemed to limit the extent of these possible uses for one superpower navy directly against the other. Second, new technology in the form of ballistic and cruise missiles and/or nuclear warheads has provided for once numerically inferior navies extraordinary destructive capabilities. Thus, these navies, which originally had only defensive or denial functions and were relatively ineffective in imposing their will upon an adversary (and, by extension, on his capital ships), now must be more fully reckoned with on both the strategic nuclear and conventional scales. For example, the small sea-based nuclear deterrent forces of Britain and France are of far greater concern to the Soviet Union than all their remaining naval forces because of the damage which could be inflicted against Russian cities by British and/or French submarine-launched ballistic missiles.[4] On the conventional level, missile-equipped fast patrol boats, submarines and aircraft, under *certain tactical conditions* of geography and surprise are capable of denying local sea areas to traditional "dreadnoughts" of superpower navies and can therefore be regarded as "ersatz" capital ships. The concept that *only* a dreadnought can defeat a dreadnought has been dramatically altered by technology.

The increased destructive capabilities of modern navies, large or small, have caused us to modify "traditional" thinking about roles and uses of naval forces. However, against this background of the increasing diffusion of power and increasing dependence upon the sea, what is indicated is *not* a decline in the utility of navies, but rather, a requirement for a broader reassessment of policy including all of these factors.

Evolution of the U.S. Navy. Since the 1890's, the U.S. Navy has acquired a projective outlook on naval power based on controlling the seas. Although the United States has become increasingly dependent upon maritime commerce and has faced adversaries equipped with "capital ships," the United States has also been protected and isolated by the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans and has had a happy history of nearly always being able to exercise "command of the sea" in this century.

The outset of the cold war required U.S. military forces capable of supporting alliances designed to contain Soviet expansion. During the late 1940's and early 1950's, the primary U.S. concern was the defense of Western Europe. This gave continued importance to protecting North Atlantic sea lines of communications (SLOC's). During this period the aircraft carrier task force was (and still is) the centerpiece in carrying out the bulk of U.S. sea control and power projection missions as well as determining much of force structure and force levels despite the advent of the Polaris submarine system (SSBN).

Based on these factors and the carriers' absolute domination of the seas during World War II, Korea and Vietnam, and because of the inherent flexibility and mobility of the Navy, U.S. national strategies of "massive retaliation," "flexible response" and the "Nixon Doctrine" have not basically changed U.S. naval missions although they are more precisely articulated today. U.S. Chief of Naval Operations,

Adm. James L. Holloway III, USN, has defined two basic functions: sea control and power projection. The 13 attack aircraft carriers (CV's) along with the attack submarines (SSN's), maritime air and surface ships form the substance of sea control. Power projection is a more subtle function ranging from nuclear deterrence and the SSBN's, through the amphibious forces and their projective capability, to conventional bombardment of the shore by aircraft and ships down to peaceful presence. However, all these examples of power projection emphasize the need, first, to establish some form of sea control.

The Evolution of the Soviet Navy. The Soviet Navy developed from very different historical, geographical, and institutional frames of reference than the U.S. Navy. For five decades since the October Revolution in 1917, the U.S.S.R. has perceived itself as strategically inferior to its major Western adversaries. After the Second World War, Stalin set the requirements for a naval "active defense" based on fast cruiser strike groups and submarines operating in support of the Red Army's maritime flanks against invasion.[5] The mission of protecting the Russian homeland, fashioned by centuries of insecurity bordering on paranoia has been one of the most significant differences in outlook between U.S. and Soviet naval developments.

As the Soviet perception of the threat adjusted to the U.S. massive retaliation doctrine and the possibility of global nuclear war, the impact of a U.S. nuclear attack launched from aircraft carriers began to occupy a higher naval priority than the traditional support mission. By the late 1950's, the Soviet military establishment had adapted, in part, to these nuclear factors and the navy's primary missions were to sink Western aircraft carriers prior to their launching strategic nuclear attacks against the U.S.S.R. and to defend against invasion. However, this new "antinuclear" mission required nearly continuous naval presence within striking distance of U.S. carriers, hence some form of forward naval deployment now became necessary.

The evolution of U.S. ballistic missile submarines and their deployment in late 1960 had further dramatic impact on Soviet naval planning and, by the early 1960's, decisions had been implemented which included the requirement for hunting and, presumably, destroying "Polaris" SSBN's. This task, which some observers feel the Soviet naval leadership grossly underestimated, was to be accomplished by a "balanced" force consisting of submarines, missile-equipped long-range aviation and surface ships.

This approach to doctrine and force planning fundamentally differed from that followed in the United States in that the Soviet view assumes not only that nuclear deterrence can fail but that its failure must serve as a rationalization for force levels. This appears to remain central to Soviet military thought. However, in parallel to the development of strategic sea-denial capabilities, the Soviet Union has partially mirrored the U.S. Navy in deploying its fleet of SSBN's certainly for strategic deterrent purposes and, in part, for "war fighting" if deterrence fails. Thus, the strategic nuclear criteria of defense against Polaris and the aircraft carrier and of maintaining a nuclear deterrent capability continue as the bedrock of Soviet naval missions. However, in order to oppose "Polaris," forward deployment of naval forces, overseas basing and overseas presence are continuous requirements more rigorous than those needed only for opposing the carrier.[6] It is these factors, among others, that undoubtedly increased the importance of Soviet missions ranging on the more "peaceful" side of the violence spectrum and are incorporated under the general heading of peacetime presence.

missions over which the West has always demonstrated a certain sensitivity and missions which the Soviets show little intention of decreasing.

Summary of Differences. A comparison of the missions of both navies, as explicitly stated by their senior admirals underscoring the different outlooks, is shown in table 1.

On the one hand, the United States, by virtue of geography, requires a long-range capability for projection of conventional force.[7] The Soviets, so far, have been more concerned with the immediate and proximate defense of their homeland, requiring counterpower projection against invasion and denying the adversary wartime use of his strategic weapons in addition to participating in nuclear attack. But, the virtues of peacetime presence, which the Soviets see as potentially "neutralizing" U.S. presence are real and are unlikely to be reduced in the future.

Given this bifurcation of Soviet naval mission between criteria of strategic nuclear war and peacetime presence, the notion of Soviet naval use spilling over from strategic nuclear sea denial to more conventional forms of sea denial and interdiction short of global war is especially relevant because of the improbability and disutility of thermonuclear war including the great difficulty in hunting Polaris, the growing importance of the oceans, and the questioning of Western resolve by the West and perhaps by the Soviet Union. It is also on this point which Western analysis divides its opinion about Soviet naval intentions.

The Debate over Soviet Maritime Power. Western analysts agree that since Stalin's day there has been unprecedented growth in the qualitative capabilities and overseas presence of Soviet maritime power. Beyond this point, there is little consensus. There is a debate over the Soviet Navy because of uncertainty about Soviet motives, likely actions and capabilities. This debate has been sometimes skewed by "mirror imagery" and "worse case" or "vulnerability" analysis. Mirror imagery is the tendency to view Soviet responses to these issues as we do, i.e., in Western terms. "Vulnerability" or "worse case" analysis is determining what the most

UNITED STATES (Holloway, 1976)	SOVIET UNION (Gorshkov, 1976)
Sea control (conventional)	Strategic sea denial (anti-SSBN, anti-CV); limited conventional sea denial
Power projection	
a. Nuclear deterrence	Participating in strategic nuclear attacks
b. Amphibious projection	Defending maritime flanks (areas immediately adjacent to U.S.S.R., such as the Northern Flank, the Danish Straits, and the Dardanelles)
c. Conventional (shore bombardment, blockade)	Protection of fleet operating areas
d. Presence	Protecting state interests, securing "prestige and influence"

Table 1

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dangerous contingency would be for the West without necessarily assessing the likelihood or probability of its occurrence and using that as a planning assumption. Taken together, these factors can obscure the real significance and meaning of Soviet maritime power and make accurate analysis difficult both on the level of Soviet operational capabilities and on the more critical plane of Soviet motives.

Despite a great deal of data, there is also substantial disagreement over the actual capabilities of Soviet maritime power. For example, while the *Kiev* class air-capable ship is described by the Soviets as being an "ASW cruiser," some Western analysts see her use as potentially oriented towards conventional projection of naval force against either other surface navies or the shore.[8] The "Y" and "D" class nuclear submarines are generally regarded in the West as only second-strike retaliatory systems, similar to our SSBN's but some observers suggest they have (or will have) counterforce capabilities beyond that role.[9] Does Soviet interest in overseas bases like Berbera in the Indian Ocean and West Africa indicate a legitimate naval requirement, attempts at expanding influence or both? What can be decided about Soviet trends in naval procurement—do they indicate longer term expansionary objectives or are they just sufficient to maintain current force levels?

Most important, however, is the debate over interpretation of Soviet maritime power in the context of Soviet political strategy and its intentions. How *will* and how *can* the Soviet Navy be used? For example, many Western analysts argue that the expansion of the Soviet Navy, in qualitative and operational measures, provides the capability for conventional sea denial and, hence, the naval power for threatening vulnerable Western maritime lines of communication such as the North Atlantic and the oil routes from the Persian Gulf which are critically important in time of both war and peace. Therefore, one primary U.S. naval response must be protecting these SLOC's. However, since the most usual scenario offered entails a protracted war at sea, which appears unlikely, these assumptions and the corresponding naval requirements and costs can be questioned even though the perceived vulnerability of SLOC's remains.

Alternatively, the Soviets describe "sea denial," at least for the present, in terms of strategic nuclear defense aimed against Western ballistic missile submarines (SSBN's) and nuclear-capable attack aircraft carriers (CV's). Thus, a major issue over which debate exists is the scope of Soviet sea denial and the relevance of severing SLOC's. Does Soviet sea denial consist only of the strategic nuclear defensive; does it include conventional uses short of general nuclear war or does the Soviet naval view incorporate both elements?[10]

The "expansionist" trends in the Soviet Navy are challenged by some observers who, in reviewing all available evidence in the form of Soviet shipbuilding programs (including aircraft and submarines),[11] explicit doctrine, public pronouncements, training exercises and deployment patterns argue that while the more conventional aspects of sea denial may one day replace the difficult, if not impossible, task of countering Polaris and Trident, at this stage what has been considered reliable evidence in the past still continues substantiating the missions outlined by Gorshkov.

The dilemma here, of course, is resolving what may be genuinely defensive Soviet *intentions* with increasingly offensive capabilities. And, since debate over the Soviet Navy seems to be ongoing in the Soviet Union as well as in the West, particularly Admiral Gorshkov's prolific arguments[12] for a broader approach to naval use, dismissing out of hand either argument would be

erroneous. Western analysts should, therefore, focus on certain indicators or pulses of Soviet action which may be helpful in resolving this issue. These "vital signs" include:

a. The Soviet debate over naval doctrine.

b. New Soviet building construction programs and weapons systems.

c. Change in Soviet deployment patterns, overseas basing, exercises.

d. Development in Soviet conventional ground and air force capabilities especially with respect to air, sealift and amphibious forces.

e. Soviet perceptions of Western political and military resolve.

The results of monitoring these vital signs will inevitably be ambiguous in part. However, if in the main, the strategic nuclear criteria continue as doctrinal requirements and are paralleled by complementary building programs and deployment patterns, the conclusion would not support the "expansionist," anti-SLOC argument. A diminution of the strategic nuclear defensive mission and the acquisition of more forces capable of projective power such as attack carrier aircraft (including radically new VSTOL's), blue-water amphibious and logistic squadrons and more extensive basing rights would tend toward confirming a fundamental change in Soviet Navy missions away from its current wartime role.

Thus, deduction of Soviet naval missions is both possible and important. However, what is missing from the general debate over Soviet motives and appropriate Western responses is any *explicit* linkage between those purely naval responses to Soviet *naval* power and broader *maritime* options which are present in the emerging maritime environment. This is indeed paradoxical because the evolution of both navies has been affected differently by the broader reach of history and environment and every indication suggests the future will be similar to the past in that respect. If that is correct, what needs to be done, as well, is to interpret the respective roles, missions and capabilities of each navy in terms of the maritime environment, and to assess the major asymmetries of U.S. and Soviet maritime vulnerabilities and dependencies in this broader context.

III. The Diffusion of Power and the U.S.-Soviet Maritime Environment. The diffusion of power is having a major impact upon both U.S. and Soviet maritime power at three levels of analysis: political, military, and economic.

Political Impacts. The proliferation of the number of sovereign states within the international system is having important political effects upon the flexibility of the major maritime powers to project military and all forms of economic and political power across the globe. In practical terms the large numbers of nonaligned states can now influence U.N. votes on Law of the Sea questions, so much so that on certain issues such as freedom of navigation through narrow straits, the United States and the Soviet Union have frequently demonstrated complementary minority interests.

The overall effect of this phenomenon appears to put increasing political constraints on the deployment and use of naval power by the United States and Soviet Union in strategic regions of the world. This is not to say that if either superpower felt its vital interests were seriously threatened it could not act unilaterally and use its naval power to uphold them. However, in lesser situations, the political and possibly military costs of using naval power against the wishes of local states have risen to the point where shows of force such as the U.S. deployment of the *Enterprise* Task Force through the Strait of Malacca into the Bay of Bengal in 1971 during the Indo-Pakistan

War may become more problematic in the future.

The net effect of these political constraints should make the superpowers increasingly wary about how they deploy their navies and how they weigh the costs and benefits of doing so.

Military Effects

• **Nuclear Weapons.** In weighing the military implications of the new environment upon the United States and the Soviet Union, the role of nuclear weapons remains the most critical ingredient. Since both countries have placed great reliance upon the nuclear submarine equipped with ballistic missiles, any changes in the environment to enhance or diminish the survivability and vulnerability of these systems will be regarded with the utmost concern. In this instance, both countries are now deploying missiles with sufficiently long ranges to permit them to be deployed near home ports respectively in the United States and the Soviet Union. But, for example, the sea area between the North Cape of Norway and the Svalbard (Spitzbergen) is believed to be rich in oil, is certainly rich in fish and is claimed by Norway. The Soviet Union considers this passageway as vital to its security since the bulk of the Soviet submarine fleet is located at Murmansk. If Norway or an international consortium were to "develop" the oilfields in a similar manner to the existing North Sea oilfields south of 62^0 N. latitude, the potential vulnerabilities of Soviet submarines and their bases would be increased because of the proximity of Western oil rigs and oceanographic research facilities which, certainly in the Soviet view, could have military implications.

Similarly the potential spread of nuclear weapons may pose as great if not greater problems for Soviet security than for the United States and its allies. The list of existing and potential nth nuclear powers indicates that most of them are more likely to be able to threaten the Soviet Union than the United States. Already Britain and France have SSBN's capable of targeting the Soviet Union. With the exception of Brazil, most of the other likely nuclear powers are located much closer to Soviet than to U.S. continental targets (Israel, India, Iran, South Africa, Republic of Korea, Republic of China).

• **Access to Overseas Military Facilities.** In contrast to nuclear issues where the U.S.S.R. may be most vulnerable, the United States will be more constrained if, as seems likely, it is further denied access to overseas naval facilities which are politically costly and are subject to the vagaries of the host country. The Soviet Union has a certain dependence on external naval facilities but has adopted austere operations using alternatives such as accomplishing necessary repairs and maintenance at anchor rather than at shore bases. However, without access to overseas bases, the United States cannot carry out all *existing* missions and may be forced to accept certain restraints in operational capabilities. The alternatives of designing forces and force levels not requiring overseas basing are extremely costly. Overseas bases, on the other hand, are not essential for current Soviet missions but could be a great bonus for future missions.

• **Proliferation of Arms and the Closure of the Seas.** More and more countries are procuring military technologies capable, in theory, of challenging the maritime forces of both the United States and the Soviet Union in local environments. The spread of cruise missiles, maritime strike aircraft, submarines and mines to less-industrial states means that they now have much more effective local "sea denial" options than were available in the past. These capabilities, together with the

extension of territorial waters out to at least 12 miles and exclusive economic zones (EEZ's) out to 200 miles strengthen the argument that increasing areas of the world's sea space may be effectively "closed" thereby eroding the maritime powers' "freedom of the seas." However, those less-industrial countries most heavily committed to a military buildup are not reducing their dependency upon the industrial powers for their ultimate security and, in some cases, may even be becoming more dependent as the problems of implementation of *very* sophisticated weapons programs compound. Since most of the emerging military powers in the less-industrial world are buying U.S. rather than Soviet equipment, this "dependency" relationship is certainly not welcomed by the Soviet Union.[13]

Furthermore, in military terms, the proliferation of arms to less-industrial countries may presently be less disadvantageous for the United States than the Soviet Union for several reasons. First, the types of naval weapons being procured by littoral states are generally low-cost alternatives to traditional "capital ships" such as SSM-equipped patrol boats. While having localized advantages due to surprise or geography in confined waters, they are not likely to be much of a match against a really sophisticated capital ship such as an attack aircraft carrier in open waters. The Soviet Union, even with limited air-capable ships like the *Kiev*, presently lacks the maritime air and traditional "capital ships" to counter, in naval terms, an enraged littoral state unless it were to deploy a large percentage of its striking fleet or rely on nonnaval options. Second, in many cases, the Soviet Union rather than the United States is a potential target for growing littoral naval capabilities, especially for those small countries who have invested most heavily in naval systems such as Israel, Iran, South Africa and Brazil. Third, although the Soviet Union has never been reluctant to use force, so far, its record of forceful or threatened naval intervention overseas has been virtually nonexistent. While the United States may be constrained in future uses of force, in calculating the probabilities of intervention against a less-industrial country, the psychological advantage may, ironically, favor the United States.

Economic Factors.

• **Sea Resource.** Both the United States and the Soviet Union have growing interests in the economic uses of the seas. At the same time that the West's conventional military capacity has diminished, so dependence upon certain resources, especially oil, has increased and will continue to increase during the coming decade. Barring dramatic changes in consumption patterns there are no alternatives to oil as the primary energy source for the next 10-15 years. Within this period Persian Gulf oil will remain critical. Any prolonged interference with the transshipment of Persian Gulf oil to Europe and Japan would have a profound impact upon Western economic, political and, possibly, military relationships.[14] As a consequence, the security of the oil-flow cycle should assume great importance for Western strategic planning. But, if the West's most serious weakness is oil, the Soviet Union's is food. Excluding a radical change in the Soviet method of agriculture and more favorable weather conditions than are currently being forecast for the next decade, the Soviet Union will continue to need to purchase Western food and expand its capacity to retrieve fish protein from the sea.[15] Similar Soviet import requirements exist in the area of technology and the need for access to Western sources.

The growing demand for sea resources, especially oil and fish, has already led to conflict and, on occasion, violence over ownership and exploration rights. Unfortunately some of the most

lucrative untapped sea resources—oil and fish—are located in potential conflict regions. Areas replete with resource conflict include the South China Sea where both Chinas, Japan, the Koreas, Vietnam, and the Philippines have competing claims for numerous offshore islands and potentially lucrative oil deposits. Conflict over fish has already resulted in violent encounters between the Soviet Union and Japan, North and South Korea, Britain and Iceland, and the United States and several South American states. The Soviet Union and Japan are especially vulnerable to the effects of 200 mile exclusive economic zones since so much of their protein needs come from the sea.

In sum, it can be anticipated that as the potential for conflict over sea resources grows, so the need to "protect" these resources with military or "constabulary" forces will grow. Both the Soviet Union and the United States may be separately drawn into future conflicts over the ownership of and access to sea resources.

• **Sea Transportation.** The overall growth in world trade is resulting in an expansion of seaborne commercial traffic. The security implications of these trends are potentially very important. At the most extreme level the West's growing dependency upon the oil SLOC's from the Persian Gulf, Alaska, North Sea, West Africa, Venezuela, and South East Asia requires much more attention than it so far has received. Even though deliberate naval action against Western SLOC's by the Soviet Union remains unlikely, the vulnerability of this commerce to boycotts and cartels, to "closing" of chokepoints and strategic straits either by attempted political or other forms of action, and to third parties or transnational actors remains a potential problem for both the industrialized and the resource-exporting states.

In parallel, the growth of the Soviet commercial fleet has led to speculation that over time the Soviet Union may be able to increase its share of seaborne traffic and thereby challenge or even negate the capabilities of the Western operators in their critical field. To offset the more demonological explanations for Soviet commercial activity it should be pointed out that the Soviet's commercial fleet is one of its few foreign exchange earners. Given the continuing demand for Western wheat and technology, it can be argued that the Soviet commercial fleet is an economic necessity. Furthermore, despite its growth, the fleet is comparatively backwards in technical terms and unlikely to challenge the U.S. merchant marine in efficiency or capability. Where the Soviet Union may have an advantage over the United States is in the centralization of its commercial maritime planning which undoubtedly has military capabilities, especially in the areas of command, control and communications and intelligence gathering. This does not assume either monolithic control or efficiency—but, compared with the divided and fractured American system, unless the latter can sort out some of its problems, the Soviets over the longer term can erode the American lead in technology.

IV. Implications for U.S. Maritime Policy.

Policy Options. In view of the differences in U.S.-Soviet naval missions and capabilities and the changes in the worldwide political, military and economic environment, how should the United States orchestrate its policy and plan its maritime forces for the next decade?

The new environment contains some fundamental paradoxes which compound the difficulty of choosing a preferred policy. The economic benefits of the new ocean regime ratified by a law of the sea agreement offer the

potential for a future U.S. bonanza especially in the areas of oil, mineral and fish exploitation and maritime transportation. However, for the next 10 years or so, the Western powers are becoming more dependent upon the seas while their control of the seas is being challenged in certain areas. Soviet maritime power has been in the ascendancy yet the Soviet Union will face severe constraints in projecting its power overseas as well as in the continued modernization of its maritime forces. The less-industrial world is modernizing and arming at a remarkable pace, yet at the same time is becoming dependent upon the industrial world for its basic technology. These trends reinforce the interdependence of the major actors in the international system at the very time when sources for military conflict in critical regions of the world show no signs of abating.

One net effect is to establish much closer and more complex linkages between various maritime activities in both a structural and geographical sense. What this all adds up to is that the number of contingencies which could occur in the decades ahead to jeopardize U.S. interests is growing; yet, for the United States to adopt unilateral means of ensuring the protection of all these interests will almost certainly exceed diplomatic and financial capabilities. This suggests that we need to think very carefully about our maritime interests and decide which of them we wish to protect by ourselves; those we wish to protect in concert with friends and allies and those we can afford to relinquish or diminish our dependence upon.

Insofar as the commercial and economic aspects of U.S. maritime policy are concerned, much greater coordination is required in Washington if the very great economic benefits from the sea are to be realized. The list of participants with important maritime interests includes not only fishing, shipbuilding and shipping industries but the Congress, Labor, the Departments of Commerce, Interior, and Transport and the State Department and Department of Defense, as well as those littoral states on both U.S. coasts which have increasing interests in coastal zone management, which includes pollution control, fishing and offshore drilling. Although coordination between the Executive and Legislative Branches and the federal and state bureaucracies is essential, leadership must start in the Executive Branch. A first step would be to institute a more balanced representation of the various interests in the Executive Branch. Establishment of a new maritime bureaucracy may not be the solution although some form of centralization through a single cabinet-level coordinator—a maritime Czar—might be a distinct improvement. Understanding the maritime issues and coordinating the bureaucratic machinery are the two most significant requirements and that responsibility resides with the President.

In terms of defense policy the problems are potentially far more serious, because in this respect they involve relationships with foreign governments. With exceptions of the defense of the North American regions including the immediate northeastern Pacific and northwest Atlantic, protection of worldwide maritime interests will have to rely upon continued and possibly increased cooperation with friends and allies. The policy dilemmas are most apparent in those areas, which up to now, we have either had complete control over or, alternatively, have not commanded very high attention in terms of U.S. strategic priorities. Of particular importance is the Northwest Pacific and the Persian Gulf-Indian Ocean region.

The problem in the Northwest Pacific is that whereas we have important commitments in Korea, Japan and the Philippines, the aftermath of Vietnam has eroded our physical and psychological capabilities to project

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force in the region. We, therefore, have the option of either reducing commitments or relying more heavily upon more subtle diplomatic initiatives and local friendly countries to provide a greater share of their defense. This problem is most acute in the case of Japan. Logic dictates that Japan should expand its military capabilities; politics suggests that this will remain difficult though not impossible in the years ahead.

In the Southern Seas[16] it would be most dangerous for the Western Allies to permit the unilateral growth of the Soviet maritime capabilities. Any potential on the part of the Soviet Union to expand its power to the point where it seriously could threaten Persian Gulf oil would, over the next decade or so, pose a great threat to the Western world which in many ways would be more divisive than the current Soviet challenge to Western Europe. The relationship between oil and security in the Middle East is extremely complicated and does not necessarily lead one to the conclusion that allied unity is inevitable in the event of disruption or even threat to oil supplies.

Given the importance of the Indian Ocean in addition to the other remaining commitments and requirements that necessitate the maintenance of a strong position in the Pacific, Atlantic and Mediterranean areas, we have several options to check Soviet power in the Middle East. Three possibilities should be examined: First, to have U.S. forces and facilities in the Indian Ocean equivalent to those of the Soviets; second, to reduce our direct military commitments and rely, instead, on more indirect policies such as arms transfers to friendly local powers; third, to rely on a more subtle approach which plays upon the Soviet Union's inherently cautious and pragmatic view of its military relations with the West. This third approach could include limited military options such as further low-keyed initiatives to secure access to military facilities in the Indian Ocean. In practical terms this means that our arms transfer policies to Middle East countries need to be more clearly related to our overall security requirements. It also suggests that serious consideration should be given to the uses of bases in Australia, possibly Cockburn Sound at Perth, thus permitting the Seventh Fleet a "swing" capability from the Pacific Ocean to the Indian Ocean theaters. A further option would be to employ more fully with Britain and France other islands base options in the general area of the Southern Seas, especially in view of potential difficulties with base rights and facilities in the Persian Gulf, the Philippines and Southern Africa.

Weapons and Force Structures. In translating these geopolitical requirements into military missions, force structures and weapons technology, priority must be given to sustaining and improving the capacity to destroy or neutralize the Soviet Fleet in conventional combat preferably by denying egress from home waters and destroying units already at sea. This capability would automatically assure protection of SLOC's and maritime interests. This type of navy would also possess sufficient flexibility and capability to respond to most non-Soviet contingencies when they arise.

For the 1980's, three approaches might be pursued. First, the geographic vulnerability of the Soviet Navy can be better exploited by current and future technology in mine warfare and mine delivery systems. "Captor," an ASW mine using a MK-46 torpedo is an excellent, but tardy, step against enemy submarines.[17] Further mining developments against both submarines and surface warships must be hastened including enhanced capabilities for delivery as close as possible to Soviet naval bases[18] thereby restricting Soviet movements and permitting U.S. sub-

marines freedom of action beyond those close-in minefields.

Secondly, while carrier task forces will remain the centerpiece of any anti-Soviet strategy, several types of additional weapons systems and basing structures augmenting this essential offensive capability should be considered. A two-phased research and development program for new air-capable ships should focus on Surface Effect Ships (SES) and VSTOL aircraft. The SES concept, despite *extremely* difficult problems of stability, endurance, propulsion, maintenance, and costs, has great potential. Riding on its cushion of air at 80-100 knots, the SES would be capable of *one* day transits from the Cape of Good Hope to Diego Garcia and from Diego Garcia to the Straits of Hormuz. With advanced weapons and sensors, these ships might be projected rapidly into distant and potentially hazardous areas with sufficient capabilities to perform their missions but without the attendant costs and risks of deploying an expensive CV.[19]

The second weapons program is to develop VSTOL aircraft having payload, endurance and performance characteristics roughly equivalent to today's carrier strike aircraft. Admiral Holloway has already made the case for this program and the U.S. Navy is actively pursuing new VSTOL technologies. These VSTOL could be stationed in CV's, aboard smaller air-capable ships such as LHA's and even in larger destroyers providing for the fleet a more dispersed and efficient air capability.

The research and development program for the next decade also needs to anticipate the likely future maritime environment and the requirement for lower cost, offensively armed surface escorts with the capacity for extended independent surveillance missions. This is in addition to current programs and not in competition with them. These relatively inexpensive "killer escorts" would be designed primarily against surface ships (and missile-armed patrol boats), would carry a modest ASW facility and be powered by a combination gas turbine-diesel system.[20]

Continued development of surface-to-surface missiles is also important. "Harpoon" is a first step but is limited in its ability to acquire independently over-the-horizon targets and perhaps in the lethality of its approximately 500-pound explosive warhead. The "Tomahawk" submarine-launched cruise missile (SLCM) incorporates advanced self-contained computer guidance which could have direct application in aiding independent target acquisition capacities against maritime targets.[21] The combination of the guidance techniques in "Tomahawk" with a harpoon-type missile, including new types of shaped explosive warheads, is a weapons development having excellent application for the fleet.

Thirdly, greater use of air force systems in sea control/sea denial against the Soviets should be explored. In this case, the Soviet example of Long Range Naval Aviation demonstrates a "balanced force, combined arms" approach.[22]

Finally, the United States should explore with its allies ways of improving Western *access* to base facilities in areas such as the Mediterranean and Indian Oceans and the Western Pacific. A combination of carrier task forces, new VSTOL aircraft and/or SES ships, a large more modern fleet of oilers and a forward base structure, perhaps including large, superstable floating concrete platforms might provide greater flexibility at less cost than either of the alternatives on its own.

V. Conclusion. Our basic conclusion is that the United States has the opportunity to reap major benefits from the emerging maritime environment in the years ahead but that this will require some hard decisions concerning

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priorities, especially given the escalating financial and political costs of maintaining a worldwide maritime presence. If positive decisions are not made then we run the risk of losing economic benefits as well as seeing the naval balance with the Soviet Union shift against us in critical areas. We believe that Soviet maritime power can be checked or neutralized by the United States and its allies at an acceptable financial cost, provided that we fully exploit our natural geographical and technological advantages and the other asymmetries in the maritime environment from which we benefit.

The practical implications of these conclusions suggest that we should articulate a policy which will have the following results in both the commercial and military sectors:

- Increase the commercial shipbuilding/capacity for exploiting the fish and mineral resources of the sea; this will also benefit the naval shipbuilding and overhaul programs by providing new yards.
- Articulate strong support for the commercial exploitation of the 200-mile EEZ with due regard for environmental concerns.
- Exploit our advantages in maritime technology especially in the fields of electronics for resource detection, ocean drilling and mining, fish breeding and management, large superstable floating concrete platforms.[2 3]
- Counter Soviet naval power by

(a) making it increasingly difficult for the Soviet Union to consider seriously conventional naval missions such as interdiction of SLOC's.

(b) exploiting Soviet geographic weaknesses

(c) signaling U.S. resolve in critical areas such as the Indian Ocean by subtle and low-key diplomatic and naval initiatives.

In sum, there is no reason why the United States should not exploit the intensive wealth of the new frontier of the oceans as it was able to exploit its western borders in the 19th century. To this extent what is required is a new order of U.S. maritime policy which, if properly implemented, can enhance our security and prosperity in an increasingly competitive world.

BIOGRAPHIC SUMMARY

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NOTES

1. The term "maritime" applies to the broadest uses of the sea including trade, transport and exploitation of ocean mineral and food resources as well as the more forceful aspects. The term "naval" applies to a state's use of (military) force in the maritime environment.

2. There have been several government studies including NSSM 125 of April 1971 on "Oceans Policy." The problem is incorporating these efforts within a broader context of interested participants of both the private and public sector. In October 1976, former Secretary of Labor Ussery announced the Ford Administration would shortly form a "cabinet level maritime coordinator," an event overtaken by the election. This may be a necessary step but, as argued below, more is required in order to produce a cogent set of policies.

3. In *Naval Strategy* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1910) Alfred Thayer Mahan amended his previous impressions that navies depend upon maritime commerce as the cause and justification of their existence. He went on to note:

> . . . but it has become perfectly evident by concrete example, that a navy may be necessary where there is no shipping. . . . More and more it becomes clear, that the functions of navies are distinctly military and international, whatever their historical origin in particular cases [page 446].

4. Britain has four "Polaris"-type SSBN's each armed with 16 A-3 Polaris missiles. Each A-3 missile has three 200KT warheads. The French have four "SSBS" SSBN's each with 16 missiles for a combined U.K./French total of 128 missiles and 256 reentry vehicles/warheads. Assuming one British and one French SSBN always on station, there is the capability of threatening the destruction of Moscow and Leningrad.

5. Bureaucratically, the Navy has been and remains "junior partner" to the other Services.

6. The carrier is far easier to detect than the SSBN and can also be "marked" or trailed by a following ship, airplane, submarine or satellite.

7. In addition to the differences in missions, geography provides two important asymmetries. First, while the United States has virtually unrestricted use of her Atlantic and Pacific coastal naval bases, the Soviets have four distant and nonsupporting fleets hampered by weather and difficulty of egress. The four fleets, Northern (Kola,Murmansk), Baltic (Riga, Leningrad), Black Sea, and Pacific (Vladivostok, Petropavlovsk) are isolated and hampered by climate. Egress from the Northern and Pacific bases requires a long transit before reaching deep water for submarines and lengthy ones to likely areas of action. Passage from the Baltic and Black Seas to open water (Atlantic and Mediterranean) is extremely hazardous and, in time of war, these seas would most likely be bottled up. Second, in terms of SSBN operations, the Barents Sea may provide a natural sanctuary for protection of Soviet submarines, because of its contour, depth, proximity to Russia and climate. A similar geographic sanctuary is an asset the United States lacks.

8. Elmo Zumwalt, *On Watch* (New York: Quadrangle, 1976), chap. 4.

9. Norman Polmar, "Soviet ASW," *Naval Review*, July 1976.

10. Further evidence in the form of enhanced conventional capabilities of the Soviet ground and air forces is used to document this trend.

11. By examining all types of Soviet construction programs including the newest classes such as the *Kiev* air-capable ships, the *Kara*-class guided-missile cruisers and the "D" SSBN's, an analyst can evaluate capabilities and, by deduction, discern likely missions. Michael K. MccGwire has been the leader in this field and his findings generally support the strategic nuclear defensive interpretation of Soviet naval motives.

12. The lengthy series in *Morskoi sbornik*, "Navies in War and in Peace," is well-known. Gorshkov's latest book is *The Sea Power of the State* (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1976). In this book, Gorshkov makes more explicit his arguments for naval use stressing the strategic nuclear requirements as well as the potential for political uses short of applying actual force. Gorshkov calls for a balanced maritime effort based, of course, on naval power.

13. Iran is one obvious example whose enhanced military power and links with the United States are matters of some military concern to the Soviet Union.

14. One current oil thesis is: (1) By 1985-1990 U.S. oil imports will be equal to that of Europe and Japan; (2) in the same period, the Soviet Union will be seeking external oil sources; (3) given a reluctance by OPEC, particularly AOPEC, to increase production because of finite oil supplies and with no alternative economic infrastructures built within those oil-rich states, the conflict over satisfying demand could reach crisis proportions.

15. An argument can be made which suggests the Soviet Union is attempting to shift diet protein requirements from fish to meat sources. The importation of U.S. grain for animal fodder and not human consumption is cited as an indication of Soviet intent. While this argument may reflect Soviet normative objectives, it is superficial and misleading for several reasons. First, the Soviets have always attempted the enhancing of beef and pork production since the revolution. But the constraint is their system of agriculture which without major restructuring, is unlikely to sustain much higher rates of meat production. Second, based on allocation of resources made in the 10th Five-Year Plan, the fishing industry is continuing at a significant level of importance. Third, the traditional demand for fish (both fresh and salt water) as part of the standard diet is not likely to change even over the longer term. Last, the Soviets are unlikely to develop further dependencies on Western food for enhancing a single source of protein supply (pork and beef). Thus, every indication suggests a continuing and, possibly, increasing reliance on fish as sources of protein.

16. The "Southern Seas" include: the Southern Indian Ocean, the Cape of Good Hope, and the South Atlantic.

17. This type of mine is actuated by the sound of an approaching submarine and the MK-46 torpedo fired at the target. The kill probabilities of this system are quite good.

18. Existing delivery systems such as U.S. Navy attack aircraft and B-52 bombers are not satisfactory since they are nuclear-capable and, in closing the Soviet coast, would probably be so interpreted. Remotely piloted vehicles, rocket-assisted delivery systems of 100-mile range and submarine delivery are feasible options.

19. The SES would be armed with cruise missiles and aircraft like the F-14 and newer generations of VSTOL. This would provide excellent capabilities and at less cost than CV's. However, one should not underestimate the potential magnitude of the development and design problems. But the potential that SES demonstrates strongly suggests further R&D.

20. Prototypes of this ship are the Vosper-Thorneycraft Mark 7, British type 21 and Italian "Lobo"-class escorts. About 320 to 400 feet in length and 3,000 tons displacement, these ships would have speeds in excess of 35 knots. Limited endurance at speed and high noise levels associated with diesel engines reduce ASW effectiveness. An austere command and control system, similar to British systems now in service, would further reduce costs. Gun armament should include at least one lightweight 5-inch mount. Antiair protection would come from these guns, from rapid firing "close-in-weapons" systems such as "Phalanx," speed, maneuverability and electronics decoys like "chaff." The Israeli Navy in the October 1973 War demonstrated the effectiveness of these capabilities against cruise missile attack. Longer range ASW torpedoes (MK-46) would complement medium-powered hall-mount variable-depth sonars. Smaller versions of these escorts (245 feet in length) are already being built for the Saudi's in this country.

21. The problems with "Tomahawk" are interrelated with SALT (Strategic Arms Limitations Talks) and the 2,000-nautical-mile range potential of the SLCM which is seen by the Soviets as a great potential threat.

22. Space precludes discussion of other recommendations. Specifically, development of new electronics warfare and advanced surveillance systems represent an ongoing requirement. Maritime aircraft such as the P-3C and S-3 "Viking" are vital to ASW. The submarine fleet, too, may have untapped potential including the possibility of commissioning a new class of fast attack nonnuclear submarines (or recommissioning those in reserve). While these submarines lack the performance characteristics of their nuclear sisters, they may be cheaper over the long term and are less manpower-intensive given the rigorous nuclear power training requirements.

23. One obvious application of these platforms is for power production since the sea offers unlimited potential for cold-water cooling.

According to Marxism-Leninism, the emergence of a true Communist society will occur only after the final collapse of capitalism. The Soviet leadership has instituted for the young people essentially a military regime of indoctrination and training to produce the "New Soviet Man." The result has been a hardcore minority of zealots which may well produce the future leadership of the Soviet Union.

THE MILITARIZATION OF SOVIET YOUTH

by

David M. Gist

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> Militarism that is built with the voluntary conscious participation of worker and peasant youth is not militarism, but rather is a weapon for the liberation of the toiling masses.[1]
>
> Leon Trotsky
> 1922

With this ideological rationalization, Naval Commissar Trotsky dismissed objections of doubters who feared that Komsomol "patronage" activities in the Red Navy would lead to the undesirable spread of militaristic attitudes. During the Civil War era there were still Bolsheviks who did not realize the possible implications of Lenin's "armed proletariat," and hoped there would soon be no need for a militarized society.

Since the days of Lenin, the inculcation of "ideological maturity" and militant patriotism has been a priority mission in Soviet schools and youth organizations. Military-oriented activities have also been a constant feature; but except for periods of national crisis, military training for the civilian populace was largely voluntary. Since 1967, the Brezhnev regime has launched a new "military-patriotic indoctrination" program for youths which rivaled Stalin's campaign of the "Great Patriotic War" era.

A desired result of the present Soviet youth policy is the creation of a militarized society. This allegation relies on Webster's definition of militarism as the "glorification and prevalence of military attitudes," and the "policy of maintaining a strong military organization in aggressive preparedness for war."[2]

THE NATURE AND ORIGINS OF "SOVIET PATRIOTISM."

The distinguishing traits of a Socialist Patriot are love of

> Motherland, understanding of his country's role in mankind's drive for the most perfect social regime, and the striving to enhance its glory and power. Socialist Patriotism is shared by all the peoples of our country; it is indissolubly tied to proletarian internationalism.[3]

Every modern society attempts to inspire its youth with love for the homeland, respect for cultural traditions and pride in national accomplishments. But the Soviet concept of patriotism goes far beyond simple expressions of "bourgeois nationalism." In nonrhetorical terms, the prominent features of "Soviet Patriotism" are determination to serve and to defend the interests of the Soviet state as defined by the ruling elite; commitment to the international "victory" of socialism over capitalism; and rejection of all non-Socialist value systems, i.e., the hatred of "class enemies."

The oath of the Komsomol proudly declares,

> We love our Motherland as our own Mother. We are prepared to serve her without sparing our strength or life itself because there is no other people as great as ours and no other country as great as ours.[4]

Belief in this sort of officially proffered chauvinism is based on two patriotic precepts: the conviction that socialism is superior to any other belief system; and the egotistical attitude assumed by the Soviets who judge themselves the original prophets and only true practitioners of Leninism. Confidence in the superiority of the Soviet system is rooted in the Marxist-Leninist vision of communism as the world order of the future and the final salvation of the oppressed masses. To the "true believer," this fact is self-evident, historically predetermined and scientifically proven. The October Revolution provided an example to the world proletariat by creating the first successful Socialist state. As "heirs of the revolution" and builders of the most advanced Socialist society, Soviet youths are constantly reminded that they must be grateful for citizenship in the best of all possible worlds.

The privileges of Soviet citizenship are accompanied by awesome patriotic responsibilities. To hasten the construction of Soviet communism, young people are told they must be unswervingly loyal and unhesitatingly obedient to the Communist Party leadership. Soviet patriots must be activists; selflessly and enthusiastically supporting all party policies and striving for fulfillment and overfulfillment of the state's economic, social and political goals. The young are urged to maintain a positive, optimistic outlook toward the Soviet system, its past history, present condition and future prospects. They are warned to be constantly vigilant for unorthodox attitudes and asocial practices which are invariably associated with vestiges of bourgeois mentality or foreign subversion.

To demonstrate his love for all things Socialist, the Soviet patriot must reject and exhibit hatred for alien belief systems.

> Hate for the class enemies and love for the Socialist motherland are two externally opposite feelings which are in a unitary and dialectical relationship. They are two aspects of Socialist Patriotism. Fervent love for the Socialist fatherland is inconceivable without irreconcilable class hate for its enemies.[5]

As the leader of alleged world imperialism, the U.S. Government is a primary object of Soviet animosity.

Since communism is believed to be the historically inevitable successor and mortal enemy of capitalism, the two systems are inherently incompatible. "Detente" and limited cooperation with capitalist states are recognized expedients which can be used to further

Soviet interests while reducing international tensions and minimizing the danger of nuclear war. But any theories dealing with the permanent partnership or convergence of the opposing systems are flatly rejected. Soviet youths are told that such ideas are insidious "bourgeois propaganda" intended to undermine the spirit and goals of the Socialist revolution. Despite the easing of international tensions and prospects of arms limitations agreements, Soviet leaders warn youths against passiveness and political "neutralism."

> Peaceful coexistence does not extinguish or cancel out the class struggle—it is a new form of class struggle employed by the working class and the socialist countries in the world arena. It cancels only one type of struggle-war as a means of settling international issues.[6]

Similarly labeled as a capitalist "propaganda trick" are bourgeois liberal views of pacifism which suggest that all wars are evil, producing " . . . only dead men and no heroes." Soviet leaders continue to support the cultivation of "heroic patriotism": the "readiness for heroic acts in combat and a will to victory even under the conditions of nuclear war."[7]

According to Marx and Lenin, the capitalist ruling class will not relinquish power without a fierce struggle. As the strength of socialism grows and capitalism approaches its "crisis," capitalist resistance to its certain fate sharpens, increasing the likelihood of a violent clash between the two systems. Although no longer stating that a direct confrontation of the superpowers is absolutely inevitable, the present leadership insists that increased military expansion and preparedness is an "objective necessity" due to the continued threat of imperialist aggression. Soviet leaders also justify the buildup of military power in order to protect the interests of the world proletariat.

> The course of peaceful coexistence . . . is aimed at preventing the imperialists from unleashing a new world war, instigating international provocations and exporting counter-revolution. At the same time its purpose is to create favorable conditions for the peoples to exercise their sacred right of choosing their own road of development . . . (i.e., socialism).[8]

By maintaining military superiority over the Western imperialists, the Soviets see an alternative to general war while still pursuing the cause of world revolution.

> For the bourgeoisie to give up power without an armed struggle, it must be forced to do so with the help of revolutionary coercion. . . . To force the bourgeoisie to give up power, the proletariat must have at its disposal superior physical force.[9]

When Soviets speak of abrogating war, they refer only to the "predatory, aggressive wars" waged by imperialists and reactionary powers against "oppressed peoples" and to direct confrontations between the U.S.S.R. and the West. There is another type of war which is entirely justified by Communist ideology: anti-imperialist "wars of liberation."

> Peaceful coexistence has nothing in common with class peace and does not cast even the slightest doubt on the oppressed peoples' sacred right to use all means, including armed struggle, in the cause of their liberation.[10]

As an "internationalist," the Soviet patriot cannot truly embrace the building of communism in the U.S.S.R. without recognizing the essential role of "just wars" in advancing the cause of world communism. In a philosophical sense, internationalism merely recognizes the spiritual "class solidarity" of the Soviet and world proletariats. In practice, the Soviet patriot is obliged to

promote morally and materially the export of Socialist revolution. Preparing for and support of these liberation struggles is a prime responsibility of Soviet citizenship.[11]

Of all patriotic obligations, the "sacred duty" of military service "in defense of the Motherland" is the highest calling. In the words of the Komsomol bylaws, the "first duty" of every Soviet patriot is ". . . to study military matters, to be supremely devoted to the great Socialist Motherland, and to be prepared to give it all his strength and, if necessary, his life." It is not enough to submit passively to the duty of military service. The true patriot "yearns to join the glorious ranks of the Young Friends of the Border Guards or of the Soviet Army," and anxiously awaits the day of his own conscription.[12]

The honored status of the Soviet military cannot be understood without appreciating the enormous impact of the World Wars on Soviet society. To the true Soviet patriot, the survival of the Socialist system and life itself were insured by the "heroes" who fought the revolution and defeated the Fascist threat. While aspiring to join the honor roll of those who served the Socialist cause, youths are taught to extoll and to revere the image of the Soviet soldier.

> Our Soviet Army, child of the Great October Revolution, the flesh and blood of the people . . . the people and the army compose one whole, one family . . . . In the Soviet Union the people love, respect and care for the army.[13]

Soviet "heroes" are not just the veterans of World War II, but the border guards defending against Chinese aggression and infiltrating foreign agents; garrison soldiers who "protect the gains of Socialism" in Eastern European countries; technicians performing their "internationalist duties" by advising "liberation forces"; and Soviet sailors who bolster the defense of socialism's friends and allies in the Mediterranean, Caribbean and Indian Oceans.

THE "UPBRINGING" OF THE "SOVIET PATRIOT"

In most Western countries, the socialization of the young is left to nonpolitical institutions such as the family, church and community. In Russia, the Bolshevik Revolution severely disrupted the functioning of traditional institutions. Collectivization, industrialization and urbanization further complicated the problem of inculcating moral and social values. Lenin and Stalin, as members of a small political cadre, were faced with the monumental task of imposing a Socialist value system on millions of politically illiterate people who had never heard of Karl Marx and were interested only in "land and liberty." The newly born Soviet Union was, at best, a loose federation of diverse nationalities and ethnic minorities. Non-Russians comprised more than half the Soviet population and strongly identified with their own cultures. Obviously, the social and political "upbringing" of future Soviet generations could not be entrusted to the family and other traditional institutions. It became the primary responsibility of a comprehensive party-directed program carried out through All-Union youth organizations and the schools.

Believing that youths cannot assimilate the desired values without intensive, long-term indoctrination by adults directed by the party elite, the Soviets have sought to avoid the emergence of any spontaneous youth culture by monopolizing the time and energy of young people in closely supervised activities. This massive effort is designed to produce permanent mobilization, either for explicit military purposes or other national priorities.

A primary educational goal is the

creation of dedicated Soviet patriots. The militant nature of patriotic education is reflected by frequent use of the term "military-patriotic indoctrination" in reference to the teaching of "Soviet Patriotism." Military-patriotic activities are invariably accompanied by a profusion of aggressive, simplistic slogans or "banners" tailored for their romantic appeal to young "fighters and revolutionaries."

The Soviet education law of 1919 clearly defined the role of the schools as agents of the Communist Party, which were tasked to teach party ideology and goals for regenerating society.[14] The original function of the schools has not changed. As the Minister of Education in the RSFSR has stated, teachers must provide "preparation of students for defense of the motherland starting with the first day of their presence in the school."[15]

Although frequently featured as a discrete subject, military-patriotic indoctrination is fully integrated into all instructional areas.* One Western educator has noted that virtually every Soviet textbook includes some "proof" of Socialist righteousness and capitalist degeneration or patriotic appeals for continued vigilance against imperialist aggression.[16] Science courses depict Soviet superiority in all technical fields. In music classes, martial spirits are aroused with patriotic lyrics like "Know that I am in the Attack."[17] The sources of gallantry and heroism are revealed through the literature of "Socialist realism" which idealizes the image of true patriots. Social science and history courses play an especially vital role by instilling confident belief in socialism's glorious past and ultimate victory. They also teach the "correct" Socialist interpretation of world history, international politics and current events.[18]

In addition to regular academic courses, weekly "political information" sessions are part of the curriculum. In Leningrad schools, for instance, each student completes a 250-hour political syllabus beginning in the fourth grade. The children study current examples of imperialist aggression, the efforts of Socialist "liberation fighters," Soviet foreign policy, and the need to maintain superior military defenses.[19]

Teaching techniques bear a resemblance to Pavlov's work in conditioned response, featuring frequent drills with standardized questions and answers:

> Teacher: "What kind of political structure is better, capitalism or socialism?" "Of course, socialism," the student answers. "Now, what methods are used to maintain the proletariat in power and why?" "Force and violence," says the student, "because until the final stage of communism is reached, the dictatorship of the proletariat must prevail . . . ."[20]

The predominant approach for teaching patriotism is the study and glorification of the Soviet military, especially the lives and exploits of "heroes" of the Civil and Great Patriotic Wars. While providing an example for future soldiers, this technique is intended to establish a sense of continuity between youths and the older generations.

> Soviet leaders emphasize that the young must "realize that they are the successors of their fathers who brought about the October Revolution and defended socialism in fierce battles against fascism. In (these) feats, the children must see living people, the source of their spiritual strength, unprecedented courage, endurance and daring."[21]

In regular courses or special study groups, students are asked to write on such subjects as "The Glory of Those Days (World War II) Will Never Die," "If the Father is a Hero, Should the Son

*A Soviet authored teaching guide for the study of patriotism is included as Appendix I.

also Become a Hero?" and "The Enthusiasm of Draft-Age Youth."[22] Picture albums of school graduates who served in the war, combat souvenirs and other military memorabilia are frequently collected and displayed in colorful "rooms of combat glory." Although similar displays are devoted to Lenin and "labor heroes," the increasing preponderance of military themes over the past decade is striking.

Overlapping extensively with indoctrination efforts in the schools, the extracurricular activities of the Komsomol (Communist Youth League or YCL), pioneers and other youth organizations provide intensive and varied military-patriotic programs.

The Komsomol has lost much of its former elitist character and become a mass organization which numbers over 40 million members. This number represents about 70 percent of the eligible age group from 14 to 28.[23] As the training ground for future Communists and the party's junior arm for political "agitators," mass educators and ideological "shock workers," the Komsomol provides the vanguard of military-patriotic indoctrination efforts. Naturally, YCL members are expected to exhibit exemplary patriotism. They are required to disseminate "military-technical" knowledge to their members and prepare themselves mentally and physically for service in the armed forces. Periodic examinations are administered to test the level of political and military learning.[24]

Beginning with the Red Navy in 1922, the YCL has supported the armed forces through the broadly defined institution of "patronage." Members write letters of appreciation to servicemen and send delegations to military bases to demonstrate the "love and support" of the people. They provide facilities and social activities for soldiers and sailors which are not unlike the work of the American USO. Another aspect of Komsomol patronage involves enhancement of the military's public image. The YCL sponsors public appearances by military "heroes" and joint civilian-military "self-help" construction projects. The past exploits and current activities of their "beloved" army and navy are widely publicized in YCL's news media. Komsomolites are expected to provide the "soul" and junior leadership of paramilitary clubs and societies. For example, 70 percent of the YCL's membership is also enrolled in the All-Union Voluntary Society for Assistance to the Army, Air Force and Navy (DOSAAF) paramilitary activities.[25]

The patronage concept continues as Komsomolites enter military service. By 1974, 92 percent of the officers and 80 percent of the enlisted men serving in the uniformed services were either active YCL members or former Komsomolites who had graduated to Communist Party membership.[26] YCL primary organizations function within most military units where Komsomolites are tasked to exemplify the spirit of "heroic patriotism," enhance the "ideological maturity" of fellow soldiers, and insure the "political reliability" of the armed forces.[27]

Komsomol youth are equally active in Soviet schools. Every administrative unit, government committee or other group dealing with educational policy is required to include Komsomol representation.[28] Teachers are urged to cooperate with YCL students in the planning and presentation of political and patriotic instruction. Upper-grade Komsomolites designated as "political information officers" often lead the "political information sessions" discussed earlier.[29] Following the major theme of glorifying the Great Patriotic War, Komsomolites organize study groups, research projects and special events such as "Two Generations Rallies" where students meet and honor war veterans.

Military-patriotic indoctrination for younger children is conducted through

the Pioneers and Octobrists. Practically all urban children and 75 percent of the total population between the ages of 7 and 15 belong to these mass organizations. Pioneer and Octobrist activities closely parallel those of the Komsomol and are generally supervised by that senior group. Since membership is virtually all-inclusive for a given peer group, the threat of exclusion and social pressure provides powerful incentives to conform with behavioral norms as defined by the youth organizations.

The three Soviet youth groups form a hierarchal pyramid with military service and eventual Communist Party membership at the apex. Octobrists and Pioneers aspire to Komsomol membership. Komsomolites yearn to become "heroic fighters" in the service of the motherland who will prove worthy of selection to the "Party of Lenin."

The trend toward military hero worship during the past decade has reached its peak in an allegedly spontaneous mass movement called the "Red Pathfinders." Originating in 1965 from a Komsomol "drive for tourism," the Red Pathfinders movement is an activity rather than a formal organization. It reportedly enjoys overwhelming popularity with Soviet youth 11 years old and older. The Pathfinders are credited with the establishment of over 71,000 museums, rooms and corners of "combat glory"; 58,000 monuments and obelisks commemorating heroic deeds; and dozens of parks on the sites of wartime battles.[30]

But the primary activity of the Red Pathfinders is "exploring the trails of glory." Every summer, millions of young people troop to the countryside to trace the paths traveled by famous Soviet military units during the Civil and Great Patriotic Wars. The Pathfinders search for unmarked graves, documents, photographs and other relics of historic value. The ultimate goal of this crusade was illustrated by the experience of a Belorussian Group in 1967.

> These astute explorers discovered the unburied remains of 70 fallen soldiers in a collapsed bunker. "By studying half-decayed notes, papers and identification badges," the Pathfinders verified that these "heroes" were members of the 100th Soviet Guards Division which fought to the last man against Hitler's initial onslaught. Through the efforts of the Red Pathfinders, "a feat of heroism performed by the (military) unit became known to the people and would never be forgotten."[31]

Red Pathfinder marches often last 3 weeks or more and may include several hundred students in a single group. The major annual event is the "All-Union March" (also called the "All-Union Tour") in which youth groups from across the Soviet Union converge on some historic spot for a mass patriotic rally. During the course of the affair, "officers, even generals in reserve and retirement, commanding and political officers of (active military) units help the young people in their search for combat relics and unknown heroes." According to Marshal Konev, Chairman of one All-Union March, military personnel also introduce hikers to "military games, forced marches, map orientation . . . and radio communications."[32] The fifth All-Union event in 1971 involved 30 million Pathfinders. Based on their cumulative performance in the military exercises, distances marched, relics uncovered, monuments erected, patriotic songs written and amateur documentary films produced, the winning detachments are selected and duly honored at concluding ceremonies.

No discussion of the military-patriotic indoctrination process would be complete without mentioning the important role of the media. Patriotic themes abound in Soviet art, films and television. The Military Publishing House distributed 134 million copies of

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2,819 novels and nonfictional works between 1961 and 1968. *Red Star*, the official army newspaper, is primarily directed at civilian readers and enjoys a multimillion copy circulation. In the two leading children's magazines; 42 percent of the content of one, and 19 percent of the other, consists of romanticized military-patriotic material.[33]

Significantly, the indoctrination process does not teach a specific dichotomy between civil and military affairs. Defending the homeland, supporting the international socialist movement, constructing Soviet communism, serving the Soviet people and obeying the Communist Party are not independent duties which can be performed separately. They are mutually inclusive aspects of a single attitude deeply ingrained in the ideal Soviet patriot.

The militant character of "Soviet Patriotism" and preoccupation with "combat hero" worship would amply demonstrate the presence of militarism in Soviet society even if no other evidence existed. But an equally prominent manifestation of militarism does exist: the explicit training of school-aged youth in the arts and skills of warfare.

TRAINING THE FUTURE SOLDIER

> The forms of military-patriotic education in the Soviet general education schools have varied. Now they are closely linked with initial military training. And this is correct. . . . Patriotic education must be accompanied by military instruction, how to master weapons, and how to conduct oneself in war. The education of love for the motherland and readiness to defend it must be accompanied by the mastery of the science of winning.[34]

This 1969 statement by the Chairman of the U.S.S.R. Academy of Pedagogical Sciences illustrates the growing association of military training, patriotic indoctrination and general education in Soviet youth policy. Peacetime military training has always been available to Soviet youth, even before the days of universal conscription. Before 1967, however, participation for non-Komsomolites was generally voluntary except for civil defense training.

The organization primarily responsible for the military training of the populace has been the All-Union Voluntary Society for Assistance to the Army, Air Force and Navy (DOSAAF) and its various predecessors. Of all Soviet mass organizations, DOSAAF is the largest, numbering over 80 million members. In some urban areas, up to 90 percent of the eligible population have joined DOSAAF ranks.[35] Membership begins at age 14 and overlaps heavily with the ranks of Komsomol. Although the organization is ostensibly an independent body under the Ministry of Defense, reserve and retired servicemen monopolize instructor positions while the senior leadership is filled with active-duty military officers.

Besides DOSAAF's "patronage" function as promoters of public goodwill, understanding and support for the Soviet military, DOSAFF is charged with two vital missions: to instruct youth and the general populace in civil defense skills; and to prepare youth physically, mentally and technically for service in the armed forces.

Since its introduction in 1955, mandatory civil defense training has steadily expanded. The current program for school-aged children begins in the second grade where boys and girls first learn proper use of gas masks and air raid shelters. By secondary school graduation, all youths complete a minimum 62 school-hour program of classroom instruction augmented by 60 to 80 hours of evacuation drills and field exercises. Predominant instructional topics include: the effects of conventional, nuclear, chemical and bacterial

weapons; bomb shelter construction, decontamination procedures, rescue operations, survival techniques and first aid. Honor graduates of the program win the badge, "Ready for Anti-Air Defense, First Grade." As a minimum, all Soviet citizens must participate in a 20-hour basic civil defense course each year. Members of local civil defense formations receive up to 90 hours additional training annually. An obvious purpose of this extensive program is to reduce the civilian casualty levels in the event of a general war. But the training also prepares the population for rapid, total mobilization during any national emergency. Significantly, the instruction is designed to ease public fear of nuclear warfare and to build confidence in the certain survival and victory of the Soviet Union under any circumstances, including a nuclear holocaust.[36]

The second major role of DOSAAF is to "strengthen the defensive capability of the Soviet Union" by teaching military skills. Although available to the general public, DOSAAF military training activities are directed toward teenaged and adolescent youths. DOSAAF-sponsored study groups in schools, factories, farms and residential complexes acquaint young people with the regulations, responsibilities and activities of soldiering. The most popular DOSAAF activities are the many and varied paramilitary clubs where students may earn a technical or athletic rating which will influence their future military assignment. The clubs encompass most special skills useful to the military including marksmanship, flying, skydiving, vehicle driving, automotive maintenance, electronics repair, radio/radar operation and police-dog training.[37]

"Young Soldier," "Young Sailor," and "Young Border Guard," clubs are especially popular with the Pioneer and younger Komsomol age groups. Participation in these units is reportedly widespread, probably due to extensive Pioneer and Komsomol involvement. DOSAAF is a major sponsor, but many of these clubs are under the direct tutelage of regular armed forces units. "Young Soldiers" and similar clubs utilize military organizational structures and design their own colorful uniforms, flags and insignia. Students receive extensive practice in small arms firing, mock grenade throwing, map reading, navigation, camouflage, saluting and close order drill. Special emphasis is placed on group participation in elementary combat tactics. Military tactics are taught by injecting military principles into organized play activities. Schoolyard favorites include "Capture the Sentry," "Remain Undetected," and "Defend the Bridge."[38]

During the summer months, paramilitary clubs take to the field. Young Soldier summer encampments feature forced marches, war games and tactical exercises. A typical day at camp might consist of a lengthy cross-country march on compass bearings with frequent stops for communications drills, crossing "mine fields," taking cover from "nuclear explosions," donning gas masks and neutralizing "enemy" positions.[39]

Another military training approach is provided through a growing number of "military-patriotic schools" attached to regular armed forces units and military academies. These institutions promote "special relationships" between military personnel and local youth. The servicemen provide part-time helpers and instructors for Pioneer work and other military-patriotic activities in the regular schools. In return, local children visit the participating military installations to attend military-technical classes and often join in or observe other service activities. In 1971, for example, more than 60,000 Young Border Guards are said to have participated in patrols with regular troopers and were credited with the arrest of "tens of border violators" and "hardened spies." Besides the general aim of involving students in military affairs, the "military patriotic school"

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concept is intended to attract promising young people to military careers and specific service branches.[40]

Organized sports play a prominent role in the Soviet militarization process. Participation in competitive athletic events develops comradeship, goal orientation, physical endurance, self-discipline, the will to win and other qualities essential to the Soviet Patriot. The current All-Union program, "Prepared for Labor and Defense of the U.S.S.R.," provides physical fitness activities for all age groups, but a primary goal is to prepare youth for military service. At each grade level, children strive to meet norms in running, jumping and swimming. They must also compete in one or more "military-technical sports" such as parachuting, marksmanship, scuba diving, flying, motorcycling or radio telegraphy. As a reward for excellent performance in the All-Union program, the graduating secondary school student can win the honored badge, "Ready for the Defense of the Motherland."[41]

Since 1970, the "All-Union Federation of Military Related Multiple Events" has conducted countrywide competition in military sports for youths 16 to 25 years of age. Popular events include cross-country running, long-distance swimming, marksmanship, grenade throwing and motor vehicle driving. The 1970 All-Union Games in "Military-Technical Sports" reportedly involved 21 million contestants.[42] Military-technical events are also prominent in the most grandiose of all Soviet sports spectaculars, the annual "Summer Tournament of the Soviet Nations." Over 80 million athletes are said to have taken part in the Sixth Summer Tournament held in 1975.[43]

The most blatantly militaristic of the so-called Soviet "sports" activities are "Summer Lightning" for Young Pioneers (ages 10-15) and "Eaglet" for Komsomol-aged youth. These comprehensive arrays of military-patriotic indoctrination, field trips and militarized games are directly supervised by the Ministry of Defense. In contrast to most DOSAAF programs (which concentrate on technical skills), specialized paramilitary clubs and summer camp activities, Summer Lightning and Eaglet are full-time programs designed to familiarize children with army life. Participants become members of permanent formations, elect their own officers and train throughout the year for final tactical exercises held each summer. Beginning in the third grade, children are introduced to the elements of military discipline, army regulations, guard duty and maneuvers in formation. Simple running, jumping and swimming games are given military significance by names such as "Obstacle Zone," "Minefield," and "Torpedo Attack." As the students progress, the games become more complex and realistic. Eaglets receive training in advanced tactics and automatic weapons firing.[44]

The most elaborate Summer Lightning and Eaglet exercises closely resemble the war games used for combat training in most modern armies. Communications equipment, field rations, vehicles and other equipment are provided by the Soviet military. The students are divided into "friendly" and "aggressor" forces. Armed with mock rifles, machineguns, hand grenades and artillery, the youngsters battle to a "decisive victory" as judged by their military advisors. A special degree of realism is often added by simulated news reports from student "war correspondents," and mock air attacks or paratrooper assaults by cooperating DOSAAF clubs or regular military units.[45] These exercises are sometimes combined with the maneuvers of the regular armed forces. In 1971, a group of 6,500 Summer Lightning participants joined with the Soviet Navy for amphibious landings and the "repulse of a naval assault force" in the Vladivostok area. The event concluded with a

ceremonial pass in review before a vice admiral.[46]

Summer Lightning and Eaglet qualify as sports only because many of the military skills and tactical exercises are organized and taught as competitive events. Local winners advance through regional contests and eventually reach the All-Union games where victorious units and individuals are nationally honored. Presumably excluding participants in local events, 16 million children are said to have competed in the 1973 All-Union Summer Lightning games.[47] Soviet officials insist that these programs are not mere recreation, but serious business. Defense Marshall Grechko publicly cited the rapid growth of Summer Lightning and Eaglet, stating that they have become " . . . one of the most important forms of military-patriotic indoctrination of youth."[48]

The 1967 "Law of the U.S.S.R. on Universal Military Service" created a new dimension in juvenile military training. While reducing the required active-duty periods by 1 year, the law established an ambitious program of "basic military training," (BMT) for 15 to 18-year old boys in the last 2 years of general, vocational and technical schools.* BMT has also been extended to factories and state and collective farms. Original plans called for implementation of BMT for all eligible youths by the 1972-1973 school year.[49]

The announced purposes of BMT were twofold: to compensate for the loss of training time resulting from reduced active duty tours; and to provide conscripts with improved technical skills needed for effective operation and maintenance of increasingly sophisticated military equipment.[50]

Superficially, the content of BMT contains little that was not previously available to most Soviet students through Komsomol, DOSAAF clubs and other voluntary paramilitary organizations. But the increased scope, intensity and universal application of mandatory military training to the entire teenaged population is unprecedented as a Soviet peacetime policy.

BMT is generally advertised as a 140-hour program conducted for 2 hours weekly during the last 2 years of secondary school. This minimum time requirement is misleading since mandatory technical training, physical conditioning and summer field exercises are not included in the formal portion of the syllabus. The amount of time reportedly devoted to these extra areas extends the total BMT program to approximately 260-300 hours. Although descriptions of the syllabus vary and are subject to local modifications, data pieced together from a number of Soviet news reports and secondary sources is summarized in Appendix 2.[51]

BMT for working youth is conducted at designated "training points" or centers. Training points are generally housed in the economic enterprises which they serve. When fewer than 15 students are present at a particular enterprise, city or district centers are being established. These centers are given the auspicious title, "Universities of the Future Soldier."[52]

Girls are also required to participate in BMT, but apparently receive only 50 to 70 percent of the syllabus hours in each area. As a technical specialty, girls complete a 44-hour course in first aid in preparation for possible service in the "ambulance and sanitary branches" of the armed forces.[53]

The administration and supervision of the BMT program is quite involved. Responsibility for overall planning and coordination rests with the Ministry of Defense which works through the military commissariats in each republic. Each republic commissariat must coordinate the efforts of designated

*Military service periods were reduced to 2 years for the army and air force, 2-3 years for the border guards depending on assignment locale, and 3 years for the navy.

supporting agencies including the republic DOSAAF committee, Komsomol organization, Ministry of Education, physical culture agencies, trade unions and active-duty military units. Although military bases provide support for nearby BMT activities, the primary responsibility for providing instructors and supervisors belongs to DOSAAF. Retired or reserve military officers and senior NCO's are preferred. If sufficiently qualified "volunteers" are not available in the local DOSAAF membership, which is often the case, the responsible "training point" commander, school principal, factory manager or farm chairman may be held personally accountable for obtaining a satisfactory BMT staff at his institution.[54] Obviously, BMT is a high priority program in which every conceivable agency dealing with youth plays some role.

Although official sources proclaim student enthusiasm for BMT, the Brezhnev leadership has provided a powerful incentive to insure popular support: Students who fail to perform satisfactorily in the program do not receive secondary school graduation certificates.

The initiation of BMT was lauded by a barrage of optimistic press notices. Subsequent Soviet editorials and journal articles reveal that the program is lagging. In November 1972 only 60 percent of the proposed BMT units were in operation. Full implementation of the program has yet to be announced. Blame has been placed on military equipment shortages, "superficial support" from active-duty military units, too few "volunteers" for instructor duty, and bureaucratic bungling by the Education and Defense Ministries. It is also probable that the program suffers from inadequate funding and overreliance on local initiative. These problems are not surprising considering the demands of the program. There are more than 40,000 secondary schools and 50,000 industrial sites presumably designated as BMT training centers. Including at least 10,000 other centers to serve rural areas, well over 100,000 facilities must be staffed and equipped.[55]

The quality and performance of BMT instructors has been questioned. While many of these "teachers" are reportedly lacking in pedagogical skills and expertise in sophisticated military-technical fields, they have been accused of attempting to impose military regimes on schools and factories. Educators and economic unit managers resent this infringement on their domains and have protested the additional burden on their overtaxed space, personnel and supply resources.[56]

Despite official dissatisfaction with BMT's progress, the program is beginning to pay dividends. The improved performance of 1975 conscripts was attributed to the claim that 70-80 percent of them were graduates of BMT programs.* Reenlistment rates and requests for admission to officer academies have also increased.[57]

SOVIET MILITARISM: CAUSES AND IMPLICATIONS

The possible goals of Soviet militarization policies may be divided into two categories: to increase military strength for defensive or offensive purposes, or to provide increased control and mobilization of the civilian populace for internal purposes.

Taken at face value, an obvious goal of the Kremlin's intensive youth programs is to improve the effectiveness and depth of Soviet military power. Although the 1967 Universal Conscription Law did not significantly enlarge the standing army, the effect has been

*The percentage of conscripts who received BMT does not necessarily indicate the degree to which BMT is implemented for the entire draft-aged population since BMT graduates are probably selected first. The current conscription rate is approximately one half of the eligible 18-year-old population.

to cycle more men through active-duty service while increasing the size and experience level of the reserve forces. BMT and paramilitary activities not only improve the quality of conscripts, but provide military indoctrination for the 50 percent of draft-aged youth who are not conscripted. The desired result appears to be the creation of a "nation in arms" which could easily be mobilized in times of crisis.

The close association of patriotic education with military training may partially be explained as an effort to improve civilian attitudes toward military service. Soviet rulers must overcome the absence of a strong military tradition in the Russian culture and the lingering abhorrence of war resulting from the suffering endured in the two world wars. The glorification of the Red Army is necessary to overcome the fact that World War II Soviet forces were not very professional or effective by international standards. Heroic victories were achieved only after costly retreats. After being assured of Soviet military supremacy all their lives, many young men see no pressing need for universal conscription. Like youths in Western countries, they are not anxious to interrupt their educations or to leave civilian jobs for the austere life of soldiering. Despite recent improvements, military pay and living conditions are still well below civilian standards. The military's reputation for stern discipline further dampens enthusiasm.[58] Despite massive attempts to enhance the status of military service, many young people are openly cynical. A 1969 study revealed that military officers ranked only 4.3 on a 10 point job prestige scale. Scientists, engineers, doctors, university teachers and even artists and writers received higher ratings.[59]

If increased military strength is accepted as a Soviet goal, the underlying motivation and intent of this aim must be addressed. A sincere insecurity complex offers one explanation. The Soviets can cite ample historical evidence to support their claim of "capitalist encirclement." Although the shifting balance of power, weakened U.S. resolve to contain the expansion of Soviet influence, and the current trend of East-West relations seemingly leave little justification for Soviet insecurity, Communist dogma maintains that capitalist nations will become increasingly dangerous and irrational as their power wanes. The persistent threat of Chinese aggression offers an even stronger case for maintaining a strong defensive posture.

Some experts contend that offense, not defense, is the Soviet aim. In the past, the Russians have chosen to limit cautiously the projection of military force overseas, probably as a result of pragmatic analysis of their inferior military position. Kremlin leaders still make frequent reference to the "international function" of the armed forces, i.e., the direct support of allies, client states and revolutionary "wars of liberation."[60] Recent Soviet actions in the Middle East, Africa and elsewhere demonstrate a degree of boldness and self-confidence unprecedented since the 1962 Cuban missile exploit. The relative increase in Soviet power and influence over the past decade may have convinced Kremlin leaders that direct confrontations with the United States no longer carry unacceptable risks. Some experts fear that the dramatic increase in mobilization, particularly the increase in civil defense training, indicates a Soviet intent to launch a preemptive nuclear war. This type of "capability-equals-intent" reasoning can be misleading. If applied to the relative emphasis Soviet leaders place on various forms of military training, it could also be argued that the Russians are expecting a major conventional land war, an amphibious invasion, airborne assaults, and so on.

Turning to internal factors, it may well be the process of militarization that is important rather than actual military results. The attainment of true

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communism requires the emergence of what Russian ideologues call the "New Soviet Man," a selfless breed who would always place the interests of society above his own, require no supervision and allow the state to "wither away." Marx believed that such men would naturally evolve within a socialist system. Soviet attempts to militarize youth may be one more phase in the struggle to mold a "New Soviet Man." Even if ideology is disregarded, the process of militarization offers an excellent tactic for beating down opposition to Communist Party control and extending habitual conformity to wider sectors of Soviet society.

Although Soviet leaders have proven highly adept at manipulating social institutions, the continual effort to maintain goal directed behavior, harness creative energies and modify national "nodal personalities," showed many signs of failure by the mid-1960's. During the Stalinist era, Soviet society had stabilized into a conservative, bureaucratic, totalitarian police state. The vision of a prosperous and classless Utopia had become a tarnished dream. Industrial modernization, mass education and Khrushchevian "liberalism" had contributed to a flourishing of individuality and growing disenchantment with ideological orthodoxy. This trend was evidenced by heightened nationalism among the Soviet minorities, renewed interest in religion and a wave of open dissent among the intelligentsia.

By 1966 the signs of discontent were particularly evident among Soviet youth. Apathy, pessimism and alienation of the younger generation had become serious and persistent problems. Whether "dropping out" of society as irresponsible "stilyagi" or actively joining in dissent movements, the rising tide of youthful individuality suggested that the ideological "upbringing" work of schools and youth organizations was unequal to the task. Beginning as future oriented reservoirs of revolutionary inspiration, Communist youth programs had become dull and ineffectual defenders of the establishment.

While launching "neo-Stalinist" cultural and economic policies, the Brezhnev regime began a massive effort to regain the confidence, loyalty and commitment of youth. Borrowing a page from Stalin's book, Brezhnev deemphasized the more esoteric elements of Communist dogma and exploited the innate patriotism and national pride of his youthful subjects.

Soviet leaders claim that the present generation lacks ideological conviction and revolutionary zeal because they have been spoiled by material advantages and not suffered through the "hard school" of social conflict and war. By glorification of wartime "heroes" and past victories, the regime hopes to refurbish the Socialist vision and inculcate youth with the revolutionary élan and "partiinost" (party mindedness) of their fathers. Even if the current programs fail to reseal totally the generation gap, military sports, war games and "hero" worship undoubtedly have more romantic appeal than the intricacies of dialectical materialism.

Other prominent features of militaristic patriotism enhance the political and social primacy of the ruling elite. By promoting xenophobia and an atmosphere of constant siege, Soviet leaders justify the necessity of national unity and continued subordination of individual interests to the needs of society as interpreted by the party. Use of external threats shifts latent hostility toward the regime to an alien scapegoat. Meanwhile, the ruling elite legitimizes its right to power by making its role as prime protector of socialism appear indispensable.

In a sense, the Soviet trend toward militarism is an admission that socialism has failed to produce a "New Soviet Man" through the "objective realities" of life in a "classless" society. The

Brezhnev leadership is redefining the "New Man" in the image of the patriot-soldier. A communal, technical specialist with high regard for productive work and Socialist responsibility, the *idealized* Soviet soldier possesses iron discipline, unquestioning loyalty to superiors, respect for authority, absolute conformity to behavioral norms, and determination to endure any hardship for the Communist cause. This describes the reasonable facsimile of the "New Man" which Kremlin leaders hope to impose on society through the militarization of Soviet youth. As Brezhnev has said, "The Army is becoming an important *school of life* for our youth and a component part of the entire system of Soviet indoctrination."[61] Educators report that the military's influence has already had a favorable effect on student discipline and appearance.[62]

Militant rhetoric is often discounted as the "Soviet style," not to be taken seriously since it proves only that Kremlin leaders are still obliged to legitimize their rule through identification with outmoded revolutionary idealism. Likewise, Soviet citizens may mimic militant rhetoric and participate in military-patriotic activities in order to survive or get ahead in the system. While many youths undoubtedly display the "outer cover" or "reddish scale," it is naive to suggest that Soviet youth are unanimously playing the role of George Orwell's Winston Smith. When an entire population is constantly bombarded with a parochial viewpoint, denied free access to opposing ideas, and required to reaffirm ceaselessly their zealous support for the system, the "mere propaganda" of the party line is bound to have a substantial effect. As Orwell so graphically illustrated in *1984*, the Winston Smiths of an authoritarian system represent an exceedingly small minority.

In the final analysis, there is no simple explanation for current Soviet developments, but a complex combination of internal and external considerations. Even if domestic factors appear to provide the primary motivation for militarism, there is still cause for concern in the West.

Judging from the record of similar social experiments, the Brezhnev policies will probably produce a minority of militant zealots and various degrees of conviction or passive acceptance among the rest of the current generation. Unfortunately, the Soviet leaders of the future may well come from the hardcore group of militarized converts and hard-line ideologues who will resist internal reform and be oriented toward military solutions to international problems. Unlike zealots of the previous generation, the leaders of tomorrow will possess a military arsenal which equals or exceeds the power of their Western "class enemies." The final result could be an increasingly activist and belligerent foreign policy.

BIOGRAPHIC SUMMARY

Following his graduation from the University of Missouri, Lieutenant Commander Gist has had extensive flying duty involving carrier tactical air operations. In 1974 he earned his M.P.A. from the University of Washington. During academic year 1976-1977 he was an Advanced Research Associate at the Naval War College. His current duty assignment is Executive Officer, Attack Squadron Eighty-two.

APPENDIX 1

This outline first appeared in the professional educators journal *Sovetskaia Pedagogika*, No. 1, 1967. It was part of a classroom teaching guide for the study of "Soviet morality."

A. Soviet Patriotism: Service to the State

1. The *love* for one's country and one's native language; the love for the distinguished people of the Soviet state.

The *readiness to defend* the great socialist country. Willingness to die for it if it becomes necessary.

Always be proud of socialism; Soviet socialism is the best in the world. Socialism was first established in the Soviet Union.

2. *Hate* toward the enemies of the country.

3. Desire to *serve* the Soviet country; belief in the communist society; optimism; self-confidence.

4. *Subordination* of individual interests to the country's interests.

Emphasis added.

Source: Wasyl Shimoniak, *Communist Education: Its History, Philosophy and Politics* (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1970), p. 165.

APPENDIX 2

Summary of available data on Basic Military Training (BMT) syllabus for secondary school and working males, aged 15 to 18.

Subject	Approx. no. of hours
1. "Psychological indoctrination" (Classroom instruction on Soviet defense policy; military history; draft law; duties of a soldier; military discipline, regulations, customs and traditions; basic strategy)	20 hrs.
2. Basic military skills (marksmanship with small arms, machine guns and anti-tank guns; grenade throwing; small arms maintenance; close order drill; communications; camouflage; small unit tactical operations)	80 hrs.
Topography	6 hrs.
3. Military-technical specialty training (most commonly mentioned include communications, radar operation, electronics repair, motor vehicle operation and repair, heavy construction equipment operation, seamanship and deep sea diving, parachuting and flying)	30-50 hrs.
Total:	136-156 hrs.

Additional required training associated with BMT but not included in "140 hour" syllabus.

1. Civil defense skills (Classroom instruction and drills on the use of gas masks, dosimeters and other emergency equipment; decontamination procedures; first aid; search and rescue; crowd control and evacuation procedures)	35 hrs.
2. Physical training (includes basic conditioning, obstacle course running and other paramilitary sports)	80 hrs.
3. Field exercises (summer camp)	5-14 days

NOTES

1. Leon Trotsky quoted in Ralph T. Fisher, Jr., *Pattern for Soviet Youth: A Study of the Congresses of the Komsomol, 1918-1954* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1959), p. 100.

2. *Webster's New World Dictionary of the American Language*, 2d College Ed. (New York: World, 1972), p. 901.

3. Quoted from *Public Education in the U.S.S.R., 1917-1967* in "Character Training in School and in Out-of-School Organizations," *Soviet Education*, November 1968, p. 22.

4. Quoted in Virginia Rhine (trans.), *Young Communists in the U.S.S.R.* (Washington, D.C.: Public Affairs Press, 1950), p. 2.

5. Quoted from editorial in *Communist of the Armed Forces*, no. 13 (July 1969), p. 26 in Leon Goure, *The Military Indoctrination of Soviet Youth* (New York: National Strategy Information Center, 1973), p. 10.

6. M. Sidorov quoted in Foy D. Kohler, et al., *Soviet Strategy for the Seventies: From Cold War to Peaceful Coexistence* (Miami: University of Miami, Center for Advanced International Studies, 1973), p. 3. Similar Soviet views are quoted in Herbert Goldhamer, *The Soviet Soldier: Soviet Military Management at the Troop Level* (New York: Crane Russak, 1975), pp. 213-214.

7. L. Oshurkov quoted in Goure, p. 8. Recent Soviet statements on justification of limited warfare and permissible nuclear war are quoted in *Soviet World Outlook*, 13 February 1976, pp. 7-8.

8. CPSU Theses Commemorating the 50th Anniversary of the October Revolution (1976) quoted in Kohler, et al., p. 186.

9. Col. N. Kitayev quoted in Kohler, et al., p. 9.

10. CPSU Theses for Lenin Birth Centenary quoted in Kohler, et al., p. 72.

11. For recent examples of Soviet views on "internationalist duties" see K. Spirov, "The Soviet Army—A School of Internationalism," *Soviet Military Review*, October 1974, pp. 23-25.; M. Zenovich, "Dawn of Freedom for Angola," *Soviet Military Review*, May 1976, pp. 38-40; and O. Ivanov, "Lessons of Vietnam," *Soviet Military Review*, April 1976, pp. 44-47.

12. Excerpts from Komsomol oath quoted in Rhine, p. 23. Also see Robert G. Wesson, *The Russian Soviet State* (New York: Wiley, 1972), p. 297.

13. *Ibid.*

14. Wasyl Shimoniak, *Communist Education: Its History, Philosophy and Politics* (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1970), p. 108.

15. L. Baliasnaia quoted in Goure, p. 28.

16. Shimoniak, p. 54.

17. O.A. Sarkisian, "The History Teacher and the School Komsomol Organization," *Soviet Education*, August 1973, p. 106.

18. *Ibid.*, pp. 96-108.

19. *Ibid.*; Also N.A. Syreishchikova, "The Political Education of Schoolchildren," *Soviet Education*, August 1973, pp. 87-95.

20. Quoted in Shimoniak, p. 210.

21. F.F. Korolev, "The October Revolution and the Education of the New Man," *Soviet Education*, October 1968, p. 48.

22. Goure, pp. 31, 50.

23. Goldhamer, p. 72.

24. Ralph T. Fisher, Jr., "The Soviet Model of Ideal Youth" in Joseph L. Nogee (ed.), *Man, State and Society in the Soviet Union* (New York: Praeger, 1972), pp. 336-344.

25. Goure, p. 21.

26. *Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, v. XVIII, No. 17, p. 13, and v. XII, No. 20, p. 6.

27. For description of the Komsomol role in the Armed Forces, see Major A. Rybin, "Ideological Education of Servicemen," *Soviet Military Review*, September 1976; V. Selyodkin, "Maturing of Soldiers," *Soviet Military Review*, August 1976, pp. 36-37; "Raising Offensive Enthusiasm," *Soviet Military Review*, July 1976, pp. 34-35; and "Komsomol Forum," *Soviet Military Review*, May 1974, pp. 38-39.

28. Shimoniak, p. 443.

29. Sarkisian, p. 97.

30. "Character Training in School and in Out-of-School Organizations," *Soviet Education*, November 1968, p. 23.

31. Marshal Ivan Konev, "Exploring the Trails of Glory," *Soviet Military Review*, January 1968, p. 19.

32. *Ibid.*, pp. 19-20.

33. Robert G. Wesson, *The Soviet Russian State* (New York: Wiley, 1972), pp. 300, 297.
34. V. Khvostov quoted in Gouré, p. 7.
35. Goldhamer, p. 42.
36. For descriptions of Soviet civil defense youth training, see Leon Gouré, *Civil Defense in the Soviet Union* (Berkeley: Univ. of California Press, 1962), pp. 45-55, 155-169; Leon Gouré, *War Survival in the Soviet Union* (Washington: Center for Advanced International Studies, 1976), pp. 193-199, and Goldhamer, pp. 74-81.
37. Gouré, *Civil Defense* . . . . pp. 38-39, and Goldhamer, pp. 39-57.
38. Gouré, *The Military Indoctrination* . . . . pp. 39-40.
39. *Ibid.*, p. 41.
40. *Ibid.*, p. 39.
41. *Ibid.*, p. 39.
42. *Ibid.*, p. 48.
43. V. Gavrilin, "Grand National Competitions," *Soviet Military Review*, December 1975, pp. 59-60.
44. Summer Lightning and Eaglet are described in Gouré, *The Military Indoctrination* . . . , pp. 42-43, and Goldhamer, pp. 70-72.
45. For fascinating descriptions of other war games, see Gouré, *The Military Indoctrination* . . . , pp. 43-45.
46. Goldhamer, p. 71.
47. *Ibid.*, p. 32, and Gouré, *The Military Indoctrination* . . . , p. 43.
48. Defense Minister Marshal Grechko quoted in Goldhamer, p. 71.
49. *Ibid.*, pp. 47-48.
50. General A. Getman, "Before Becoming a Soldier," *Soviet Military Review*, June 1969, p. 40.
51. Primary sources were Seymour Rosen, "Basic Military Training in Soviet Schools," *School and Society*, November 1970, pp. 421-423; "Soviet Schools Introduce Military Training," *The (London) Times Educational Supplement*, 13 September 1968, p. 443; Gouré, *The Military Indoctrination* . . . , p. 46-55; Goldhamer, pp. 39-67; and "A Report of Military Training at Secondary School," *Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, 1 November 1972, p. 16.
52. Rosen, pp. 421-422.
53. *The (London) Times Educational Supplement*, p. 443, and Gouré, *The Military Indoctrination* . . . , p. 51.
54. Rosen, pp. 421-422.
55. BMT implementation problems are discussed in "A Report on Military Training at Secondary School," p. 16; Gouré, *The Military Indoctrination* . . . , pp. 61-66; Rosen, pp. 421-422; and Goldhamer, pp. 47-55.
56. Goldhamer, pp. 50-51.
57. *Ibid.*, p. 48, 65, and Gouré, *The Military Indoctrination* . . . , p. 62-63.
58. A 1971 study indicated that 42 percent of draft-age youth surveyed cited "submission to military discipline" as the most serious adjustment problem they would encounter if conscripted. Another 21 percent anticipated that a "high physical work load" would be their principal problem. Quoted in Goldhamer, p. 214.
59. *Ibid.*, p. 23.
60. Several Soviet references to the "international function" of the armed forces are given in Kohler, et al., pp. 76-78, 190-199. Also see references listed in note 11.
61. Emphasis added. L. Brezhnev quoted in Gouré, *The Military Indoctrination* . . . , p. 13.
62. *Ibid.* p. 61.; Rosen, pp. 421-423.



PROFESSIONAL READING

BOOK REVIEWS

Booth, Ken. **Navies and Foreign Policy.** New York: Crane, Russak, 1977. 281pp.

Why do we need a navy? Traditionally the answer has been, at least according to the views of Mahan and other writers in the classic school, to fight other navies. In 1945 this question was asked again, with the clear implication that since the Japanese Navy was no longer a threat we did not need a navy ourselves. Today the Soviet Navy is our chief rival at sea. If the U.S. and Soviet navies fight each other, the conflict will probably not be limited to the sea and in all likelihood it will escalate to a major nuclear exchange. At least Soviet military doctrine says as much. Thus, it could be argued that the U.S. Navy as it is presently constituted is really an expensive and possibly an unnecessary form of insurance.

"Why do we need a navy?" opens this lucid and most important study of the functions of navies since Sir Julian Corbett wrote *Some Principles of Maritime Strategy*. Booth notes that there are many tools to help us think about the unthinkable, but that there are few tools, indeed, to help us think about the thinkable uses of modern naval power. He then skillfully proceeds to develop and to discuss several useful tools.

States use the sea primarily for three major purposes: (1) The passage of goods and people, (2) the passage of military forces for diplomatic and combat purposes, and (3) the exploitation of resources in or under the sea. Navies are a means to achieve these purposes.

Navies have three major roles: (1) The Military Role–balance of power functions and employment of force to achieve objectives; (2) the Diplomatic Role–negotiation from strength, manipulation and prestige; and (3) the Policing Role–coast guard responsibilities and nation-building tasks such as internal stability and development. These roles and their supporting analyses are particularly useful tools, because they avoid the confines of strict adherence to the traditional concept that navies are useful only to fight other navies. Thus, they are a good starting place to begin study of the uses of naval power in the modern world. They take into account the salient features of the modern world: the danger of nuclear war; the rise of new states, many of which are characterized by political and social instability; the emerging maritime regime as seen in the U.N. Conference on the Law of the Sea; and the political rivalries which continue despite changes in the international system.

These roles are not only useful tools for study and analysis in general, but they have particular merit for U.S. naval officers because they avoid the "missions of the navy" as descriptive categories. Recently the Navy had four "missions"–strategic deterrence, sea control, projection and naval presence. More recently these "missions" have become "functions" and instead of four, there are now two: sea control and projection of power. This is not to say that these "missions" or "functions" do not have their own utility, particularly

for budget formulation. However, they should not be confused with operational roles.

Budget formulation, analysis and administration require specific categories of military activity, which frequently have little practical relationship to the use of military force in actual combat. By the nature of bureaucracy and beaucratic politics many observers fail to recognize or to admit that the categories of the Navy "missions" are essentially semantic and administrative conveniences necessitated by our form and method of government. They confuse these categories with the realities of combat and the employment of naval forces, which are the same for any nation using military power. However, bureaucratic and procedural matters and methods will vary for each nation. Confusion of administrative convenience with the realities of combat can only set the stage for frustration, bad thinking and consequent error. Booth's analysis is a useful antidote for such confusion.

In Part I, Booth discusses "Naval Diplomacy," "Navies and Prestige" and in a later chapter he shows how navies are not only executors of foreign policy, but they are also influences upon it. In a chapter on the types of navies, Booth distinguishes global, oceangoing, contiguous sea and coastal navies by showing how the different types of navies are related to the specific circumstances and needs of the respective governments maintaining them. This distinction is a novel and refreshing change from the classic theory (not surprisingly developed in the United States and Great Britain) that navies must seek command of the sea. This classic or Blue Water theory had nothing to offer smaller navies which were unable to achieve command of the sea for one reason or another. In the shadow of this theory the French developed the *Jeune École* and Tirpitz his risk theory, neither of which proved to be very successful.

Then in Part II Booth discusses the permanently operating factors. In his discussion of naval capabilities, he identifies the "technical, physical, doctrinal and human variables related to the potential or actual operational performance of the units of naval power." In so doing he asks specific questions and points to specific items that will provide a more complete and detailed evaluation than one normally finds in what passes for analysis. In this respect his analysis is similar to, but more sophisticated, because it is more complete, than that provided by Admiral Turner in his recent article in *Foreign Affairs.*

Domestic sources of naval policy are also considered. Booth admits that it is easier to say domestic factors affect foreign policy than it is to identify precise linkages. Still, he identifies and discusses the "internal variables which affect the general size, effort and character of a country's military policy in general and naval effort in particular." This chapter on the roots and internal influences on naval policy is particularly illuminating.

Booth's concluding chapter is a brilliant discussion of the international context in which naval policy either succeeds or fails. He seeks the "sources of order and disorder at sea" in his discussion of the utility of navies in the context of contemporary technological, social, political and legal developments—the facts of life in the international system.

To those who subscribe to the fashionable position that military and naval forces have lost much of their utility, Booth points out "Military hesitation and scruple are decidedly Western phenomena: even here, however, the utility of armed forces has not been undermined to the extent that it has become fashionable to suppose." In cautioning against throwing the baby out with the bath water, he adds an important qualification, "As with armed forces in

general, naval strategy in the modern world is less concerned with contributing to victory in war than with furthering national interests short of war." This is a point naval planners are apt to forget.

The conclusion of this remarkable book is essentially good news: "The historic naval powers have had to adjust and are in the process of adjusting their thinking to the new circumstances." Booth shows how some adjustments have already been made and he provides us with the tools to make additional necessary adjustments.

He writes clearly, concisely and to the point. He avoids trendy phrases and words, which frequently confuse more than they enlighten. No naval officer and no student of international politics should ignore this incisive and thought-provoking study. One can only hope that the leadership of the U.S. Navy will read and study it, along with the responsible political leaders. They ignore it at our peril.

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Denton, Jeremiah A., Jr. with Ed Brandt. **When Hell was in Session.** New York: Reader's Digest Press, 1976. 235pp.

Secretary of Defense McNamara was aboard the U.S.S. *Independence* on 18 July 1965 when Commander Denton led 28 A6 Intruders to bomb a cluster of warehouses on the south bank of the Ma River. On a previous strike five planes had been shot down over this heavily defended area. As Denton led the flight in and released his bombs a seemingly light hit knocked out the plane's airbrakes. As he pulled it softly out of its dive a second hit knocked out all controls. In slamming the rudder to keep the plane level he snapped a tendon in his left thigh. He and his bombardier-navigator ejected from the plane and Denton landed in the river where he hoped to escape by swimming downstream under water. However, his painful left leg was useless and he was quickly captured by North Vietnamese soldiers who followed him down the bank. He was destined to spend nearly 7½ years in prison, 4 of them in solitary confinement.

Hanoi broadcast that Denton and his flight had been personally sent on its mission by McNamara to bomb civilians and the captured airmen would be treated as imperialist war criminals. Although North Vietnam had signed the Geneva Convention on the treatment of prisoners of war it evaded the Convention's code of decency through the fraudulent blanket charge of American imperialism. As the crippled Denton was brought into Hao Lo prison he was welcomed by the strains of Yankee Doodle whistled from one of the cells and he knew there were courageous countrymen on hand. Labeled the Hanoi Hilton this full city block compound was eventually to hold some 700 American prisoners before the war ended.

Although Denton was the first A6 pilot captured, his jailers made no attempt to get military information from him but pressed hard for statements they considered of propaganda value. They tried to get him to say that McNamara had ordered him to bomb civilians and in their obsession with this charge he sensed the North Vietnamese greatly feared bombing attacks. As the war with its bombings continued the Hanoi Hilton and its related prison camps became a battlefield where the captors relentlessly strove to break the spirit of their prisoners, using increasingly cruel bodily tortures in the process.

The backbone of prisoner resistance was the Code of Conduct issued as an Executive Order by President Eisenhower in August of 1955. This code stresses the necessity of a chain of

command leadership promoting strict discipline. Its key clause is: "I will make no oral or written statements disloyal to my country or its allies or harmful to their cause." Providentially a series of senior officers resilient in spirit and body managed to keep this code a vital influence throughout the long years of captivity. This victory was won only by men determined to resist until broken by excessive pain and when recovered to resist until torture broke them again. This amazing leadership and discipline was maintained through a variety of communication systems encouraging morale and keeping the scattered areas of the hugh prison posted on all that went on. Morse, tap, vocal sounds and light and shadow codes were constantly employed to evade the relentless efforts made to disrupt these skillful systems. Denton's fascinating material on prisoner communications and how to maintain them under ruthless scrutiny should form invaluable pages in a training manual for any American force ever sent to fight on or over foreign territory.

The treatment given prisoners varied as American bombing attacks increased or waned with food at times reduced to starvation levels with some prison leaders given only a piece of bread and a cup of water per day. Early in February 1966 as Denton refused to write biographical material his hands were cuffed behind him and his feet placed in heavy irons with a 5-foot bar between them making walking difficult. He was beaten several times daily by tough guards who hauled him to his feet as often as they slugged him to the cell floor. He stopped eating in order that a weakened condition might enable him to lose consciousness more quickly. After 7 days of such treatment he hysterically caved in and wrote a useless biography of half-truths and fiction. He sensed that the prison officials were not so much interested in eliciting truth as they were in forcing tortured prisoners to capitulate and make any sort of confession useful for North Vietnamese propaganda.

Besides being beaten with fists and rods the torture sessions centered on the use of restrictive rope bindings under the direction of a guard all the prisoners feared as a coldly efficient master torturer. Arms would be bound behind the back from shoulders to elbows as tightly as strong guards could pull the ropes. The agony was threefold, the terrible pinching of the flesh, the acute pain as the heart labored to force blood through the strangled veins and the even more intensified pain as the ropes were loosened and blood flowed back to restore circulation. The dreadful epitome of this brutal treatment was the technique of binding arms and legs together to force the body into a foetal position. After one such frightful session frustrated guards placed a cement-filled iron bar across Denton's shins and took turns jumping up and down on it. After several hours of such abuse he whispered *bao cao*, the words for surrender. Trying to write out a confession of war guilt he did not realize he could only make spirals on the paper. His taped confession was so incoherent that when broadcast throughout the prison his fellow Americans realized the terrible ordeal he had suffered before caving in. A message was tapped through to his cell: "We want to express our admiration for the man who is keeping his cool under this kind of pressure. We are proud to serve under his leadership." The torture-weakened Denton felt it was one of the happiest moments of his life.

Over a 15-month period he went through six such major torture sessions with his fate duplicated by many more of the officers their captors regarded as the leadership element among the prisoners. Some had limbs permanently crippled. For these Americans hell indeed was in session. As Denton entered the fifth day of a torture session from

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the depths of despair he silently confessed to God his inability to resist any longer and offered his body and soul as a sacrifice to the Almighty. God's answer came in the form of an intense mystical experience wherein a profound sense of peace calmed his mind and completely eased his broken body. Despite what he terms the most deeply inspiring moment of his life as the months and years dragged on Denton thought his chances of coming out sane enough to lead a normal life were one in fifty.

Earlier in his captivity Denton was displayed before television cameras while being questioned by North Vietnamese reporters. While fending off their queries he seized the opportunity to send a vital message to the outside world. Staring into the bright lights of the cameras he blinked his eyelids with rapid and slow movements to spell out in Morse code the letters T . . . O . . . R . . . T . . . U . . . R . . . E. The film was eventually shown in the United States and naval intelligence picked up his signal and had the first proof of the crimes being committed within the Hanoi Hilton. For this daring and keenly intelligent deed he was rewarded with the Navy Cross after his return to America.

It was devastating to the North Vietnamese that prisoners so totally at their mercy would continually resist until physically broken and then after brutally induced confessions would build up their strength to again defy them. For the prisoners' recovery from torture became a way of life. They knew they were united in a common cause to defeat a cruel enemy and this common cause of their fellowship in suffering gave them amazing strength and recuperative power. Denton came to feel that in a very real sense they were making their captors their prisoners. He took comfort in recalling the dictum by Clausewitz: "It is principally the moral forces which decide." His fervent religious faith united with a love of his country continually strengthened him. Even so as breaking points neared and he screamed with pain he prayed to die and longed to commit suicide. Then as he slowly recovered from a torture session he would renew his devotions by saying the Mass in Latin and English and making spiritual communions. He even composed Christmas and Easter poems which were communicated throughout the prison complex and memorized by many of the men. The victory of the Cross inspired the lines: "Dark clouds can hide the rising sun, and all seem lost, when all be won!" Gradually as prisoners became united in resistance and suffering they became more deeply aware of their common brotherhood and God's love for them. Their coded conversations back and forth usually ended with the letters GBU (God bless you).

Late in 1969 the torture sessions and prison restrictions eased considerably. Regular medical inspections took place and the food was much improved in contrast to earlier periods when the North Vietnamese seemed determined to starve them to death. The prison commandant struggled with his inability to break permanently his prisoners. He developed a nervous tic over one eye along with trembling hands and was relieved from command. Before disappearing he admitted to Denton that the prison officers and guards in their rage over the bombing attacks had violated the Vietnamese tradition of humane treatment.

Denton sensed his captors deeply feared that President Nixon might very well have the war fought through to an allied victory and hold the North Vietnamese Army responsible for war crimes. Denton stresses that he and all the prisoners he knew were convinced that continued heavy airstrikes were the key to allied victory. He feels such a victory was possible as early as mid-1966. Even as late as December

1972 when President Nixon ordered the B52 raids halted on Christmas Eve Denton prayed the President would promptly renew them. He believed it to be the decisive moment of the war. Air defenses around Hanoi had been obliterated and the prison officers and guards were a thoroughly frightened enemy. They deferred to the senior officers among the prisoners and strove to portray themselves as good guys who should be safe from retaliation.

Denton strongly believes that American apathy and disunity lost the war for the allies and resulted in the betrayal of millions of southeast Asians. He bluntly claims that the allied defeat was due to the "most incredible and most dangerous string of miscalculations and blunders in our history." Hawk and dove historians will debate such conclusions for decades to come.

As prison conditions eased with the Americans allowed to visit between cells and exercise outdoors the tight discipline of the harsher years tended to weaken. Increased freedom led to arguments over card games with some clashes ending in slugging matches. Leaders like Denton found it more difficult to promote discipline and an unbending policy towards their captors as the war wound down. The prisoners lost the brave spirit which had bound them so closely together throughout the years of harsh adversity.

With the end of the war Denton led the first group of released prisoners on the flight to Clark Field in the Philippines. His simple words on landing were, "We are profoundly grateful to our Commander in Chief and to our nation for this day. God bless America."

This reviewer is forced to wonder if Denton and his fellow prisoners who from jail cells and solitary confinement fought a relentless war with a vicious enemy were no more than average Americans or an elite group intensely proud of their national heritage and determined to prove its superiority even under hideous tortures. Our nation in the future may well desperately need elite groups fervent in religious faith and patriotism. Denton's little book of travail is perhaps the best training manual yet written by a military man on what it takes to achieve such heroic heights.

CANON LOCKETT F. BALLARD

Estes, Thomas S. and Lightner, E. Allan, Jr. **The Department of State.** New York: Praeger, 1976. 272pp.

This volume is one of a series comprising the "Praeger Library of U.S. Government Departments and Agencies." It represents the 34th volume of a series edited by Dr. Ernest S. Griffith and Dr. Hugh Langdon Elsbree, whose purpose is to provide an up-to-date, comprehensive, and detailed discussion of the American federal bureaucracy. This particular volume was first assigned to the late George V. Allen. Upon his death, the present authors took over the work. In the book as published, they have retained a first chapter written by Ambassador Allen on the diplomacy conducted prior to the Constitution.

The book contains ten chapters and four appendixes, plus a number of useful organizational charts. These appendixes and charts enhance the book's value considerably. For example, Appendix D is a listing of 12 foreign affairs manuals giving the main regulations of the Department of State.

For a compact book, its scope is broad. After the initial background chapter the book traces the development of the Department of State to its present organization. It then turns sequentially to policymaking and policymakers, to educational and cultural exchange, and interagency relations. Chapters VII and VIII deal with foreign affairs and the U.S. Congress, followed by the State Department and the public. The final chapters consider multilateral diplomacy and then the State Department in a changing world.

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The authors are admirably equipped by background to write a first-rate treatment, and they do so. Thomas S. Estes, Ambassador to the Republic of Upper Volta from 1961 to 1966 (and State Department Adviser to the President of the Naval War College in the next 3 years) and E. Allan Lightner, Jr., former U.S. Ambassador to Libya, have 35 to 40 years of service each.

What is especially valuable about this book is that it is written by "insiders" who know their subject but who, despite long service in the Department, have a fresh perspective and are well aware that modern complexities call for some new bureaucratic solutions.

Finally, the book has the great merit of being up-to-date and accurate.

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Green, L.C. **Superior Orders in National and International Law.** Leyden: Sijthoff, 1976. 374pp.

My Lai and the Calley case apparently combined to inspire the Canadian Government to invite Professor Green to do a study of the problem of the availability of the defense of "superior orders" as a justification for illegal acts committed by members of armed forces. This book is the result. Professor Green graphically demonstrates the problem by prefacing his book with a three-box strip from *The Wizard of Id.* The Knight, Sir Rodney, orders a bowman to fire; the bowman does nothing; Sir Rodney demands to know what he is waiting for; the bowman responds: "My lawyer." This is both humorous and tragic: for, in truth, the poor serviceman is indeed sometimes placed in a position in which he must make a decision with respect to which lawyers would, and probably will, argue; and he must do this quickly and with the knowledge that he may be damned if he does and damned if he does not.

As its title indicates, the book dissects the law with respect to superior orders from two points of view: that of national courts applying national law in trials of their own nationals (the law of some 28 countries representing most of the major legal systems of the world are included); and that of courts, international or national, applying international law in an international context (the decisions of international tribunals and of the national courts of 11 countries are included).

The dilemma which confronts the serviceman is the conflict, or possible conflict, between two rules of conduct, both of which must govern his actions. A U.S. Military Tribunal at Nuremberg said: "It is basic to the discipline of an army that orders are issued to be carried out." A Navy Board of Review succinctly stated: "Predictable obedience is the essence of a disciplined military force." At the same time, international law, and most national laws, hold the individual serviceman personally responsible if, in obeying the order received from a superior, he commits a criminal act when "moral choice was in fact possible," or if, "in the circumstances at the time, it was possible for him not to comply with the order," provided that the order was "manifestly illegal" and "unless he did not know and could not reasonably have been expected to know that the act ordered was unlawful." Professor Green suggests that "the concept of *manifest/palpable illegality or unlawfulness,* which is not a concept readily understood by the ordinary man, be replaced by that of *obvious criminality.*" This latter term might well be more understandable to the average serviceman—provided that he receives instruction in which he is advised that he must obey only lawful orders and that an order requiring him to perform an act of "obvious criminality" is not a lawful order and should not be obeyed. At the other end of the spectrum, Professor Green believes that the

commander who merely acts as a "post-office," relaying to subordinates an unlawful order received from above, would have no defense if he were aware of the unlawfulness of the order. This is undoubtedly correct if we can rely on the post-World War II cases involving the transmittal of such orders.

The author properly points out that there is a general and erroneous tendency to regard war crimes trials as "victor's justice," something to which members of the victor's own armed forces are not subjected, although individual members thereof may be just as guilty as the members of the defeated enemy's armed forces who are tried. As he indicates, the victor's personnel are tried under national law and without publicity. Few members of the American public could name anyone but Calley as having been tried by a U.S. court-martial for an offense which, although charged as an offense under national law, would be a war crime from the point of view of international law; but such trials have been held in most wars.

Two final notes: The author places considerable reliance on a lesson plan which was prepared at the Army JAG School for the use of its instructors, referring to its contents as indicative of the attitude of "the United States military authorities." I am sure that the personnel of the JAG School would be the first to admit that such a document represented nothing more than the views of the then School authorities. It *might* represent U.S. military doctrine—but it might not. And, the Dutch publisher, Sijthoff, has produced yet another volume with the footnotes hidden at the end of each chapter where the reader can locate them only after a frustrating and time-consuming procedure. Certainly, reasonably inexpensive methods exist, or could be devised, whereby the footnotes would be more readily available to the reader. It is particularly unfortunate that such an excellent and informative volume as that of Professor Green must suffer under this infirmity, since this study is unquestionably one which should be owned by everyone with a concern for or an interest in military law or the law of war.

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Guillermaz, Jacques. **The Chinese Communist Party In Power, 1949-1976.** Trans. by Anne Destenay. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1976. 614pp.

The West, someday the world, is and will be indebted to this senior French historian, with considerable experience in China, for this judiciously interpretative survey of mainland China since the Communist Party attained national power. It is the sequel to his already well-respected *A History of the Chinese Communist Party, 1921-1949* (London: Methuen; New York: Random House, 1972).

In his foreword the author explains his purpose: "... I have tried as far as possible to adopt a viewpoint situated within the Chinese system ... [not to justify but] to share the ideas and reasoning of its leaders and to understand the feelings and the behavior of the masses." Actually he is more objective than this deeply felt sympathy and admiration has permitted in some others. He accords their due to the CCP, its leaders and cadres, the new institutions and the people while not falling into the uncritical euphoria of the wishful or unprincipled.

The treatment is divided into four parts: The first dealing with the consolidation of the new regime, 1949-53; then the period of the First Five-Year Plan, 1953-57; followed by the Great Leap Forward, communization and readjustments (1958-62); finally a 244-page analysis of the Socialist Educational Campaign, the Cultural Revolution, and

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developments from then into 1976. Main emphasis is on political history with considerable attention to factions, ideological views and economic policies. Chapters are usually short and moderately documented. Those on cultural topics and on foreign affairs are succinct, interpretative summations. Professor Guillermaz's analyses of Sino-Soviet relations have more depth, though they cannot provide commentary on each set of statements or actions. On pages 324-330 one finds a very thoughtful summary of Sino-Soviet issues and divergent interests, with nonpartisan emphasis on Chinese positions and rationale. In the longer run, the reviewer is a little skeptical of "points of no return" in relations between states. With respect to the U.S.S.R. and the PRC, this author chooses the period 1962-63; some others would date this from the summer of 1959. Truth probably is: In such a complex development, there was no one focal "point."

Professor Guillermaz found reason in China's agricultural preponderance for devoting much attention to problems of that agrarian economy and society. Perceptively he explains the processes and adjustments during communization, and he provides one of the clearest available descriptions of the three-level reallocation of functions after 1960. Perhaps more could have been included about the implications of these changes for the communes as political entities.

To illustrate the profundity of this writer's insights at numerous points in the book, I shall quote from just one passage concerning serious disturbances during the Cultural Revolution (p. 428):

> Anarchism was primarily the result of the inability of the "revolutionary rebels" to gain a firm foothold everywhere and at every level. It varied in intensity and was generally tempered by the inherent characteristics of an ancient society that was accustomed to doing without authority in times of crisis and based its inner order on morality and customs, and also by the Chinese distaste for extremes. Where any other country would inevitably have slid into a state of generalized, relentless civil war, China fell back on the traditional reflexes of prudence and discretion.

How could a general work satisfy everyone in every respect? Highly as this reader can recommend the book, he notices a few subjects or interpretations that could have been included. There might have been clearer indications of Chinese nationalistic, hard bargaining with Soviet leaders during the years 1950-54. In Chapter 12 more could have been written about the Hundred Flowers episode as a pressure for rectification of cadre styles. Also, some of the antirevisionist arguments and rhetoric of the Anti-Rightist Movement of 1957 reflected the contentions with Soviet ideologues that were already underway in dialogues that had not yet become quite hostile. There is some suggestion, but no clear concept conveyed, of the ways in which Party organs encroached laterally on state administrative (including statistical) functions at most levels during the Great Leap. On page 440 the chance is missed to mention the disorders that occurred in Hong Kong during one phase of the Cultural Revolution. And, though I know why China specialists are tempted to depict Chinese culture and circumstances as unique, I am not sure that there are not analytical gains to be made by the comparison of China's experience with other modernizing and revolutionary patterns. For example, no one overlooks the holistic character of Marxism-Leninism-Maoism, but one is not sure whether Professor Guillermaz views Confucianism as a consummatory system of thought.

On the other hand, as indicated above, there are many illuminating passages in this book: the author's comment on the Great Leap (p. 211);

his analysis of the fall of Lin Piao (p. 463); his summary interpretation of the Cultural Revolution (pp. 464-468); and others. The volume ends with a carefully selected bibliography and a fairly detailed index.

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Gwynn, Julian. **The Royal Navy and North America: The Warren Papers, 1736-1752.** London: Navy Records Society, 1973. v. 118. 463pp.

Dr. Gwynn's edition of the Warren papers is an outgrowth of his Oxford D.Phil. thesis which was published in Canada under the title *The Enterprising Admiral: The Personal Fortune of Admiral Sir Peter Warren* (Montreal, 1974). The documents in this Navy Records Society volume are taken from Warren's previously unpublished, official and private correspondence.

Although Warren's abiding concern for prize money is apparent from these documents, this aspect is not stressed to the degree which it was in Dr. Gwynn's first book. In the documents, the reader will find Warren's views on strategy and force deployment, his political ambitions and the problems he faced in leadership and management of the squadron on the North American station during the War of the Austrian Succession.

This collection has been drawn from many sources in America and in England. It relates entirely to Warren's service on the North American station, most notably in the siege of Louisbourg in 1745 and subsequently as governor of the colony of Cape Breton. Geographically limited in this way, the volume will have its greatest appeal to readers in the United States and Canada. However, the general reader of 18th-century history will find Parts II, III and IV, in particular, to be such a close interchange of letters that little prior knowledge is necessary. An excellent introduction and an appendix of thumbnail sketches on each person mentioned in the documents provides a valuable overview and detailed background information. Two specially drawn maps and some well-chosen portraits and views directly complement the documents. While this correspondence does not have the literary merit which one might generally associate with the Augustan Age and "Dr. Johnson's England," there is a great appeal in a sailor's bluff, forthright manner of expression. There is much to be learned from it about 18th-century life and society.

The general reader will face one disadvantage: Many, but not all the relevant documents are printed in this volume. There are noticeable gaps in the exchange of letters. While this is a serious disadvantage to the unity of the book, it is, in this case, an advantage to the scholar. The editor has assiduously noted the letters which he has been unable to find, and in a lengthy appendix, he has listed chronologically the Warren papers of related interest which are published elsewhere. This cross-index to 16 different publications is a valuable tool, in itself, which will benefit specialists in American colonial history as well as the naval scholars for whom it is intended.

There is little doubt that this volume will stand as one of the best that the Navy Records Society has produced. In form and scholarship, it is a model of its kind.

JOHN B. HATTENDORF
Pembroke College, Oxford

Hezlet, Sir Arthur. **Electronics and Sea Power.** New York: Stein and Day, 1975. 317pp.

Sir Arthur Hezlet has expanded his subject from its original inspiration—the effect of the discovery of electromagnetic radiation on naval warfare—to include all electrical and electronic devices used at sea, including sonar. This

gives a wide basis from which to cover the impact of these technological advances on seapower, and thus the book covers a broader spectrum than its title might suggest.

Sir Arthur, therefore, starts with the introduction of the electric telegraph into naval operations in the Crimean War, when the Royal Navy used it to communicate with its squadron in the Black Sea. Almost immediately we hear the complaint of "rudder orders from the beach" with one officer signaling "Permit me to resign a command impossible to exercise at the extremity, sometimes paralyzing, of an electric wire!"

The interrelation of strategy, tactics and C^3 (command, control and communications), which are even more closely connected today, was neatly illustrated in the Spanish-American War. Both sides used the same trunk cable to Hong Kong to communicate with their forces in the Philippines and adjacent seas. The U.S. Asiatic Fleet was based at Hong Kong, while the Spaniards used an extension of the cable to Manila. After his victory at Manila, Commodore Dewey sent in a request for this extension to be declared neutral so that both sides could use it to communicate with their capitals. This was refused, so Dewey cut the cable. This meant he had to use a ship to relay traffic to and from Hong Kong, but the Spanish forces were totally isolated.

Sir Arthur moves on to the history of the invention of wireless and its naval applications. He gives proper recognition to my own electromagnetic hero, Capt. H.B. Jackson, RN, who, in the early 1890's, began experimenting with Hertzian waves to try to develop an IFF (identification) device for torpedo boats. Jackson and Marconi met in 1895 and both derived impetus from this meeting. By 1899, Jackson was back at sea, in command of H.M.S. *Juno* and supervising the successful use of wireless by three scouting ships of "Side B" in their "victory" over "Side A" in the annual Fleet Maneuvers. Marconi was in the United States to report on the America's Cup Races by wireless for the *New York Herald*, and also to give a successful demonstration of his equipment between the U.S.S. *Massachusetts* and *New York*.

Wireless received its first full war test in the Russo-Japanese War in 1904. It was the basis of the blockade of Port Arthur, as a continuous patrol of relieving Japanese cruisers was kept off the port, able to call up the main battlefleet from its base if the Russians made a move. On the other side, the Japanese ships' free use of wireless was exploited by their opponents to give early warning to their approach. Furthermore, the Russians successfully jammed the Japanese observation frequency during a bombardment. While Togo's victory at Tsushima depended to a large extent on his fleet's successful use of the new communications method, it is clear that the Russians were fully aware in this war of how an adversary's signals could be exploited—the beginning of electronic warfare.

Possibly the most important development of the early days of World War I came almost by chance, when some unusual intercepted signals were passed as a curiosity to Sir Arthur Ewing, an amateur cryptologist. British naval strategy depended on detecting the German fleet as soon as it left harbor, but there was no way to do this. Ewing, in the famous Room 40, unraveled the unusual signals as the German Navy cipher and on 14 December 1914 announced that the German battle cruisers were about to leave harbor. Beatty's battle cruisers sailed and intercepted the Germans off Dogger Bank. The lesson was immediately taken by the Grand Fleet, who introduced stringent wireless emission control procedures, and as Room 40 produced more and more authenticated intelligence, Jellicoe

based his plans almost entirely upon it, so that by the time of Jutland (1916) the Grand Fleet usually sailed *before* the High Seas Fleet in order to get into the best intercept position. The whole existence of this source was successfully kept secret, and remained so for years, in fact not being officially admitted until the 1960's.

Between the wars, there was slow but sure progress in wireless, which became known as radio, the development of fully operational sonar and the first researches into radar by the U.S., British and German Navies. Early use of radar in ships in World War II did not produce good results for the first sets to go to sea had little advantage over the eye. But at night and in restricted visibility the advantage of radar and of its users' understanding its capabilities and limitations began to tell. A realization that the battle had to be fought in the electromagnetic as well as the spatial dimensions grew.

When the *Bismarck* broke out into the Atlantic in May 1941, contact was first made by H.M.S. *Suffolk* visually, but maintained in the mist (where the *Bismarck* could not engage her) by radar. After the *Hood* was sunk, *Suffolk* lost radar contact, but later, believing the British were still shadowing, *Bismarck* transmitted a long cipher signal giving her intentions. This was immediately detected by the British shore HF/DF network, but because a staff officer did not understand radio propagation, the fix was incorrectly plotted and the Home Fleet set off in the wrong direction. Hezlet then says that the Admiralty realized the mistake and organized aircraft patrols to relocate the German battleship, but one wonders what part the Bletchley cipher-breaking establishment described in another recent book, *The Ultra Secret* by G.W. Sinterbotham, played in this. Here I touch on my only disappointment with Sir Arthur's book. He seems to have been unable to use much recently declassified information; possibly he was inhibited by the same cautious attitude which preserved the secrets of Room 40 for so long.

The epitome of the triumph of radar at sea might be the little known Battle of Empress Augusta Bay in the Pacific in November 1943. Rear Admiral Merrill's cruisers and destroyers fought off a strong Japanese force seeking to attack the transports unloading troops and material at Bougainville at night. By fighting entirely on radar and keeping at long range, the Americans overcame the Japanese advanced night-fighting tactics, which had earlier made the combination of visual lookouts, optical ranging, star-shell and searchlights so effective. However, the combination of long-range air radars and voice radio providing early warning and efficient aircraft direction, together with radar-controlled antiaircraft guns and radar-fused shells was the key to the successful air defense of the allied fleets, enabling them to operate right up to the shores of the enemy homelands by 1945. This was probably the biggest effect of the use of electromagnetic radiation on naval operations in World War II.

In discussing developments since World War II, Sir Arthur is once again inhibited by continuing security classification rules and the book tails off into a mere catalog of publicity releases. However, this does not detract from the main body of his work, which by drawing on the history of a new technology, teaches vital lessons in naval operations. All the interactions of what is now known as electronic warfare were established by the end of World War I if not before, and yet had to be relearned in World War II when the battle spread into new areas of the spectrum. This book is well worth reading by the layman, for Sir Arthur's

clear explanations of technical points and by both expert and nonexpert to gain an understanding of the fourth dimension of naval warfare—the electromagnetic and acoustic spectra.

M.G.M.W. ELLIS
Commander, Royal Navy

Jervis, Robert. **Perception and Misperception in International Relations.** Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976. 445pp.

The concept of misperception is very much in vogue among contemporary social scientists. It has been employed to help explain any number of foreign policy decisions which proved less than successful, among which are German policy prior to the First World War, appeasement of Hitler in the 1930's and the American involvement in Indochina. Despite the apparent appeal of the concept to students of international relations there have been surprisingly few efforts to provide an adequate theoretical formulation of perception and misperception. Herein lies the utility of the Jervis book. It is an imaginative attempt to apply systematically concepts from psychology to foreign policy decisionmaking in an attempt to elucidate the processes of perception and the possible patterns of misperception.

The book is divided into three sections. The first is concerned with the context of policy and is set off by a perceptive analysis of the utility of and problems inherent in applying psychological insights to international relations. The remainder of the section is devoted to the concept of an actor's intentions, how statesmen draw inferences about the meaning of other's behavior. What is likely to make them conclude that another state has aggressive or pacific designs? This question is explored in two brief case studies of the origins of World War I and the cold war.

Part II, processes of perception, examines the influence of preexisting beliefs on perceptions. Jervis convincingly demonstrates the prevalence of premature cognitive closure or the extent to which we see what we expect to see regardless of the reality. He suggests a variety of conditions that encourage such misperception, among them the concerns of policymakers, the perspectives of leaders, the distribution of information within a government and time lags.

The remainder of the book is a catalog of common misperceptions. Jervis asserts that most misperceptions can be attributed to three generic and chronic problems: Overestimating the extent to which other's actions are centrally directed and coordinated; overestimating one's own importance as an influence or target; and the influence of a policymaker's own desires and fears upon his perceptions. Within these categories Jervis develops a number of hypotheses. One of the most interesting relates to wishful thinking, the extent to which policymakers are insensitive to evidence that suggests an undesired outcome is likely. He finds that the evidence does not support the conventional wisdom that policymakers are overly prone to wishful thinking. Statesmen sometimes see what they want to see but are just as likely to perceive imaginary dangers. The $64 question here is, of course, the circumstances in which perception will be skewed in one direction or the other. Jervis is unable to provide us with many clues.

This failure is perhaps the major drawback to the book. His analysis helps us to understand past decisions, cases where the nature and direction of misperception are known, but offers only limited guidance in avoiding future misperceptions. Such guidance consists in sensitizing scholars and policymakers to the kinds of misperceptions that exist and the kinds of situations in which misperceptions are likely to occur. This in itself is a major contribution and

probably all that the current state of the art will permit.

RICHARD NED LEBOW
Naval War College

Jones, Douglas C. **The Court-Martial of George Armstrong Custer.** New York: Scribner's, 1976. 291pp.

Chances are most schoolchildren learn about and remember Lt. Col. George Armstrong Custer as the "hero" of the battle of the Little Big Horn (Montana Territory), where he, on the morning of 25 June 1876, along with his entire unit of 266 officers and men (including 5 civilians and 3 Indian scouts), rode into the midst of thousands of hostile Indians and, to a man, were slaughtered. Custer, a graduate at the bottom of his West Point Class of 1861, was never known for his faint-heartedness or lack of ambition. At the age of only 25 he became a temporary brigadier general of a Michigan volunteer cavalry brigade that distinguished itself in the battle of Gettysburg, and Custer earned for himself national renown and a reputation for daring and brilliance. As many a combat commander has discovered, however, the difference between daring and brilliance and recklessness and defeat can be a very thin one indeed.

In that summer of 1876, Custer and his 7th U.S. Cavalry regiment were ordered against the Sioux, led by Sitting Bull and Crazy Horse. Custer's spearheading unit was one of three converging columns ordered to return the Sioux (and their friends the Cheyenne) to reservations they had left in protest of the U.S. Government's inability to control gold-seeking white prospectors from entering Indian lands. Custer was ordered by his immediate superior, Brig. Gen. A.H. Terry, to rendezvous with Terry's force on 26 June for a coordinated attack. Instead, Custer attacked the vastly superior Indian force one day early, with fateful results.

What if Custer had survived the battle that day and had been brought to account for his actions which contravened the orders of General Terry? Was Custer's attack the result of his desire to gain immediate tactical advantage following loss of the element of surprise? Or, was his attack the result, as the prosecution in *The Court-Martial of George Armstrong Custer* charges, of Custer's "overriding ambition (to) precipitate a headlong engagement with a vastly superior enemy in order to defeat said enemy before other friendly forces could arrive to assist him?"

In his superbly written, historically based account, novelist Douglas C. Jones poses some interesting questions: To what extent are a commander's wrong battlefield decisions criminally neglectful? How does one sustain the burden of proving that disastrous actions stem from political ambitions or from a desire for personal glory? What is the measure of an "unwarranted loss of animals and men?" While perplexing, these questions can at least be resolved in a court of law. But should they, or should they more appropriately be resolved in another forum? The author has succeeded in illustrating the difficulty in obtaining convictions for even the most disastrous decisions made in the heat of battle, even those with seemingly blatant ulterior motives. By implication, Mr. Jones also refers to two areas of potential abuse in the military judicial system- "command influence" and military prosecutors who may not be truly independent of, and immune from, those with an interest in the case. Neither plays an important role in this novel, but the reader can judge the implications.

As an interesting reading experience, *The Court-Martial of George Armstrong Custer* is commended for students of battles as well as for students of the courtroom. Jones' novel also provides a valuable psychological insight as to what may have motivated Custer's

decision that unfortunate day on the Little Big Horn.

ROBERT C. BERKLEY
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Naval War College

Rhodes, Anthony. **Propaganda, The Art of Persuasion: World War II.** Edited by Victor Margolin. New York and London: Chelsea House. 319pp.

Psychological warfare, we are reminded by Daniel Lerner in his academic "Afterword" to this outsize volume, "is as old as Joshua's trumpets at the walls of Jericho." The present work attempts, for the period 1933-1945, a comprehensive overview of the craft in all its dimensions. The output of only the principal Allied and Axis adversaries is considered (Germany, Italy, Japan, Great Britain, the United States, and the Soviet Union), but the elements comprising that output are lavishly displayed: poster, leaflet, radio, film, and postage stamp.

In addition to Lerner's 8-page monograph on propaganda and psychological war which really should have been boosted up to "Foreword"—there is a 6-page discussion by William Murphy of the propaganda film, buttressed by an elaborate "filmography" of Axis and Allied documentary productions. The principal author, Anthony Rhodes—an English journalist, novelist, and travel writer supplies the main text, which in each chapter is paralleled by black-and-white illustrations and rounded out with a color section. One chapter is devoted to Resistance propaganda on the continent of Europe.

For so various a project the number of spelling and typographical errors is not obtrusive, but one howler must be shared here: The Marshall Islands of the western Pacific emerge (p. 259) as "the Martials!" A few of the caption or title translations suffer rites of passage. For example, the Nazi anti-Semitic theme of *der Ewige Jude* (p. 49), which should be translated as "The Wandering Jew," comes out literally as "the Eternal Jew." While the text several times assures us that Josef Goebbels, the German propaganda minister, was a genius at his work, the thesis is never analyzed. Indeed, the text as a whole, panoramic though it be and jampacked with names, will have little that is new to offer past students of the subject. The volume's index is grossly inadequate.

But such carpings pale in face of the overwhelming testimony of the illustrations themselves. Printed on first-class stock, every drawing is cleanly reproduced, and the color items are at times staggering. Considering the cost of artwork today, the book's price is not exorbitant. In sum, here is an opulent introduction to a very intriguing topic.

CURTIS CARROLL DAVIS

Rider, Hope S. **Valour Fore and Aft: Being the Adventures of the Continental Sloop Providence 1775-1779, Formerly Flagship Katy of Rhode Island's Navy.** Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1977. 259pp.

Mrs. Rider here traces the engrossing story of one small 12-gun sloop which enjoyed perhaps the most colorful career in the war at sea for American independence. Equally fascinating is the cast of characters who served as commanding officers of this inconspicuous trader turned man-of-war.

Owned by John Brown, merchant prince of Providence, *Katy* was chartered by the Rhode Island Government to protect the trade in Narragansett Bay shortly after open fighting erupted at Lexington and Concord. During the fall of 1775, the Colony purchased *Katy* "with her boats, stores and appurtenances" for $1,250.

Abraham Whipple, local and active revolutionary, commanded *Katy* in the Rhode Island Navy. It was Whipple who, in 1772, led the band of defiant

firebrands which boarded and burnt His Majesty's Revenue Cutter *Gaspee*.

Katy performed her first duty for the general welfare of the United Colonies as requested by General Washington. The Virginia planter and soldier, in the unfamiliar environs around Boston, suffered from an acute shortage of gunpowder. This condition would become chronic. At the General's behest, *Katy* was dispatched on a fruitless trip to Bermuda for powder.

The Continental Congress on 13 October 1775 made the initial move to form a national navy. Esek Hopkins, a Rhode Island mariner, was named Commander-in-Chief. *Katy* transported Hopkins and New England seamen to Philadelphia where the first Continental fleet was forming. Upon arrival in the Delaware, *Katy* was taken into Continental service and renamed *Providence* for the city from whence she came.

Abraham Whipple was transferred to the larger Continental ship *Columbus*, and John Hazard, still another Rhode Islander, assumed command of *Providence*. The sloop was a part of Hopkins' fleet in the successful amphibious assault on New Providence Island in the Bahamas. Shortly thereafter, Captain Hazard enjoyed the dubious distinction of being the first officer cashiered out of the Continental Navy. Command of *Providence* went to John Paul Jones—his first Navy command.

Jones, in *Providence*, cruised successfully against enemy shipping in northern seas before passing the helm to Captain Hoysteed Hacker. *Providence*, operating next in company with the *Alfred*, Jones' new command, captured a large British transport carrying a cargo of winter uniforms intended for General Burgoyne's army in Canada, but which instead were destined to warm Washington's ever-needy troops.

Next skipper to tread *Providence*'s quarterdeck was John Peck Rathbun, one of the most audacious officers to serve under the Continental colors. Rathbun sailed *Providence* back to the Bahamas, and with his lone sloop recaptured New Providence and that island's two forts. Commodore Hopkins earlier used a 6-ship fleet to carry out the same mission.

Early in 1779, Hoysteed Hacker returned for a second command tour on board *Providence* and, as it developed, he would be her last captain. Off Sandy Hook during May, Hacker after a sharp engagement took H.M. Brig *Diligent*—one of the few Royal Navy vessels to be captured during the course of the Revolution. *Providence* was now joined to the combined Continental Navy, Massachusetts Navy and privateer armada making up for the ill-starred Penobscot Expedition; certainly the war's greatest military fiasco.

Trapped in Maine's Penobscot Bay by the total ineptitude of the senior Continental naval officer present, Dudley Saltonstall, and by a British squadron under Adm. Sir George Collier, the American vessels fled in panic up the Penobscot River. There on the morning of 16 August 1779, *Providence* was put to the torch to avoid capture. Thus, on this dreary note ended the remarkable career of the "Lucky Sloop" which during 4 years of war had on more than one occasion painfully twisted the British lion's tail.

The author follows *Providence*'s history faithfully in interesting easy-to-read prose. Mrs. Rider is a native Rhode Islander, and the reader is soon aware of where her affections rest. In amassing "firsts" for sloop *Providence* and the author's fellow Rhode Islanders, some Rhode Island "firsts," such as at Machias, Maine, and those on Lake Champlain are overlooked. All local patriots are "bold" and "able," and British actions are "high-handed," and their view "distorted." A bit more familiarity with "navalese," the seaman's language, would have served Mrs. Rider well. Although source citations do not so indicate, the author makes

extensive use of the primary materials available in the already published volumes of the Navy Department's ongoing *Naval Documents of the American Revolution* series.

On balance, it is a book well worth reading. And, the Naval Institute Press is to be congratulated for producing a handsome volume which is an outstanding example of the bookmaking art.

WILLIAM JAMES MORGAN
Naval Historical Center

Simmons, Edwin H. **The United States Marines. The First Two Hundred Years 1775-1975.** New York: Viking Press, 1976. 342pp.

Brig. Gen. Edwin H. Simmons, U.S. Marine Corps (Retired) has written an excellent account of the first 200 years of the Marine Corps.

The objectivity of a marine writing about marines might be questioned and when the reviewer is also a marine one may well have cause to reflect on just how partisan this version of the Corps' history really is.

Skeptics with justifiable reservations and marines who pride themselves on their knowledge of the Corps might be surprised to learn that marines have commanded ships at sea in time of war. In the War of 1812, Marine Lt. John Marshall Gamble, from Capt. David Porter's 32-gun frigate *Essex*, was given command of the captured British privateer *Greenwich*. Lieutenant Gamble, with a prize crew of sailors and marines, then captured the biggest prize taken on the cruise, the 22-gun British frigate *Seringapatam*. Equally surprising is that hot-tempered, Irish-born Lt. Col. Anthony Gale, 4th Commandant of the Marine Corps, was dismissed from the service while in office by an Army General Court-Martial. Simmons tells us that among Gale's charges was ". . . being intoxicated in common dram shops and other places of low repute in the city of Washington." (Marines have always enjoyed a Washington liberty—one wonders what the other charges were.) Simmons further reports that "Gale pleaded not guilty by reason of temporary insanity, but the court found him guilty as charged. President Monroe approved the sentence which was dismissal from the service, and it was put into execution on 16 October 1820." Such frank commentary appears throughout Simmons' work. He reports accurately and lets the reader form his own opinions and impressions. Simmons comes forward with some very interesting and little-known historical facts. For example, at the Battle of New Orleans, 1814, Gen. Andrew Jackson's center was held by Maj. Daniel Cormick and 300 U.S. Marines. It was at Jackson's center that the British attacks were directed and repulsed with heavy British losses, including their commander General Packenham.

What Simmons has done is difficult at best. He has put together a very readable, accurate and unbiased history of the Marine Corps. He has reported facts and events on a subject normally given to exaggeration and perhaps a little fantasy. While there can be little argument that marines make good copy, the problem has always been where to draw the line or how much is enough? Simmons skillfully tells us just enough. He satisfies the casual reader and provokes the more serious.

The book is short, for the time span and events covered, but well organized and full of useful information. Simmons touches many bases in his narrative. For example, he identifies the literary contributions of such fine marines as Lawrence T. Stallings, *What Price Glory?*, and John W. Thomason, Jr., *Fix Bayonets!*, both classics of World War I. He tracks carefully but fairly the running battle of the Marine Corps' fight to survive as a service. It is all there. The early years are especially well done and the account is very informative. The

latter years of the Corps' history, while more familiar to us all, are less impressive. There is a passage on page 179 which discusses the landing on Saipan in the Marianas during World War II that incorrectly identifies the 2d Marine Division as landing on the right or south of the sugar-mill town of Charan Kanoa when, in fact, it was the 4th Marine Division. The 2d Division landed on the left or north of the town. In fairness, however, the familiarity we all have with the events of the recent past has colored somewhat our individual impressions.

Simmons' Acknowledgement and Short Bibliography sections, and the Battle Honors section are most interesting and provide useful information for the curious reader.

Even President Harry S. Truman whose "fondness" for marines is well documented on p. 238 would, I believe, concede that Simmons' history is a good one and a valuable addition to any professional library.

F.A. HART, JR.
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Naval War College

Thompson, W. Scott and Frizzell, Donaldson D. **The Lessons of Vietnam.** New York: Crane, Russak, 1977, 288pp.

A sensible, informed, sober discussion of the American involvement in Vietnam is all too rare. Many written commentaries have been inspired by outrage, or have given vent to frustration. As a result far too much of the literature on this recent, important and traumatic experience contains only a few nuggets of truth or flashes of insight. Too much of it falls into the category of pure bilge and hogwash, authors of which generally have little competence to analyze and to evaluate their subject matter. Certainly they had no responsibility for implementing the U.S. involvement.

We should be grateful to Professor Thompson and to Air Force Colonel Frizzell for providing this relatively short, but serious discussion of what happened in Vietnam. Based on a conference held at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy in the spring of 1974, the papers presented and the comments from the delegates have been edited and arranged in a logical, coherent fashion which elucidates the issues to permit their serious examination. In this way one can see clearly both strengths and weaknesses.

It was indeed a remarkable conference. In addition to distinguished members of the academic community, the 31 participants included several senior former officials: Adm. Elmo Zumwalt, Gen. William Westmoreland, Maj. Gen. Edward Lansdale, Ambassadors Henry Cabot Lodge and Robert Komer, and the Honorable Paul Nitze. Although much of what these participants said is a restatement of previously held positions and at times seems to be a justification of them, it is still valuable as a starting point for further study and analysis.

The sensible organization, excellent editing and helpful comments by the editors directly raise important issues and show quite clearly where equally important issues were ignored. For example, Clausewitz told us that the "... first, grandest and most decisive act of judgment which the Statesman and the General exercises is rightly to understand" the kind of war they are engaging in. Stephen Young, who worked with AID and CORD, pointed out that the Vietnam War was an extension of Vietnamese politics. He noted that while this elemental fact was often expressed, it was seldom used to determine policy and to shape programs. This is a serious accusation which requires further study.

There was a general consensus that national objectives in Vietnam were both ill-defined (General Keegan) and

negatively stated (Thompson and Frizzell). General Lansdale offered that U.S. leaders made no true political use of American military power. Gen. S.L.A. Marshall pointed out that insufficient force was used to achieve military objectives, a not very subtle point which has frequently been missed by critics and unqualified commentators.

Sir Robert Thompson noted that before Tet 1968 the war was a kind of perpetual motion in which the NVA and the U.S./ARVN forces could have gone on indefinitely, provided the Americans were prepared to do so, because of the failure to attack the VC/NVA rear bases. To him one of America's "truly effective acts" was the incursion into Cambodia in 1970, because it not only closed the port of Kompong Som, but it also showed the enemy that Cambodia was no longer off limits to our side. Sir Robert emphasized that the U.S. objective should have been to attack the enemy's logistics, rather than to defeat his main forces. Interestingly enough, in the same exchange, Ambassador Komer used the analogy of submarines threatening convoys, when he said, "What we never had in this war were submarines on the ground . . . (which) would really have tied the enemy up. It is those 12-man squads capable of moving in those mountain ranges that would have performed like submarines."

The theme of the importance of logistics runs throughout the discussions. Yet it is never adequately addressed, even when Sir Robert Thompson tells of how he was in Washington at the time of the Cambodia incursion and told Henry Kissinger that this act had gained for us at least 1 and maybe 2 years. He quotes Kissinger as saying, "Everyone in the Pentagon, State Department and CIA is telling me it has only gained us three months." To which Sir Robert replied, "That is not possible. Some of this stuff is coming from Europe on Russian and other ships: they cannot possibly in that time frame do a switch of supplies and beef up the Ho Chi Minh Trail to put all that stuff down the Trail within a matter of just 3 months."

The effect of logistics on the war is largely an unexplored area, despite the report of the Joint Logistics Review Board. It is significant that by skirting and rarely addressing this point the conference participants—both academics and officials—show a serious lacunae in our general understanding of this particular war and in a larger sense in what thoughtful, responsible individuals think is important in order to understand war.

The making of day-to-day tactical decisions by civilians in Washington at least during the Rolling Thunder campaign was an understandably irksome fact of life for many senior officers in the chain of command who were bypassed. Colonel Frizzell quite properly discusses command/control arrangements. Inexplicably he refers to a "new management concept" which delegated to senior officers in the field the authority to make important day-to-day decisions. The use of the phrase "new management concept" is not only unfortunate, it is wrong. Colonel Frizzell is referring to a restoration of the integrity of the chain of command, and of command itself, in which decisions are made at the appropriate levels, subject, of course, to guidance from higher authority.

If our experience in Vietnam has demonstrated anything, it is that the President and the Secretary of Defense are unable over a long period to make day-to-day tactical decisions. Their province is policy guidance; determination of the desired effect of the tactical actions they initiate; and overall responsibility for the direction of the war. Subordinate officers in the chain of command should make tactical decisions, if only because they are closer to the scene and they do not have the additional burdens of the highest offices.

Robert Pfaltzgraff's summary is a concise and masterful statement of the "lessons learned":

- "The need for a more comprehensive understanding of the relationship between military power and the development of an adequate indigenous political base."
- "The need to understand the close relationship between domestic politics and foreign policy."
- "The existence of gaps in historical experience and culture requires a broadly based understanding of the country in which military operations are conducted. . . ."
- "The need for a more accurate assessment of the military requirements for effective conduct of operations."
- The need to analyze goals and objectives more carefully.
- The need to establish workable and appropriate command/control relationships in an age of instantaneous communications and the possibility of nuclear conflict.

The great danger of our unpleasant and largely unsuccessful involvement in Vietnam is that we—both civilians and military—will put it behind us and ignore it. We will do this at our peril. Serious, concentrated study is required. To be productive and valuable, this should be free from rancor and emotion. Happily, a significant and important start has been made in this direction.

B.M. SIMPSON III
Lieutenant Commander, U.S. Navy

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Doris Baginski and Mary Ann Varoutsos

Aumann, R.J. and Shapley, L.S. **Values of Non-Atomic Games.** Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1974. 333pp. $16.00

"Non-atomic games" is a term used for mass games that are mathematically represented by utilizing a continuum of players. This highly scientific volume is concerned with the development of a value theory for such games, concentrating on the processes of coalition-forming and payoff distribution. The text consists of mathematical propositions and formulae.

Barraclough, Geoffrey. **The Crucible of Europe; the Ninth and Tenth Centuries in European History.** Berkeley: University of California Press, 1976. 180pp. $14.95

The Carolingian Empire, which arose after the fall of Rome, while it had serious systemic flaws that made its rapid demise inevitable, still laid the governmental and institutional bases for the subsequent states of France, Germany, and Italy. These three nations are treated, and there is a chapter on the strong fundamental Anglo-Saxon achievement in England—a contrast to the ephemeral establishments of the successors to the Carolingian Empire.

Beard, Edmund. **Developing the ICBM; a Study in Bureaucratic Politics.** New York: Columbia University Press, 1976. 273pp. $15.00
The 1957 Soviet launching of Sputnik, with its military potential, took the United States by surprise. How far had America advanced in this area? Here the author presents the results of his search to discover American action in this field prior to 1954, revealing the divisions, inflexibilities, and interservice rivalry that influenced and inhibited the progress of the ICBM development.

Boardman, Robert. **Britain and the People's Republic of China, 1949-1974.** New York: Barnes & Noble, 1976, 210pp. $23.50
Rather than giving a comprehensive account, the author develops his study from a selection of periods and episodes of British policy toward the People's Republic of China. The years from 1949-1955 are given special emphasis.

Brown, Seyom. **New Forces in World Politics.** Washington: Brookings Institution, 1974. 224pp. $7.95; paper $3.95
The author sees both the cold war coalitions and the nation-state system being simultaneously undermined, the thawing of the first releasing social demands and movements challenging the second. The underlying causes of existing global political instabilities are studied, and speculations are offered on potentials for changing the political and institutional prospect: world statesmanship may choose between reducing or extending societies' dependency on each other. Brown submits U.S. policy initiatives for promoting internationalism to produce "a peaceful transformation of world politics into a just and uncoercive system of world order."

Camps, Miriam. **The Management of Interdependence; a Preliminary View.** New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1974. 104pp. paper $3.95
This fourth publication in the series of Council Papers on International Affairs offers some provocative suggestions as to the type of international system that should be sought and established in the immediate future. The management of knotty problems involved in effecting successful relationships among nations and transnational activities will require drastic reforms in institutional infrastructure, in attitude, and in policies.

Carbaugh, Robert J. and Fan, Liang-shing. **The International Monetary System.** Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1976. 168pp. $12.00
This comprehensive account of the structure and nature of the present international payment system includes a study of past monetary systems and analyses of possible reforms and alternatives to the present system.

Carroll, John M. **Confidential Information Sources: Public & Private.** Los Angeles: Security World Publishing Co., 1975. 335pp. $14.95
In almost every aspect of life today it seems necessary to establish security and identity—largely through the medium of records. How to obtain such information from a broad spectrum of sources ranging from credit cards, medical and educational records, motor vehicle and government records, up to even Interpol in law enforcement systems, is the subject of this study.

Clough, Ralph N. **East Asia and U.S. Security.** Washington: Brookings Institution, 1975. 248pp. $8.95; paper $3.50
Reconsidering U.S. interests in the Far East, the author stresses the importance of relations with Japan in future American East Asian policy and addresses the prospects of stabilizing the balance of power among the United States, Japan, China, and the Soviet Union. It is recommended that the United States concentrate on dealing with Northeast Asia and keep free of entanglements in the less relevant problems of Southeast Asian countries.

Ellis, John A. **A Short History of Guerrilla Warfare.** New York: St. Martin's Press, 1976. 220pp. $8.95
Analyzes guerrilla theory and practice from ancient times to the present, using both military and political perspectives. A bibliography and a chronology of notable guerrilla wars are appended.

Engel, Peter H. **The Overachievers.** New York: Dial Press, 1976. 210pp. $8.95
An examination of the nature and behavior patterns of that particular breed of businessman—the overachiever—whose drive is essential to effect the changes vital to the movement of industry, which in turn moves the world.

Farwell, Byron. **The Great Anglo-Boer War.** New York: Harper & Row, 1976. 495pp. $16.95
A social rather than military history of the Boer War, this very readable account focuses on its human aspects: the prisoners of war, the field hospitals, the concentration camps, and the attitudes which shaped the behavior of the combatants on each side.

Fox, J. Ronald. **Arming America.** Boston: Harvard University Press, 1974. 484pp. $15.00
This is probably the most comprehensive book yet written about how the United States buys weapons. It begins with the initiation of an idea for a weapon system and follows the process through congressional authorization, appropriation, defense marketing, source selection, contracting, program management, and program control. It is a book about what actually happens from beginning to end in the development and production of major weapons systems sponsored by the Federal Government. The book deals with a multitude of problems extending well beyond the subject of acquiring weapons, such as problems of lack of congressional capability in dealing with multibillion dollar defense programs; problems of civilian vs. military control of defense activities; and problems of lack of qualified personnel within the Defense Department.

Friesen, Connie M. **The Political Economy of East-West Trade.** New York: Praeger, 1976. 203pp. $18.50
Composed of ideological, economic, military, and political elements, détente is a policy which hopes to provide a restructuring of East-West relations. This analysis focuses on the political and economic aspects of détente in the area of trade.

Grantham, Dewey W. **The United States since 1945: the Ordeal of Power.** New York: McGraw-Hill, 1976. 298pp. paper $6.95
Professor Grantham attempts to clarify and give some order to the unprecedented problems in the areas of foreign relations, politics, and economics, with their attendant shattering social and cultural consequences, that made the years since 1945 one of the most cataclysmic periods in U.S. history.

Hatch, John. **Two African Statesmen: Kaunda of Zambia and Nyerere of Tanzania.** Chicago: Regenery, 1976. 268pp. $15.00
A biographical comparison of two exemplary African leaders who have devoted their lives to putting into practice the principle of racial equality in their respective countries.

Hazan, Baruch A. **Soviet Propaganda; a Case Study of the Middle East Conflict.** New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Books, 1976. 293pp. $12.95
An analysis of the motivation, methods, media, themes, and techniques of Soviet propaganda, studying especially how it is applied toward the State of Israel and the contest in the Middle East in order to implement the Soviet objectives in the area.

Hoehling, Adolph A. **Thunder at Hampton Roads.** Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1976, 232pp. $9.95
The author relies heavily upon letters and diaries of the men who were involved with the U.S.S. *Monitor*, and so provides a lively chronicle from her construction to confrontation with the Confederate ironclad *Merrimack*, sinking off the coast of Cape Hatteras, and discovery over 100 years later.

Hunt, William R. **Arctic Passage.** New York: Scribner, 1975. 395pp. $12.95
This history of the Bering Sea from 1697 to 1975 reports on the color and romance of that region's explorers, ancient Indian peoples, incredible natural beauty, and the mysteries of the land bridge which once connected Asia and North America.

Isaak, Robert A. **Individuals and World Politics.** North Scituate, Mass.: Duxbury Press, 1975. 322pp. $8.95; paper $6.95
In discussing the basic principles and theories of international relations, the author uses the experiences of world leaders such as Gandhi, Hitler, and Kissinger to provide a human focus.

Kanroji, Osanaga. **Hirohito: an Intimate Portrait of the Japanese Emperor.** Los Angeles: Gateway Publishers, 1975. 167pp. $8.95
Identified as "imperial attendant for seventy years," 96-year-old Court Chamberlain Kanroji offers his personal observations on the actions, nature, and character of Emperor Hirohito. Following the Japanese tradition for those in his position, the author avoids expressing any political or military opinions; consequently the book is almost purely complimentary reminiscences about the Emperor.

Lebow, Richard N. **White Britain and Black Ireland: the Influence of Stereotypes on Colonial Policy.** Philadelphia: Institute for the Study of Human Issues, 1976. 152pp. $10.95

An analysis of the nature of prejudice, and how it found fertile ground in Britain during a time of social and political transition, is developed in the study of the Irish colonial experience during the first half of the 19th century.

Macksey, Kenneth. **Guderian, Creator of the Blitzkrieg.** New York: Stein and Day, 1975. 226pp. $12.50

A former tank major, Macksey has a professional approach to the subject of Heinz Guderian's formation and employment of the German panzer divisions that were so effective in World War II. He presents an understanding, evaluative portrayal of the German Chief of Staff, who was a controversial nonconformist, personifying the Prussian spirit of patriotism, military duty, and honor, but still evincing human emotions and compassion.

Mason, Herbert M., Jr. **The United States Air Force: a Turbulent History.** New York: Mason/Charter, 1976. 284pp. $12.95

This account, written by the former aviation editor of *True*, concentrates on the Air Force's contributions to the century's major conflicts as it traces the history of the Air Force from its earliest days as a tiny branch of the Army Signal Corps to the present.

Medvedev, Roy A. Medvedev, Zhores A. **Khrushchev; the Years in Power.** New York: Columbia University Press, 1976. 198pp. $8.95

The two erudite dissident Russian brothers who began this book in 1963 met with such obstructions from the Soviet state that it was not completed until 1976. It follows Khrushchev from his early prudent successful agricultural reforms through his skillful climb to power after Stalin's death to his fall as a result of his reckless domestic policies subsequent to 1964. The reader is made to sense the climate of Khrushchev's era as it was experienced by the Soviet people.

Montagu, Ashley. **The Nature of Human Aggression.** New York: Oxford University Press, 1976. 381pp. $9.95

A prominent anthropologist and social biologist concludes that aggression is not instinctive in man or any other animal. He states that "behavior is the interaction between genetic tendencies and environmental influences" and that "no one becomes aggressive or hostile without learning to do so." What man should learn to cultivate is cooperation; it was highly developed in primitive peoples who were remarkable for their humanity and peacefulness.

Pandey, Bishwa N. **Nehru.** New York: Stein and Day, 1976. 499pp. $12.50

Covering the years 1889 to 1964, this biography focuses on Nehru's political achievements and such major influences on his career as his family, his friendship with Gandhi, and the nationalist movement.

Preston, Paul, ed. **Spain in Crisis: the Evolution and Decline of the Franco Regime.** New York: Barnes & Noble, 1976. 341pp. $18.00

This collection of monographs traces the background and policies of the Franco regime and the political, social, and economic factors which contributed to its decline.

Naval War College Review, Vol. 30 [1977], No. 3, Art. 27

Quade, E.S. **Analysis for Public Decisions.** New York: American Elsevier, 1975. 322pp. $17.95

A timely, important book for all involved in the formulation and implementation of policy decisions in the public sector. This work demonstrates that analytic help for public policy decisions is not confined to questions that can be quantified. It is a very practical book which recognizes the place of political realities, considered judgment, and intuition in formulating public decisions.

Rubenstein, Moshe F. **Patterns of Problem Solving.** New Jersey: Prentice Hall, Inc., 1975. 544pp. $15.95

Highly interesting treatment of the process of problem solving in complex and uncertain environments. Very readable with low level of mathematical rigor.

Schneider, Stephen H. **The Genesis Strategy: Climate and Global Survival.** New York: Plenum Press, 1976. 419pp. $14.95

The author recommends for contemporary application the advice that Joseph gave to Pharaoh to store part of the rich harvests from the 7 years of plenty to provide for the ensuing 7 years of famine. His knowledgeable discussion of the problems of climate, its control, and its politics; of technological advances and their effects; of population growth; of the North American grain drain; and of the politics of food is followed by his suggestions for a solution to the world predicament, employing the Genesis strategy concept.

Smith, Page. **Jefferson: A Revealing Biography.** New York: McGraw-Hill, 1976, 310pp. $12.50

Letters and diaries of Thomas Jefferson and his family and friends, as well as some modern psychological theorizing, are used extensively in this biography which focuses on his personal life and relationships.

Solzhenitsyn, Aleksandr, et al. **Détente.** New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Books, 1976. 112pp. $5.95

In the first two essays of this collection, Solzhenitsyn warns America of the dangers of détente and the nature of communism. These are followed by a commentary consisting of seven essays by various contributors.

Stern, Joseph P. **Hitler: The Führer and the People.** Berkeley: University of California Press, 1975. 254pp. paper $3.65

The author explores Hitler's use of language and imagery to touch upon deep chords within the German culture and so exert his phenomenal power over the German people.

Theobald, Robert. **Beyond Despair: Directions for America's Third Century.** Washington: New Republic Book Co., 1976. 169pp. $8.95

The ability to provide effective communications and the distribution of knowledge are considered especially important in this analysis of the changes which must take place in democratic institutions for democratic societies to survive as they move from an industrial to a postindustrial era.

Tugwell, Maurice. **Arnhem; a Case Study.** London: Thornton Cox, 1975. 60pp. £2.50
Tugwell presents a succinct account of the only airborne attack attempted by the Allies during World War II, complete with the order of battle, maps, and illustrations. The author also analyzes Arnhem in view of the requirements and uses of airborne warfare.

Vital, David. **The Origins of Zionism.** London: Oxford University Press, 1975. 396pp. $22.00
Traces the history of the Zionist movement from its obscure beginnings in Russia and Eastern Europe during the early 1880's through 1897, the year of the First Zionist Congress. Four men play pivotal roles in the narrative: Lilienbaum, Pinsker, Herzl, and Ahad Ha'am.

Von Braun, Wernher and Ordway, Fred I., III. **The Rockets' Red Glare.** Garden City, N.Y.: Anchor Press, 1976. 212pp. $9.95
A concise, illustrated history of rocketry written in nontechnical language by two well-known leaders in the field.

Walters, Robert E. **Sea Power and the Nuclear Fallacy.** New York: Holmes & Meier, 1975. 215pp. $10.95
The author uses geopolitical studies to develop two themes within this book: the nuclear arms policies of the Western nations have been based upon outdated and incorrect strategic concepts; and the world's oceans are growing in military and economic importance.

Ware, Mitchell. **Operational Handbook for Narcotic Law Enforcement Officers.** Springfield, Ill.: Thomas, 1975, 115pp. $12.50
A step-by-step presentation of the practical procedures and methods needed for the successful enforcement of narcotic laws. All of the concepts expressed here have been tested and evaluated in the field.

Watson, Francis M. **Political Terrorism: the Threat and the Response.** Washington: Luce, 1976. 248pp. $10.00
Terrorism is a group effort employed as a coercive means, excluding any discussion and using propaganda and psychological impact to accumulate the power to effect political change of some kind. This compelling investigation of terrorist activity around the world cites a broad spectrum of cases ranging from the recognized nationalist liberation movements to such enigmatic examples as the Manson Family and the Patty Hearst kidnapping. Watson identifies the four points in the sequence of terrorist strategy and proposes a nationally cooperative, coordinated counterstrategy for breaking this cycle.

Weglyn, Michi N. **Years of Infamy: the Untold Story of America's Concentration Camps.** New York: Morrow, 1976, 351pp. $10.95
The author, a former teenage internee herself, has written a balanced account of the wartime imprisonment of Japanese-Americans, fully documented with primary source material.

Weinstein, Franklin B. **Indonesian Foreign Policy and the Dilemma of Dependence: from Sukarno to Soeharto.** Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1976. 384pp. $17.50

First in the series of *Politics and International Relations of Southeast Asia*, this volume examines how Indonesia has sought to acquire necessary outside resources without compromising her independence.

Williams, John. **The Guns of Dakar: September 1940.** London: Heinemann, 1976. 201pp. £4.50

Operation Menace was the de Gaulle-inspired and Churchill-supported amphibious effort by combined British and Free French forces to take the Vichy-held base at Dakar in Senegal. Its failure demonstrated the consequences of attempting to launch an offensive with inadequate preparation and reliance on a false supposition: that the French forces in Dakar would welcome de Gaulle.

Wolfe, Thomas W. **The SALT Experience: Its Impact on U.S. and Soviet Strategic Policy and Decisionmaking.** Santa Monica, Calif.: Rand, 1976. 248pp. paper $7.00

This analysis of the complexities implicit in negotiations between two nations with different technological and strategic goals also explores the mutually supportive relationship which exists between the SALT talks and the policies of détente.